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By:

Abhijit Mulye

21 August 2024 at 4:59:11 pm

Fadnavis reins in Sena’s Marathi push

AI generated image Mumbai: The ruling Mahayuti coalition in Maharashtra is witnessing a delicate political balancing act, with Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis increasingly overriding key decisions of alliance partners, particularly the Shiv Sena, while simultaneously attempting to placate them on other fronts. The tension within the alliance came to the fore on Thursday when Fadnavis stepped in to dilute a controversial mandate enforced by Shiv Sena Transport Minister Pratap Sarnaik, which...

Fadnavis reins in Sena’s Marathi push

AI generated image Mumbai: The ruling Mahayuti coalition in Maharashtra is witnessing a delicate political balancing act, with Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis increasingly overriding key decisions of alliance partners, particularly the Shiv Sena, while simultaneously attempting to placate them on other fronts. The tension within the alliance came to the fore on Thursday when Fadnavis stepped in to dilute a controversial mandate enforced by Shiv Sena Transport Minister Pratap Sarnaik, which required auto-rickshaw and taxi drivers in Mumbai to possess basic Marathi language proficiency. The Transport Department’s enforcement drive, which threatened non-Marathi-speaking drivers with suspension or cancellation of their licences, sparked outrage among North Indian drivers who form a sizeable section of the public transport workforce in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR). Protests brought parts of Mumbai, including Kandivali and Malad, to a standstill. Recognising the potential electoral fallout, Fadnavis intervened, saying drivers need not be “experts” in Marathi. He also extended the grace period for drivers to acquire a working knowledge of the language to one year, effectively diluting Sarnaik’s hardline stance. Fadnavis announced the decision after a delegation of transport operators met him. The episode highlights the conflicting political compulsions of the Mahayuti partners. Eknath Shinde’s Shiv Sena is keen to pursue a pro-Marathi, “sons of the soil” agenda to consolidate its traditional voter base and counter the rival Shiv Sena (UBT) faction led by Uddhav Thackeray. The BJP, however, relies heavily on North Indian and migrant voters in the MMR, particularly as crucial civic and state elections approach. Any aggressive regional policy that alienates this constituency could have electoral consequences for the party. The Marathi language issue is not an isolated instance of Fadnavis stepping in to override decisions associated with the Shiv Sena. It fits into a broader pattern of the chief minister’s administration reviewing or reversing several initiatives of the previous government headed by Shinde. In April 2026, the BJP-led Environment Department, headed by Minister Pankaja Munde, scrapped 14 lake conservation projects, 11 of which had been cleared during Shinde’s tenure, and ordered recovery of more than Rs 73 crore. The Fadnavis government has also modified several initiatives introduced by the previous regime. In January 2025, it altered Shinde’s three-course school meal plan, placing the responsibility on local school management committees to raise funds for sweet dishes. In April 2025, the government scrapped the ‘One State, One Uniform’ policy for schools. A Rs 3,200-crore tender for mechanised housekeeping services at government hospitals, issued under the Shinde government, was also stayed. Yet, Fadnavis remains conscious of the need to preserve the fragile alliance. To manage growing resentment within the Sena, he has adopted what can be described as a ‘blow hot, blow cold’ approach — overriding decisions when they clash with the BJP’s broader political interests while offering political concessions on other fronts. One such move was the recent appointment of Shiv Sena leader Bharat Gogawale as Guardian Minister of the politically important Raigad district, ending a 19-month-long tussle over the post. At the same time, the Mahayuti government recently reduced the powers exercised by Guardian Ministers over District Planning Committee (DPC) funds, directing that 70 per cent of the funds be allocated directly to local MLAs. The move is aimed at reducing the concentration of financial powers with individual ministers. As the Mahayuti navigates these competing interests, Fadnavis has also instructed alliance partners to resolve disputes internally and avoid public sparring. However, the latest confrontation over the Marathi language requirement underscores the limits of that arrangement. While Fadnavis continues to use his authority to protect the BJP’s broader electoral interests, the Shiv Sena remains under pressure to assert its regional identity and distinguish itself from the Thackeray faction. With elections approaching, balancing these competing political priorities is likely to remain one of the biggest challenges for the Mahayuti government.

India’s Dilemma: The Specter of a Three-and-a-Half-Front War

Updated: Jan 2, 2025

In the first of a two-part series, we examine India’s growing security challenges, both internal and external, and the strategic steps needed to navigate these complexities

India’s Dilemma

The world is a powder keg. Unrest in Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, and across the Middle East coincides with the protracted war between Russia and Ukraine. These crises ripple across borders, leaving no country untouched. For India, the stakes are particularly high. In Asia, tensions with Bangladesh and Pakistan, coupled with an unresolved standoff with China, exacerbate an already precarious security environment. Adding fuel to the fire, domestic challenges further intensify the risks, raising the alarming possibility of what strategists dub a “three-and-a-half-front war.”


