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By:

Prasad Dixit

11 October 2024 at 6:39:23 am

The ‘Exclusionary Vision’ Dilemma for Sovereign Countries

Sovereign nations protect their distinct cultural foundations while still upholding an inclusive vision of governance. The same principle should apply to India. The ‘Universal Oneness Celebration’ event that was recently held in New York City attracted criticism that was only to be expected from certain obvious quarters who chastised the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) for having an allegedly ‘exclusionary vision’. In a free society, one can always express a personal opinion on the...

The ‘Exclusionary Vision’ Dilemma for Sovereign Countries

Sovereign nations protect their distinct cultural foundations while still upholding an inclusive vision of governance. The same principle should apply to India. The ‘Universal Oneness Celebration’ event that was recently held in New York City attracted criticism that was only to be expected from certain obvious quarters who chastised the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) for having an allegedly ‘exclusionary vision’. In a free society, one can always express a personal opinion on the effectiveness with which the stated ideology or philosophy of any organisation is being implemented on the ground. However, labelling an organisation that considers ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ as its core belief as having an ‘exclusionary vision’ is curious, to say the least. We are living in a world of different sovereign countries, each with its own history, cultural identity that acts as a foundation for nation-building and, of course, its own international borders and immigration policies. It is interesting to see how different countries look at the cultural identity and ethos that shape them, and how they protect the foundation on which they stand while still championing their own ‘inclusive vision’. Illusion of Contradiction Take France as an example. The principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity were born out of the French Revolution. They serve as the guiding star for France. Many other countries in the world have also adopted these principles and drawn inspiration from them. Such noble principles, however, are never sufficient to define the foundation of a sovereign country that differentiates it from others. While Liberty, Equality and Fraternity are held in high regard in France, the French language is the foundation on which France stands as a sovereign country. As it is often said, language carries with it not merely its grammar and vocabulary, but a whole culture of its own. Approximately 13 percent of the population in France has a mother tongue different from French. It is noteworthy how France looks at its cultural foundation — the French language — vis-à-vis the spirit behind the principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity enshrined in its Constitution. Article 2 of the same French Constitution explicitly states that France has only one official language — French. From time to time, there are demands to grant official status to other minority languages, but they face tremendous political and legal resistance and are shot down. Other languages are denied even ‘co-official’ status because this is perceived as a direct threat to the deeply rooted ideology of the centralised linguistic unity of France. It goes a step further. There is a concerted, systematic effort to preserve the ‘purity’ of the French language and fight the ‘invasion of English’, called Franglais. It is mandatory under the law, including the Toubon Law, to use the French language in government publications and workplaces, and to include a French translation if any English slogan is used even in a commercial advertisement. Similarly, although Italy recognises a few ‘minority languages’, its official national language is only one — Italian. The approach taken by Germany or Japan is broadly the same. One cannot but wonder whether the same critics of the RSS would call an approach taken by France ‘exclusionary’. The fact is that every sovereign country has its own cultural foundation, which is the cause of its very existence. Countries go out of their way to ‘exclusively’ protect and preserve that cultural foundation. That does not mean, however, that France exclusively belongs only to the majority population whose mother tongue is the same as the national language. Nor does it mean that the State will treat its citizens differently based on their mother tongue, or give preferential treatment to the majority community over linguistic minorities. It is in this perspective that one needs to look at the civilisational ethos dating back thousands of years that forms the foundation of the Indian subcontinent, and the historical context of events that led to India being born as a present-day sovereign country in 1947. How India should treat its cultural foundation is no different from how France, Italy, Germany or Japan should do it. Needless to say, neither India nor any of these other countries discriminate against certain citizens when it comes to governance and the rule of law. There is no contradiction or ‘exclusionary vision’ whatsoever in the approach taken by France, and the same should hold true for India as well. Contextual Similarity As far as the United States of America is concerned, neither any particular language, nor any religion, nor any ethnic origin independently defines the cultural foundation of that country. And yet, there is certainly an ‘American culture’ that defines the country and acts as its foundation. People from all over the world, with very different backgrounds, have migrated to that land and ‘American culture’ has assimilated them. Although it may be difficult to define it very clearly, there is certainly ‘Unity in Diversity’ in American culture. The country calls itself ‘a melting pot’. It goes out of its way to protect this attribute through uniform civil laws that apply to all citizens regardless of their religion or ethnicity. Not everything was just and fair in American history. However, American culture and its democratic ethos not only allow open discussion and debate on what was wrong, but also encourage action on the ground to correct historical wrongs. Former President Bill Clinton summarised it well in one of the presidential debates when he said: “There is nothing wrong in America that cannot be corrected by what is right in America.” When it comes to immigration, whether for tourism or work, the US perhaps has been the most open country for several decades. Its policy towards even illegal immigration has been very soft. It has realised, however, that all this is being taken for granted by many countries and even deliberately misused. Any legitimate attempt, in the larger interest of the country, to change and tighten that policy and stop illegal immigration and settlement invites severe criticism. With that criticism, ironically, an otherwise very open and welcoming country gets painted as being very rigid and intolerant. This specific aspect of American culture, and the criticism it faces, has a clear parallel with the civilisational ethos that forms the foundation of India. Indian culture has also assimilated people from many parts of the world for centuries. It too has its own ‘Unity in Diversity’ that is not very easy for many to define and appreciate. It also welcomes open discussion about historical wrongs and makes a sincere attempt to correct them. The accommodating and welcoming nature — the ‘Atithi Devo Bhava’ psyche — implicit in Indian culture has also been deliberately and rampantly misused. Any attempt to enforce the law of the land invites the same criticism that the US faces. Needless to say, India, like the US or any other country, would and should go out of its way to protect its cultural foundation. Doing so can be termed an ‘exclusionary vision’ only as part of a motivated agenda, if not an absolute unwillingness or inability to grasp and respect the cultural foundations of different countries. There is a need to refine and temper the definition of the so-called ‘exclusionary vision’ for it to make sense in a world of sovereign nations that want to legitimately protect their individual identities in different ways. In other words, the very definition of ‘exclusionary vision’ itself needs to be more ‘inclusive’ in more ways than one. Given its history, the US perhaps is the best country to appreciate what it means to espouse ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ as an inclusive ideology. It is also the best country to appreciate the fact that attempts to prevent the deliberate misuse of an inclusive ideology cannot be termed an ‘exclusionary vision’. (The writer has worked in the Information Technology sector. Views personal.)

