India and Bangladesh: A Tango Gone Awry

An unelected regime, rising fundamentalism and great-power meddling have pushed India-Bangladesh ties to their coldest point in decades.

Foreign policy is rarely forged in the chancelleries alone. It rests on sturdier foundations: a government’s legitimacy, public consent and a coherent sense of economic and military purpose. When those pillars weaken, diplomacy becomes reactive and neighbours feel the tremors. Bangladesh today offers a cautionary tale. Its interim administration headed by Muhammad Yunus appears to be presiding over not a transition but a painful unravelling.

That diagnosis is no longer whispered only by critics abroad. At a recent dialogue hosted by a prominent think tank, Brigadier (ret.) Sakhawat Hossain, an adviser to the interim government, conceded that core state structures had “collapsed” and that the prospects for credible general elections were uncertain. Other analysts have been blunter still: with key political forces excluded from the electoral process, any vote risks lacking the minimum conditions of fairness and inclusion. Bangladesh, long praised for defying the pessimists, now looks perilously close to confirming them.

Hardline Drift

The interim government has tied itself in knots of its own making. It enjoys tentative backing from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), but that support has frayed since the death of Begum Khaleda Zia, the party’s matriarch and last unifying figure. To compensate, the administration has edged closer to an assortment of religious and hardline groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami, the transnational Hizb ut-Tahrir and the clerical network Hefazat-e-Islam among them. At the same time, it has flirted with the creation of a so-called ‘King’s Party’ - a pro-government outfit drawing on select leaders from the student movement and aligning itself with ideological hardliners. The result has been a predictable resurgence of fundamentalism, a shrinking political centre and mounting instability.

Nowhere have the consequences been starker than in Bangladesh’s relations with India. Ties that once appeared resilient and anchored in trade and quiet security cooperation have chilled to a degree unseen in years. Attacks on minorities, particularly Hindus and Hindu temples, have risen sharply. India’s consular presence has faced threats. New Delhi accuses Dhaka of sheltering separatist elements linked to violence in Assam, Tripura and elsewhere in India’s northeast. Illegal migration across the porous border has surged, fuelling economic and security anxieties south of the frontier. Meanwhile Bangladesh’s growing warmth towards China, Pakistan and Türkiye has set off alarm bells in New Delhi.

The atmosphere darkened further with the killing of Sharif Osman Hadi, a recognisable face of Bangladesh’s agitation politics, shortly after the announcement of election timelines. Responsibility was swiftly pinned on India, though no credible evidence was produced. What followed was a wave of violence targeting political opponents, minorities, journalists and even diplomatic missions. Islamist networks seized on Hadis’s death as a rallying cry.

India, for its part, has its own grievances. It is uneasy with the interim government’s apparent susceptibility to fundamentalist pressure and the steady drumbeat of anti-India rhetoric. Dhaka, meanwhile, bristles at India’s decision to offer refuge to Sheikh Hasina and at her occasional interventions from exile. It has also taken umbrage at New Delhi’s criticism of moves to ban the Awami League and its defence of Hasina’s right to free expression. Such disputes are hardly unprecedented in South Asia. What is striking is how rapidly they have corroded the relationship.

Foreign Meddling

Why has the slide been so steep? One answer lies beyond the subcontinent. Many in New Delhi see the imprint of American diplomacy in the fall of Sheikh Hasina and the elevation of Yunus, long viewed in India as sceptical at best and hostile at worst. The chief adviser himself has lent fuel to such suspicions, describing the change of government as “an amazing, meticulous design” - not merely a spontaneous student uprising but the product of careful planning. Whether or not that reading is shared in Washington, its consequences are visible enough: a Bangladesh that seems increasingly comfortable defining itself in opposition to India, even as its own economic momentum falters and political stability ebbs.

The rise of fundamentalism has further dimmed the prospects of a free and fair election that might restore a more balanced foreign policy. An India-friendly government, once assumed to be a plausible outcome of any transition, now looks a distant hope. Instead, New Delhi faces a neighbour that is politically fragile, administratively fractured and ideologically polarised.

Pakistan, with its long experience of proxy mobilisation, will be tempted to encourage Jamaat-e-Islami’s resurgence and exploit Bangladesh’s governance paralysis. China, for now content with transactional economic ties, is poised to deepen its leverage as Dhaka grows more dependent on foreign funding. Both trends threaten to narrow India’s strategic room for manoeuvre in its eastern neighbourhood.

What, then, is to be done? The era of easy assumptions about India–Bangladesh amity is over. New Delhi must accept that the familiar tango built on incremental trust and quiet accommodation may no longer be viable. Instead, it should focus on insulating itself from emerging economic and security risks: tightening border management, diversifying supply chains and engaging Bangladeshi society beyond the current ruling circle. Moral clarity, though unfashionable in geopolitics, will matter too. As Eleanor Roosevelt once observed, doing what feels right rarely spares one from criticism. But in a region where hesitation invites mischief, resolve may yet prove the safer course.

(The author is a retired naval aviation officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)