Battle for the Bow and Arrow

The Shiv Sena dispute before the Supreme Court is no longer just about MLAs and symbols, but about what legally defines a political party. AI generated image The fight over the Shiv Sena has moved well beyond Maharashtra’s familiar political theatre. In the Supreme Court, the dispute has narrowed to a question that is less dramatic on the surface but potentially far more consequential: what exactly makes a political party a political party? Is it the elected strength of its legislators? The...

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The Shiv Sena dispute before the Supreme Court is no longer just about MLAs and symbols, but about what legally defines a political party. AI generated image The fight over the Shiv Sena has moved well beyond Maharashtra’s familiar political theatre. In the Supreme Court, the dispute has narrowed to a question that is less dramatic on the surface but potentially far more consequential: what exactly makes a political party a political party? Is it the elected strength of its legislators? The organisation outside the legislature? The party constitution on record with the Election Commission? Or some combination of all three? That question lies at the centre of the legal battle between the factions led by Eknath Shinde and Uddhav Thackeray. Two Claims Senior advocate Neeraj Kishan Kaul, appearing for the Shinde faction, has defended the Election Commission’s February 17, 2023 decision, recognising the Shinde camp as the Shiv Sena and allotting it the bow-and-arrow symbol. The Thackeray faction has challenged that decision. The bench is also dealing with challenges connected to the Maharashtra Assembly Speaker’s January 2024 decision on disqualification petitions. The Thackeray faction, represented by senior advocates Kapil Sibal and Devadatt Kamat, has drawn a sharp distinction between the political party and its legislature wing. Its argument is a group of MLAs breaking away from the legislative wing does not automatically mean that the political party itself has changed hands. The party’s organisation, structure and identity cannot simply be equated with the numbers sitting in the Assembly. The Shinde faction says the dispute was never merely about legislators walking out. According to its argument, the rupture extended into the wider political organisation, with competing meetings, resolutions and claims of support from party workers and functionaries. The legislative split was, in its telling, only one visible part of a larger party-wide conflict. That distinction determines whether the Election Commission could legitimately intervene under Paragraph 15 of the Election Symbols Order and decide which rival faction represented the recognised political party. Kaul has argued that the Commission was entitled to consider the wider organisational dispute rather than treating the matter as a purely legislative rebellion. Constitutional Tussle The courtroom fight has also brought an old Shiv Sena document back into the spotlight. Kaul has relied heavily on the constitution placed on record with the Election Commission after the poll panel raised objections to the party’s earlier structure. The material before the court says the Commission had, in the late 1990s, pushed for a more democratic organisational structure, including changes to the manner in which party office-bearers were selected. The 1999 constitution subsequently went on record. The Shinde side says the 2018 constitution represented a significant departure from that structure. Its argument is that the later arrangement concentrated substantial authority in the party chief and relied extensively on nominated or appointed office-bearers rather than elected organisational bodies. It has also questioned why its leaders participated in the organisational structure created under the 2018 arrangement and did not object to it at the time. Kaul has further argued that the 2018 constitution relied upon by the Thackeray faction was not registered with the Election Commission, while the 1999 constitution was on the Commission’s record. This has become a significant element of the Shinde faction’s case. The Thackeray faction, meanwhile, has relied on the Supreme Court’s earlier Constitution Bench judgment in the Subhash Desai matter to reinforce the distinction between a political party and its legislature party. The earlier judgment’s discussion about not conflating the political party with its legislature wing arose in the context of questions such as who could appoint the whip. It did not, according to the Shinde side, mean that the Election Commission must ignore legislative strength altogether when determining which faction represents a recognised political party. The Shinde side has also invoked the Sadiq Ali case, arguing that legislative majority remains a relevant consideration in a party-symbol dispute. The case has therefore increasingly begun to look like a legal examination of the Election Commission’s decision-making process. The Thackeray faction has questioned the Commission’s jurisdiction and the basis on which it concluded that there was a party-wide split. Its challenge effectively asks whether the Commission went too far in examining the internal structure of the Shiv Sena. The Shinde faction argues that Article 324 gives the Election Commission broad powers and that, when two groups claim the same recognised party, the Commission has to examine the party constitution, organisational structure and available evidence to identify which group represents the party. The practical difficulty is obvious. The Election Commission cannot ask every Shiv Sena member whom they support. Nor can it conduct a referendum among every booth-level worker. Kaul has therefore defended the organisational-majority approach as a workable method of assessing cadre support through recognised organisational bodies and elected representatives. The Shinde camp has also brought the events after the 2019 Maharashtra Assembly election into the argument. Shiv Sena and BJP fought the election together, but the government subsequently formed under Uddhav Thackeray was with Congress and NCP. According to the Shinde side, that political realignment created discontent among sections of the Shiv Sena organisation and contributed to the eventual split. The Thackeray faction disputes the broader narrative and maintains that the legislative rebellion cannot simply be converted into proof that the political party itself changed hands. It has also challenged the Maharashtra Speaker’s decision not to disqualify MLAs from either faction. The Supreme Court has examined questions about what could follow if that decision were set aside, including whether consequential disqualification could arise under the Tenth Schedule. Party recognition and legislative disqualification arise under different legal frameworks. The Shinde side has argued that earlier cases concerning disqualification cannot simply be transplanted into the Election Commission’s determination under the Symbols Order. The real question is no longer simply who has more MLAs. It is whether those MLAs, the party organisation, the constitution and the cadre can legally be treated as parts of the same answer. (The writer is a political observer. Views personal.)