India’s geographical location offers both an advantage and a disadvantage. Strategically positioned as a hub for global logistics, the country is critical to ensuring regional stability. Yet, its proximity to two longstanding adversaries—China and Pakistan—complicates matters. Bangladesh, with its shifting allegiances, has added a new dimension to this calculus. The volatile domestic situation, marked by communal and political unrest, completes the trifecta, with internal challenges forming the “half front” in this ominous scenario.


Indo-China relations have long tested India’s diplomatic mettle. For decades, China has pursued a strategy to keep India on edge, using a mix of psychological and military provocations. Rooted in its desire to avenge the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ China’s worldview is deeply shaped by a need to dominate its regional neighbours.


India’s rapid ascent on the global stage poses a direct challenge to China’s ambitions of regional and global supremacy. Beijing views New Delhi’s rising stature with unease, particularly its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, its robust infrastructure along contested borders and its leadership in multilateral forums like the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD). The refusal to join initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has further strained ties.


The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, a tragic flashpoint in Indo-China relations, epitomized China’s aggressive designs. Beijing’s displeasure with India’s border infrastructure development and its closer ties with Western allies has only fuelled its belligerence. Militarily, China holds the upper hand, leveraging its advanced arsenal against India’s aging defence systems. This disparity emboldens Beijing to test India’s resolve repeatedly, creating a perpetual state of tension.


Beyond its direct provocations, China’s deepening ties with South Asia complicate India’s security calculus. Bangladesh, once a trusted ally, now edges closer to Beijing. Economic investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, strategic military partnerships, and increased political engagement hint at a significant shift in Dhaka’s priorities. While India continues to invest in its ties with Bangladesh, the growing influence of China in the region presents challenges that are impossible to ignore.


Since Partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have shared an acrimonious relationship. Pakistan’s grievances, from the creation of Bangladesh to its inability to annex Kashmir, have defined its hostile posture toward India. While India’s economic growth and diplomatic successes have widened the gulf, Pakistan continues to rely on asymmetric warfare through state-sponsored terrorism.


India has responded firmly with cross-LoC strikes and diplomatic efforts like pushing Pakistan onto the FATF grey list. However, Islamabad’s deepening ties with Beijing, including advanced weapon supplies, have strengthened its military, forging a troubling China-Pakistan nexus. This partnership, with potential strategic collaboration in Siachen and Ladakh, poses a serious challenge to India, raising concerns of a coordinated assault from both adversaries.


Bangladesh, once a close ally, now emerges as a wildcard in India’s security landscape. While the two countries share historical ties rooted in India’s role during Bangladesh’s liberation, recent developments suggest a drift. Dhaka’s growing economic partnership with Beijing and its reluctance to fully endorse India’s regional leadership underscore this shift.


China’s significant investments in Bangladesh’s infrastructure, ranging from ports to power plants, mirror its strategy in other South Asian countries. For India, this growing influence represents not just an economic challenge but a strategic one. The possibility of Bangladesh aligning with China in regional disputes adds another layer to India’s external threats.


The Domestic ‘Half Front’

India’s security challenges are compounded by internal issues like communal tensions, political polarization, and insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast, which strain resources and create exploitable vulnerabilities. Kashmir remains a flashpoint, with unrest offering Pakistan opportunities to stoke proxies, while Northeast insurgencies require constant vigilance. To counter the threat of a coordinated three-front assault, India must recalibrate its security policy with investments in defence modernization, strong alliances, and diplomatic finesse.


Modernizing the armed forces, with a focus on indigenization and reducing dependence on foreign suppliers, is imperative. Simultaneously, India must strengthen its regional partnerships, leveraging platforms like the QUAD and the Indian Ocean Rim Association to counterbalance China’s influence. Engaging with Bangladesh to rebuild trust and counter Beijing’s narrative will be equally crucial.


A united and resilient nation is less susceptible to external manipulation, ensuring that the ‘half front’ does not become a full-blown crisis. The challenges are formidable, but so too is India’s resolve.


(The author is a retired Indian Naval Aviation Officer and a geo-political analyst.


(In Part Two tomorrow, we focus on Bangladesh’s potential to emerge as a third front in the conflict, explore how India’s domestic situation constitutes a ‘half front’ and examine key remedial measures India must adopt to mitigate the threat)

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