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By:

Anuradha Rao

3 March 2025 at 9:18:19 pm

The Problem with One-Face Politics

From Kanhaiya Kumar to Arvind Kejriwal, Indian politics offers a warning about movements that struggle to grow beyond one dominant face. Watching Abhijeet Dipke rise to prominence recently made me think of Kanhaiya Kumar. Not necessarily because of their politics, but because of a pattern. Kanhaiya did not emerge alone. During the JNU agitation of 2016, Umar Khalid, Shehla Rashid and Anirban Bhattacharya were also prominent voices. Yet one person became the most recognisable electoral...

The Problem with One-Face Politics

From Kanhaiya Kumar to Arvind Kejriwal, Indian politics offers a warning about movements that struggle to grow beyond one dominant face. Watching Abhijeet Dipke rise to prominence recently made me think of Kanhaiya Kumar. Not necessarily because of their politics, but because of a pattern. Kanhaiya did not emerge alone. During the JNU agitation of 2016, Umar Khalid, Shehla Rashid and Anirban Bhattacharya were also prominent voices. Yet one person became the most recognisable electoral political face of that moment. Dipke, too, is part of a movement with other articulate people around him. Yet increasingly, one name travels. That raises three questions for any movement or political party hoping to become a serious electoral alternative. Can the party nurture more than one face? Can those faces make big ideas understandable? Can one of them eventually take over? Similar Patterns Irom Sharmila moved from extraordinary moral authority as an activist into electoral politics, but that authority did not translate into votes. Jaya Prakash Narayan built Lok Satta around governance reform and institutional change, but strong ideas did not translate into large-scale electoral strength. Akhil Gogoi moved from grassroots activism into Raijor Dal and built an electoral presence, but the organisation remains strongly identified with him. Chandrashekhar Azad moved from the Bhim Army to the Azad Samaj Party and then into Parliament. His next test is whether the organisation can grow beyond his own appeal. Then, there is Arvind Kejriwal. India Against Corruption had several formidable names around it: Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia, Yogendra Yadav, Prashant Bhushan, Kumar Vishwas and others. Yet over time, AAP became overwhelmingly identified with Kejriwal. Politics naturally seeks a protagonist. Charisma, timing and communication matter immensely, as does media attention. The problem arises when the organisation stops looking beyond that face. What happens to the second, third and fourth people? Are they given responsibility? Are they allowed to build their own constituencies? Are they exposed to the public often enough to become independently recognisable? Or does the success of one leader quietly become the ceiling for everyone else? Perhaps, it is far too early to ask this question of Dipke. Perhaps it is too early to ask whether he has a succession plan. We do not yet know clearly whether he even sees his movement becoming a conventional political party, or what shape he ultimately wants it to take. But it is not too early to ask what happens to the talent around him. Succession is a late-stage question. Talent visibility is an early-stage one. A movement reveals something about its future long before it contests an election: through whom it allows to speak, whom it trusts with responsibility, and whether others around the founder are allowed to build their own identities. Succession Woes This is hardly limited to politics. Indian organisations have struggled with the same issue for years. Family-run businesses have a clear succession path. Whether the next generation is always the best choice is another matter, but the direction is obvious. Outside family businesses, the problem is often more glaring. Companies speak endlessly about leadership pipelines, high-potential talent and succession planning. Yet when a long-serving chief executive or founder leaves, boards often find that nobody inside is ready. Was there really no talent, or did the organisation fail to recognise, retain, stretch and give it enough room to grow? That question matters even more today because what we once recognised as talent may no longer be enough. The skills that made someone successful ten years ago may not be the skills needed for the next decade. Politics faces the same problem. Recognising talent is only the beginning. The second challenge is whether that talent can communicate. Yogendra Yadav is a useful example. Few would question his understanding of Indian politics, elections, rural India, or public policy. He brings nuance to issues that deserve it. But nuance has a difficult relationship with electoral politics. A voter should not need a seminar to understand what you are proposing. That does not mean dumbing down ideas. India will need serious thinking on artificial intelligence, jobs, education, agriculture, climate, cities and demographic change. Political leaders will need intellectual depth. But depth must be translated. The real skill is making something simple without making it simplistic. A leader must understand the ten-year problem and explain its relevance in ten seconds. Politics needs intellectual depth in the engine room and clarity on the dashboard. Perhaps this is why one person sometimes races ahead of equally intelligent colleagues. The political star may not be the person with the most sophisticated argument. It may be the person who can make that argument understandable beyond the room. Then comes the third question: can one of them eventually take over? Congress has spent decades responding to criticism that leadership succession repeatedly returns to one family. The BJP faces a very different situation. After more than a decade of Narendra Modi dominating national politics, discussion of who will follow him remains largely speculative. When does a party start preparing for what comes next? Certainly not when the chair becomes vacant. Future leaders need years of preparation before the public. They need to govern, campaign, debate, explain difficult ideas, face criticism, make mistakes, lose occasionally and recover. More importantly, several people need that opportunity. Succession planning should not mean identifying a single successor in advance. It should mean ensuring there are choices. Which brings me back to Dipke. Perhaps the interesting question is not whether he becomes another Kanhaiya Kumar, another Kejriwal, or disappears from public memory. The real test of a political organisation is not whether it discovers a star. It is whether it knows what to do with all the talent standing around the star. (The writer is a learning and development professional. Views personal.)

