From Jihadist to Statesman?

Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa, once the face of Syria’s insurgency, is being recast as a geopolitical linchpin by Trump, Europe and even the Gulf.

In a region notorious for shifting alliances and smouldering ruins, few transformations of late have been as audacious (or as expedient) as that of Syria’s president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, hitherto known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. A decade ago, he was the poster boy of Syria’s jihadist rebellion. Today, he is welcomed by the Arab League, feted in Paris by Macron, and embraced by Donald Trump. Once the commander of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian franchise, al-Sharaa now projects himself as a nationalist reformer, eager to stitch Syria back into the regional fabric.

The fact that the world is even entertaining this volte-face is testament to the collapse of old certainties in the shape-shifting realm of today’s geopolitics. With Bashar al-Assad’s power gutted by 14 years of war, and with Iran’s influence eroded by Israeli strikes, Gulf monarchies and Western powers alike have opted for a pragmatic reset.

This rebranding has unfolded with theatrical efficiency. Last month, al-Sharaa met Donald Trump in Riyadh, an encounter that sent ripples across capitals from Tel Aviv to Ankara. The message in that meeting, orchestrated by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was that the Arab world’s most notorious former jihadist was now emerging as a figure worth courting. Syria’s Arab League membership was promptly restored while Trump lifted sanctions, to the consternation of many in the West. France and the European Union queued up to dangle investment carrots before Syria. Even China has begun to ink infrastructure MoUs.

Even Israel began to exhibit something like rapprochement, signalling it would tolerate al-Sharaa’s ascendancy so long as he kept Iranian militias out and maintains quiet on the Golan Heights.

Meanwhile, Al-Sharaa’s message to the West has been one of sober realism. Gone is the language of jihad and revolution. In its place is a blueprint of “zero problems with neighbours,” neoliberal reconstruction, and an invitation to join Syria’s economic resurrection. His government thus far has made all the right noises with promises to neutralise chemical stockpiles, eliminate foreign jihadists, sideline Palestinian militants and even prosecute the perpetrators of sectarian killings. These gestures helped secure the support of Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi, thus unlocking a historic accord that integrates the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces into the state.

Syria under al-Sharaa is being packaged as the next success story of the Abraham Accords. This perfectly suits Trump, who has been almost desperately eager to burnish his Middle East credentials. Trump has privately warned Israel that continued escalation in Gaza could rupture the budding Arab-Israeli détente. Meanwhile, he has gently nudged Ankara and Tel Aviv to resolve their Syria disputes through back-channel talks.

To the Gulf states, al-Sharaa is a case study in political Islam 2.0. Whereas the revolutionary model backed by Turkey and Qatar favouring Muslim Brotherhood-aligned movements has proved destabilising, the Syrian president’s post-jihadist conservatism appears more palatable. It may not be ‘liberal’ in the classic sense of the word, but it is disciplined. It promises order, not upheaval. For Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis, this is enough. In the calculus of power, non-Brotherhood Islamism is an acceptable bulwark against both Iranian expansionism and renewed chaos.

Still, risks abound. The blood on Sharaa’s past is not so easily washed away. His links to al-Qaeda and later Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) may no longer be actionable, but they remain disquieting. The massacre of over 1,300 Alawites in March this year nearly torpedoed his international rehabilitation. That he weathered the storm owed much to political timing and to the weariness of foreign powers with Syria’s endless fragmentation. The West no longer demands a democratic transition in Damascus but merely seeks a manageable partner.

It appears that is exactly what al-Sharaa aspires to be. It remains to be seen whether he can consolidate power, placate former enemies and keep foreign actors at bay. After all, Syria’s mosaic of sects and militias is not easily ruled. Yet in this moment, with the West Asian world craving stability, Ahmed al-Sharaa is being recast not as the ghost of Syria’s jihadist past, but as a symbol of its post-Assad pragmatism.

Al-Sharaa walks a tightrope, balancing Western expectations, Gulf patronage, Kurdish integration and domestic legitimacy. He must rebuild a state with gutted institutions while placating warlords and regional satraps who remain sceptical of his authority.

For now, the gamble continues.