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By:

Rajendra Joshi

3 December 2024 at 9:20:26 am

Sugar industry strains as traders reap profits

Gap between ex-mill prices, retail rates raised questions Kolhapur: The Indian sugar industry is caught in a deepening crisis, with sugar mills struggling to secure remunerative prices for their produce even as traders and middlemen appear to be making substantial profits. While sugar mills are receiving between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal through recent sale tenders, retail prices have remained as high as Rs 58 per kg. The widening gap between ex-mill prices and retail rates has...

Sugar industry strains as traders reap profits

Gap between ex-mill prices, retail rates raised questions Kolhapur: The Indian sugar industry is caught in a deepening crisis, with sugar mills struggling to secure remunerative prices for their produce even as traders and middlemen appear to be making substantial profits. While sugar mills are receiving between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal through recent sale tenders, retail prices have remained as high as Rs 58 per kg. The widening gap between ex-mill prices and retail rates has raised serious questions about the role of intermediaries and the effectiveness of the Centre’s efforts to contain sugar prices. The margins available to traders and intermediaries have reportedly crossed 20 per cent, leaving sugar millers perplexed. At a time when both sugarcane growers and mill operators are under financial pressure, the trading chain appears to be benefiting disproportionately. The Centre must examine this growing disparity and take corrective measures to prevent speculative profiteering. Retail sugar prices began rising sharply in August, touching nearly Rs 70 per kg in some markets. The escalation added to inflationary pressures and caused concern among consumers, particularly ahead of the festive season. In response, the Centre introduced a series of measures to improve domestic availability and moderate prices. These included permitting duty-free sugar imports, initially until October 31, a deadline subsequently extended to December 31. The government also directed sugar mills to commence the crushing season from October 15 and tightened monitoring of sugar stocks. In another significant intervention, it modified the ethanol policy, restricting the diversion of sugarcane juice, sugar syrup and B-heavy molasses for ethanol production. Following these measures, sugar mills began witnessing a decline in the prices offered through their sale tenders. Recent transactions have fetched between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal. Going by the conventional relationship between ex-mill prices and retail rates, sugar should ideally have been available to consumers at less than ₹50 per kg. However, retail prices continue to hover around Rs 58 per kg, pointing to a substantial disconnect between the mill gate and the consumer market. Traditionally, sugar retailing operated on relatively thin margins. Since sugar is an essential commodity, retailers often treated it as a low-margin product to attract customers who would subsequently purchase other household provisions. The margin was sometimes informally equated with the resale value of the empty 50-kg jute bags in which sugar was supplied. This was considered a nominal return for retailers. That traditional pricing mechanism, however, appears to have undergone a significant change. The widening gap between mill-level tender prices and retail rates has created considerable scope for intermediaries to extract higher margins. The critical question is whether the additional amount paid by consumers is reaching the sugar mills or remaining within the trading chain. The issue assumes particular significance in Maharashtra, where the sugarcane pricing dispute has intensified ahead of the new crushing season. Farmers’ organisations have been demanding a minimum price of Rs 5,500 per tonne for sugarcane. Millers, meanwhile, are preparing to agitate for a revision in the Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) framework and the restoration of a more supportive ethanol policy. The Swabhimani Shetkari Sanghatana, led by Raju Shetti, has taken a firm position that sugar mills should not be allowed to commence operations until farmers receive an acceptable price for their cane. Shetti has also drawn the state government’s attention to the unusually high retail prices of sugar, questioning why consumers continue to pay more even as mills are forced to sell at relatively lower rates. The Centre’s sudden changes to the ethanol policy have further complicated the industry’s financial position. Ethanol production had emerged as an important revenue stream for sugar mills, enabling them to diversify operations, improve cash flows and enhance their capacity to pay farmers. Restrictions on the diversion of sugarcane-based raw materials have weakened this support at a critical juncture. The resulting contradiction is difficult to ignore: farmers are demanding better cane prices, millers are struggling with shrinking realisations and policy uncertainty, while intermediaries appear to be benefiting from the gap between wholesale and retail prices. The government cannot address the sugar crisis merely by regulating mill stocks, imports and ethanol diversion. It must also examine the entire supply chain, identify where the widening margins are accruing and ensure that the benefits of market interventions reach both sugarcane growers and consumers. With nearly Rs 2 lakh crore riding on the sugar economy, allowing intermediaries to thrive while the industry’s primary stakeholders struggle would be a serious policy failure.

