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21 August 2024 at 3:50:16 pm

Arid State

Maharashtra has finally put an official number on a crisis that farmers have been experiencing for weeks. The state government has declared 265 of its 358 talukas drought-affected, activating the first stage of its drought-management framework. The scale of the distress should make this more than another seasonal relief exercise. It is a reminder that water stress is no longer an episodic crisis but a recurring governance challenge. The state received 798.2 mm of rain against a normal 970.9...

Arid State

Maharashtra has finally put an official number on a crisis that farmers have been experiencing for weeks. The state government has declared 265 of its 358 talukas drought-affected, activating the first stage of its drought-management framework. The scale of the distress should make this more than another seasonal relief exercise. It is a reminder that water stress is no longer an episodic crisis but a recurring governance challenge. The state received 798.2 mm of rain against a normal 970.9 mm between June 1 and September 26, a deficit of 18 percent. The first drought trigger is activated when rainfall falls more than 25 percent below normal and is accompanied by a prolonged dry spell of 21 days. Though the aggregate state deficit is lower than that threshold, the taluka-level assessment has established the conditions required for intervention. Except for five districts, rainfall has been deficient across the state. The government has ordered a stay on the recovery of agriculture-related loans and restructuring of crop loans, while extending concessions on electricity bills for agricultural pumps. Employment Guarantee Scheme norms are to be relaxed; food grains provided to farmers and arrangements made for drinking water and fodder. Crop-loss surveys will determine the eventual financial assistance. While these measures can cushion the shock, they cannot solve the problem. Maharashtra has lived with drought long enough for drought relief to have become an administrative routine. The more difficult question is why the state repeatedly finds itself having to mobilise the same machinery. Tankers, fodder camps, loan restructuring and employment guarantees are indispensable when the rains fail. But they are essentially the politics and economics of response, not resilience. The state has considerable experience in watershed development, farm ponds, check dams, groundwater recharge and other forms of water conservation. Yet the effectiveness of such interventions depends less on announcing them than on where they are built, whether they are maintained and whether groundwater extraction is regulated. Large-scale water-conservation works announced as part of the present relief package must therefore be judged by measurable outcomes rather than expenditure. There is a larger agricultural question. A state with highly variable rainfall cannot indefinitely expand water-intensive cropping patterns in regions whose hydrology cannot support them. Crop choices, irrigation efficiency and groundwater management have to become part of drought policy rather than being treated as separate subjects. The present declaration should consequently be viewed as both relief and warning. While the relief is urgent, the warning is structural. The state government cannot control the monsoon but it can decide how much water it captures when the rains arrive, how efficiently it uses what it stores and how resilient its farmers are when the skies fail. A drought code can declare an emergency. But only sustained water management can prevent the emergency from becoming routine.

India’s Dilemma: The Specter of a Three-and-a-Half-Front War

Writer: Commodore S.L. Deshmukh
Commodore S.L. Deshmukh
Jan 1, 2025
4 min read

Updated: Jan 2, 2025

In the first of a two-part series, we examine India’s growing security challenges, both internal and external, and the strategic steps needed to navigate these complexities

India’s Dilemma

The world is a powder keg. Unrest in Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, and across the Middle East coincides with the protracted war between Russia and Ukraine. These crises ripple across borders, leaving no country untouched. For India, the stakes are particularly high. In Asia, tensions with Bangladesh and Pakistan, coupled with an unresolved standoff with China, exacerbate an already precarious security environment. Adding fuel to the fire, domestic challenges further intensify the risks, raising the alarming possibility of what strategists dub a “three-and-a-half-front war.”


India’s geographical location offers both an advantage and a disadvantage. Strategically positioned as a hub for global logistics, the country is critical to ensuring regional stability. Yet, its proximity to two longstanding adversaries—China and Pakistan—complicates matters. Bangladesh, with its shifting allegiances, has added a new dimension to this calculus. The volatile domestic situation, marked by communal and political unrest, completes the trifecta, with internal challenges forming the “half front” in this ominous scenario.