India’s Dilemma: The Specter of a Three-and-a-Half-Front War

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

Jan 1, 2025

4 min read

Updated: Jan 2, 2025

In the first of a two-part series, we examine India’s growing security challenges, both internal and external, and the strategic steps needed to navigate these complexities

The world is a powder keg. Unrest in Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, and across the Middle East coincides with the protracted war between Russia and Ukraine. These crises ripple across borders, leaving no country untouched. For India, the stakes are particularly high. In Asia, tensions with Bangladesh and Pakistan, coupled with an unresolved standoff with China, exacerbate an already precarious security environment. Adding fuel to the fire, domestic challenges further intensify the risks, raising the alarming possibility of what strategists dub a “three-and-a-half-front war.”

India’s geographical location offers both an advantage and a disadvantage. Strategically positioned as a hub for global logistics, the country is critical to ensuring regional stability. Yet, its proximity to two longstanding adversaries—China and Pakistan—complicates matters. Bangladesh, with its shifting allegiances, has added a new dimension to this calculus. The volatile domestic situation, marked by communal and political unrest, completes the trifecta, with internal challenges forming the “half front” in this ominous scenario.

Indo-China relations have long tested India’s diplomatic mettle. For decades, China has pursued a strategy to keep India on edge, using a mix of psychological and military provocations. Rooted in its desire to avenge the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ China’s worldview is deeply shaped by a need to dominate its regional neighbours.

India’s rapid ascent on the global stage poses a direct challenge to China’s ambitions of regional and global supremacy. Beijing views New Delhi’s rising stature with unease, particularly its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, its robust infrastructure along contested borders and its leadership in multilateral forums like the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD). The refusal to join initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has further strained ties.

The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, a tragic flashpoint in Indo-China relations, epitomized China’s aggressive designs. Beijing’s displeasure with India’s border infrastructure development and its closer ties with Western allies has only fuelled its belligerence. Militarily, China holds the upper hand, leveraging its advanced arsenal against India’s aging defence systems. This disparity emboldens Beijing to test India’s resolve repeatedly, creating a perpetual state of tension.

Beyond its direct provocations, China’s deepening ties with South Asia complicate India’s security calculus. Bangladesh, once a trusted ally, now edges closer to Beijing. Economic investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, strategic military partnerships, and increased political engagement hint at a significant shift in Dhaka’s priorities. While India continues to invest in its ties with Bangladesh, the growing influence of China in the region presents challenges that are impossible to ignore.

Since Partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have shared an acrimonious relationship. Pakistan’s grievances, from the creation of Bangladesh to its inability to annex Kashmir, have defined its hostile posture toward India. While India’s economic growth and diplomatic successes have widened the gulf, Pakistan continues to rely on asymmetric warfare through state-sponsored terrorism.

India has responded firmly with cross-LoC strikes and diplomatic efforts like pushing Pakistan onto the FATF grey list. However, Islamabad’s deepening ties with Beijing, including advanced weapon supplies, have strengthened its military, forging a troubling China-Pakistan nexus. This partnership, with potential strategic collaboration in Siachen and Ladakh, poses a serious challenge to India, raising concerns of a coordinated assault from both adversaries.

Bangladesh, once a close ally, now emerges as a wildcard in India’s security landscape. While the two countries share historical ties rooted in India’s role during Bangladesh’s liberation, recent developments suggest a drift. Dhaka’s growing economic partnership with Beijing and its reluctance to fully endorse India’s regional leadership underscore this shift.

China’s significant investments in Bangladesh’s infrastructure, ranging from ports to power plants, mirror its strategy in other South Asian countries. For India, this growing influence represents not just an economic challenge but a strategic one. The possibility of Bangladesh aligning with China in regional disputes adds another layer to India’s external threats.

The Domestic ‘Half Front’

India’s security challenges are compounded by internal issues like communal tensions, political polarization, and insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast, which strain resources and create exploitable vulnerabilities. Kashmir remains a flashpoint, with unrest offering Pakistan opportunities to stoke proxies, while Northeast insurgencies require constant vigilance. To counter the threat of a coordinated three-front assault, India must recalibrate its security policy with investments in defence modernization, strong alliances, and diplomatic finesse.

Modernizing the armed forces, with a focus on indigenization and reducing dependence on foreign suppliers, is imperative. Simultaneously, India must strengthen its regional partnerships, leveraging platforms like the QUAD and the Indian Ocean Rim Association to counterbalance China’s influence. Engaging with Bangladesh to rebuild trust and counter Beijing’s narrative will be equally crucial.

A united and resilient nation is less susceptible to external manipulation, ensuring that the ‘half front’ does not become a full-blown crisis. The challenges are formidable, but so too is India’s resolve.

(The author is a retired Indian Naval Aviation Officer and a geo-political analyst.

(In Part Two tomorrow, we focus on Bangladesh’s potential to emerge as a third front in the conflict, explore how India’s domestic situation constitutes a ‘half front’ and examine key remedial measures India must adopt to mitigate the threat)

Battle for the Bow and Arrow

India’s Dilemma: The Specter of a Three-and-a-Half-Front War

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