India’s Dilemma: The Specter of a Three-and-a-Half-Front War

Updated: Jan 2, 2025

In the first of a two-part series, we examine India’s growing security challenges, both internal and external, and the strategic steps needed to navigate these complexities

India’s Dilemma

The world is a powder keg. Unrest in Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, and across the Middle East coincides with the protracted war between Russia and Ukraine. These crises ripple across borders, leaving no country untouched. For India, the stakes are particularly high. In Asia, tensions with Bangladesh and Pakistan, coupled with an unresolved standoff with China, exacerbate an already precarious security environment. Adding fuel to the fire, domestic challenges further intensify the risks, raising the alarming possibility of what strategists dub a “three-and-a-half-front war.”


India’s geographical location offers both an advantage and a disadvantage. Strategically positioned as a hub for global logistics, the country is critical to ensuring regional stability. Yet, its proximity to two longstanding adversaries—China and Pakistan—complicates matters. Bangladesh, with its shifting allegiances, has added a new dimension to this calculus. The volatile domestic situation, marked by communal and political unrest, completes the trifecta, with internal challenges forming the “half front” in this ominous scenario.


Indo-China relations have long tested India’s diplomatic mettle. For decades, China has pursued a strategy to keep India on edge, using a mix of psychological and military provocations. Rooted in its desire to avenge the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ China’s worldview is deeply shaped by a need to dominate its regional neighbours.


India’s rapid ascent on the global stage poses a direct challenge to China’s ambitions of regional and global supremacy. Beijing views New Delhi’s rising stature with unease, particularly its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, its robust infrastructure along contested borders and its leadership in multilateral forums like the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD). The refusal to join initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has further strained ties.


The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, a tragic flashpoint in Indo-China relations, epitomized China’s aggressive designs. Beijing’s displeasure with India’s border infrastructure development and its closer ties with Western allies has only fuelled its belligerence. Militarily, China holds the upper hand, leveraging its advanced arsenal against India’s aging defence systems. This disparity emboldens Beijing to test India’s resolve repeatedly, creating a perpetual state of tension.


Beyond its direct provocations, China’s deepening ties with South Asia complicate India’s security calculus. Bangladesh, once a trusted ally, now edges closer to Beijing. Economic investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, strategic military partnerships, and increased political engagement hint at a significant shift in Dhaka’s priorities. While India continues to invest in its ties with Bangladesh, the growing influence of China in the region presents challenges that are impossible to ignore.


Since Partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have shared an acrimonious relationship. Pakistan’s grievances, from the creation of Bangladesh to its inability to annex Kashmir, have defined its hostile posture toward India. While India’s economic growth and diplomatic successes have widened the gulf, Pakistan continues to rely on asymmetric warfare through state-sponsored terrorism.


India has responded firmly with cross-LoC strikes and diplomatic efforts like pushing Pakistan onto the FATF grey list. However, Islamabad’s deepening ties with Beijing, including advanced weapon supplies, have strengthened its military, forging a troubling China-Pakistan nexus. This partnership, with potential strategic collaboration in Siachen and Ladakh, poses a serious challenge to India, raising concerns of a coordinated assault from both adversaries.


Bangladesh, once a close ally, now emerges as a wildcard in India’s security landscape. While the two countries share historical ties rooted in India’s role during Bangladesh’s liberation, recent developments suggest a drift. Dhaka’s growing economic partnership with Beijing and its reluctance to fully endorse India’s regional leadership underscore this shift.


China’s significant investments in Bangladesh’s infrastructure, ranging from ports to power plants, mirror its strategy in other South Asian countries. For India, this growing influence represents not just an economic challenge but a strategic one. The possibility of Bangladesh aligning with China in regional disputes adds another layer to India’s external threats.


The Domestic ‘Half Front’

India’s security challenges are compounded by internal issues like communal tensions, political polarization, and insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast, which strain resources and create exploitable vulnerabilities. Kashmir remains a flashpoint, with unrest offering Pakistan opportunities to stoke proxies, while Northeast insurgencies require constant vigilance. To counter the threat of a coordinated three-front assault, India must recalibrate its security policy with investments in defence modernization, strong alliances, and diplomatic finesse.


Modernizing the armed forces, with a focus on indigenization and reducing dependence on foreign suppliers, is imperative. Simultaneously, India must strengthen its regional partnerships, leveraging platforms like the QUAD and the Indian Ocean Rim Association to counterbalance China’s influence. Engaging with Bangladesh to rebuild trust and counter Beijing’s narrative will be equally crucial.


A united and resilient nation is less susceptible to external manipulation, ensuring that the ‘half front’ does not become a full-blown crisis. The challenges are formidable, but so too is India’s resolve.


(The author is a retired Indian Naval Aviation Officer and a geo-political analyst.


(In Part Two tomorrow, we focus on Bangladesh’s potential to emerge as a third front in the conflict, explore how India’s domestic situation constitutes a ‘half front’ and examine key remedial measures India must adopt to mitigate the threat)

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