Indo-China relations have long tested India’s diplomatic mettle. For decades, China has pursued a strategy to keep India on edge, using a mix of psychological and military provocations. Rooted in its desire to avenge the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ China’s worldview is deeply shaped by a need to dominate its regional neighbours.


India’s rapid ascent on the global stage poses a direct challenge to China’s ambitions of regional and global supremacy. Beijing views New Delhi’s rising stature with unease, particularly its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, its robust infrastructure along contested borders and its leadership in multilateral forums like the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD). The refusal to join initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has further strained ties.


The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, a tragic flashpoint in Indo-China relations, epitomized China’s aggressive designs. Beijing’s displeasure with India’s border infrastructure development and its closer ties with Western allies has only fuelled its belligerence. Militarily, China holds the upper hand, leveraging its advanced arsenal against India’s aging defence systems. This disparity emboldens Beijing to test India’s resolve repeatedly, creating a perpetual state of tension.


Beyond its direct provocations, China’s deepening ties with South Asia complicate India’s security calculus. Bangladesh, once a trusted ally, now edges closer to Beijing. Economic investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, strategic military partnerships, and increased political engagement hint at a significant shift in Dhaka’s priorities. While India continues to invest in its ties with Bangladesh, the growing influence of China in the region presents challenges that are impossible to ignore.


Since Partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have shared an acrimonious relationship. Pakistan’s grievances, from the creation of Bangladesh to its inability to annex Kashmir, have defined its hostile posture toward India. While India’s economic growth and diplomatic successes have widened the gulf, Pakistan continues to rely on asymmetric warfare through state-sponsored terrorism.


India has responded firmly with cross-LoC strikes and diplomatic efforts like pushing Pakistan onto the FATF grey list. However, Islamabad’s deepening ties with Beijing, including advanced weapon supplies, have strengthened its military, forging a troubling China-Pakistan nexus. This partnership, with potential strategic collaboration in Siachen and Ladakh, poses a serious challenge to India, raising concerns of a coordinated assault from both adversaries.


Bangladesh, once a close ally, now emerges as a wildcard in India’s security landscape. While the two countries share historical ties rooted in India’s role during Bangladesh’s liberation, recent developments suggest a drift. Dhaka’s growing economic partnership with Beijing and its reluctance to fully endorse India’s regional leadership underscore this shift.


China’s significant investments in Bangladesh’s infrastructure, ranging from ports to power plants, mirror its strategy in other South Asian countries. For India, this growing influence represents not just an economic challenge but a strategic one. The possibility of Bangladesh aligning with China in regional disputes adds another layer to India’s external threats.


The Domestic ‘Half Front’

India’s security challenges are compounded by internal issues like communal tensions, political polarization, and insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast, which strain resources and create exploitable vulnerabilities. Kashmir remains a flashpoint, with unrest offering Pakistan opportunities to stoke proxies, while Northeast insurgencies require constant vigilance. To counter the threat of a coordinated three-front assault, India must recalibrate its security policy with investments in defence modernization, strong alliances, and diplomatic finesse.


Modernizing the armed forces, with a focus on indigenization and reducing dependence on foreign suppliers, is imperative. Simultaneously, India must strengthen its regional partnerships, leveraging platforms like the QUAD and the Indian Ocean Rim Association to counterbalance China’s influence. Engaging with Bangladesh to rebuild trust and counter Beijing’s narrative will be equally crucial.


A united and resilient nation is less susceptible to external manipulation, ensuring that the ‘half front’ does not become a full-blown crisis. The challenges are formidable, but so too is India’s resolve.


(The author is a retired Indian Naval Aviation Officer and a geo-political analyst.


(In Part Two tomorrow, we focus on Bangladesh’s potential to emerge as a third front in the conflict, explore how India’s domestic situation constitutes a ‘half front’ and examine key remedial measures India must adopt to mitigate the threat)

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