India’s Dilemma: The Specter of a Three-and-a-Half-Front War

Writer: Commodore S.L. Deshmukh
Commodore S.L. Deshmukh
Jan 1, 2025
4 min read

Updated: Jan 2, 2025

In the first of a two-part series, we examine India’s growing security challenges, both internal and external, and the strategic steps needed to navigate these complexities

India’s Dilemma

The world is a powder keg. Unrest in Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, and across the Middle East coincides with the protracted war between Russia and Ukraine. These crises ripple across borders, leaving no country untouched. For India, the stakes are particularly high. In Asia, tensions with Bangladesh and Pakistan, coupled with an unresolved standoff with China, exacerbate an already precarious security environment. Adding fuel to the fire, domestic challenges further intensify the risks, raising the alarming possibility of what strategists dub a “three-and-a-half-front war.”


India’s geographical location offers both an advantage and a disadvantage. Strategically positioned as a hub for global logistics, the country is critical to ensuring regional stability. Yet, its proximity to two longstanding adversaries—China and Pakistan—complicates matters. Bangladesh, with its shifting allegiances, has added a new dimension to this calculus. The volatile domestic situation, marked by communal and political unrest, completes the trifecta, with internal challenges forming the “half front” in this ominous scenario.


Indo-China relations have long tested India’s diplomatic mettle. For decades, China has pursued a strategy to keep India on edge, using a mix of psychological and military provocations. Rooted in its desire to avenge the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ China’s worldview is deeply shaped by a need to dominate its regional neighbours.


India’s rapid ascent on the global stage poses a direct challenge to China’s ambitions of regional and global supremacy. Beijing views New Delhi’s rising stature with unease, particularly its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, its robust infrastructure along contested borders and its leadership in multilateral forums like the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD). The refusal to join initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has further strained ties.


The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, a tragic flashpoint in Indo-China relations, epitomized China’s aggressive designs. Beijing’s displeasure with India’s border infrastructure development and its closer ties with Western allies has only fuelled its belligerence. Militarily, China holds the upper hand, leveraging its advanced arsenal against India’s aging defence systems. This disparity emboldens Beijing to test India’s resolve repeatedly, creating a perpetual state of tension.


Beyond its direct provocations, China’s deepening ties with South Asia complicate India’s security calculus. Bangladesh, once a trusted ally, now edges closer to Beijing. Economic investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, strategic military partnerships, and increased political engagement hint at a significant shift in Dhaka’s priorities. While India continues to invest in its ties with Bangladesh, the growing influence of China in the region presents challenges that are impossible to ignore.


Since Partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have shared an acrimonious relationship. Pakistan’s grievances, from the creation of Bangladesh to its inability to annex Kashmir, have defined its hostile posture toward India. While India’s economic growth and diplomatic successes have widened the gulf, Pakistan continues to rely on asymmetric warfare through state-sponsored terrorism.


India has responded firmly with cross-LoC strikes and diplomatic efforts like pushing Pakistan onto the FATF grey list. However, Islamabad’s deepening ties with Beijing, including advanced weapon supplies, have strengthened its military, forging a troubling China-Pakistan nexus. This partnership, with potential strategic collaboration in Siachen and Ladakh, poses a serious challenge to India, raising concerns of a coordinated assault from both adversaries.


Bangladesh, once a close ally, now emerges as a wildcard in India’s security landscape. While the two countries share historical ties rooted in India’s role during Bangladesh’s liberation, recent developments suggest a drift. Dhaka’s growing economic partnership with Beijing and its reluctance to fully endorse India’s regional leadership underscore this shift.


China’s significant investments in Bangladesh’s infrastructure, ranging from ports to power plants, mirror its strategy in other South Asian countries. For India, this growing influence represents not just an economic challenge but a strategic one. The possibility of Bangladesh aligning with China in regional disputes adds another layer to India’s external threats.


The Domestic ‘Half Front’

India’s security challenges are compounded by internal issues like communal tensions, political polarization, and insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast, which strain resources and create exploitable vulnerabilities. Kashmir remains a flashpoint, with unrest offering Pakistan opportunities to stoke proxies, while Northeast insurgencies require constant vigilance. To counter the threat of a coordinated three-front assault, India must recalibrate its security policy with investments in defence modernization, strong alliances, and diplomatic finesse.


Modernizing the armed forces, with a focus on indigenization and reducing dependence on foreign suppliers, is imperative. Simultaneously, India must strengthen its regional partnerships, leveraging platforms like the QUAD and the Indian Ocean Rim Association to counterbalance China’s influence. Engaging with Bangladesh to rebuild trust and counter Beijing’s narrative will be equally crucial.


A united and resilient nation is less susceptible to external manipulation, ensuring that the ‘half front’ does not become a full-blown crisis. The challenges are formidable, but so too is India’s resolve.


(The author is a retired Indian Naval Aviation Officer and a geo-political analyst.


(In Part Two tomorrow, we focus on Bangladesh’s potential to emerge as a third front in the conflict, explore how India’s domestic situation constitutes a ‘half front’ and examine key remedial measures India must adopt to mitigate the threat)

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