India’s Fertility Fault Line

Writer: Sagari Gupta
Sagari Gupta
Aug 23
6 min read

As fertility falls below replacement level in several states, India faces a new demographic challenge: fewer workers, faster ageing and a growing economic cost of family formation.

India’s fertility rate has fallen to around replacement level nationally, but that headline conceals a far more consequential regional divide. Tamil Nadu’s total fertility rate is 1.7, Maharashtra’s 1.8, while Sikkim remains at 1.1 in NFHS-5. India’s fertility transition is no longer a single national story. It is producing states with very different problems, and some are beginning to worry about having too few young people rather than too many.


That is the context in which Andhra Pradesh is considering incentives for larger families. Sikkim has already experimented with financial and employment-related incentives for second and third children. Tamil Nadu has extended maternity leave for women government employees having a third child. Maharashtra presents another important case: fertility is low, but the state has not shifted towards an explicit pronatalist policy.


The question is why families are having fewer children, what that means for the future workforce, and whether governments are addressing the economic conditions behind fertility decisions.


Ageing Dividend

India’s demographic dividend was built on a favourable age structure. As fertility declined, the share of children fell and the proportion of working-age people increased. But this advantage will not last indefinitely.


The India Ageing Report 2023 estimates that people aged 60 and above accounted for 10.5 percent of India’s population in 2022. By 2050, that share is projected to reach 20.8 percent, with the elderly population rising to about 347 million. The population aged 80 and above is projected to increase by around 279 percent between 2022 and 2050.


Fewer children today eventually mean fewer young adults entering the labour market. At the same time, more people will require pensions, healthcare and long-term care.

This transition is already more advanced in several southern states. Tamil Nadu’s NFHS-6 profile shows that only 20.2 percent of its population is below 15, while 16.3 percent is aged 60 and above. Its fertility rate is 1.7.


The arithmetic is straightforward. A smaller younger population reduces some immediate spending on children, but it also narrows the future pool of workers. That is why population policy is increasingly becoming labour-market policy.


Governments can calculate a birth incentive in rupees. Households, however, calculate the much larger cost of raising a child in terms of housing, schooling, childcare, healthcare, transport, food and the income one parent may forego.


A couple does not decide whether to have a third child because the replacement fertility rate is 2.1. They decide based on whether their household can absorb another eighteen years of expenditure, care and responsibility.


For urban middle-class households, the cost is particularly visible. A second or third child may require a larger home, additional childcare and higher education expenditure. For women, there can be an additional cost: reduced employment or slower career progression. This makes fertility inseparable from women’s participation in the labour market.


Women’s Trade-off

The latest PLFS data show that India’s female labour-force participation rate for people aged 15 and above was 32.7 percent in June 2026, compared with 72.9 percent for men.


If childcare falls primarily on women, having another child can reduce the mother’s ability to remain in paid employment. A policy designed to increase births could therefore weaken female labour supply unless childcare and employment protections improve simultaneously.


This is where Tamil Nadu’s maternity leave decision becomes relevant. The state is reducing one cost of having a third child for women in government employment: the risk of losing income during maternity.


But most Indian women are not government employees. A serious fertility policy therefore has to move beyond maternity leave. Affordable childcare, maternity protection across employment categories, paternity leave, flexible work and easier return to employment after childbirth may matter more over the long term than a one-time cash payment.


Maharashtra’s case is useful because its fertility transition is occurring inside one of India’s largest and most economically productive state economies.


NFHS-6 puts Maharashtra’s total fertility rate at 1.8. Only 21.8 percent of its population is below 15, while 14.4 percent is aged 60 and above.


For a state such as Maharashtra, economic growth increasingly has to come from productivity, capital investment, technology, higher female employment, longer working lives and migration rather than simply from an expanding workforce.


That is an important distinction for the national debate. A state can have low fertility and still have strong economic growth. The question is whether that growth can be sustained as the age structure changes.


Care Economy

Ageing will also expose India’s weakness in social care. The elderly population will not only require pensions. It will require people to provide care.


The India Ageing Report notes that ageing is particularly difficult for women because they have lower lifetime earnings and greater exposure to widowhood and economic dependence. The growth of the oldest-old population will further increase demand for long-term and community-based care.


India’s traditional response has been to rely heavily on families. But that model becomes harder to sustain when families become smaller.


A household with one child has fewer potential caregivers than one with three children. But expecting children to substitute for pensions and public eldercare simply shifts the cost of ageing from the state to younger households.


That is not a sustainable demographic strategy. India needs a care economy that includes geriatric healthcare, home-based care, trained caregivers, community services and stronger old-age income security.


There is an economic opportunity here as well. Care is labour-intensive. A larger formal care sector could create employment at precisely the time some states begin facing shortages of younger workers.


Population policy also has an environmental cost. More people require more housing, water, energy, food and transport. But population alone does not determine environmental pressure. Consumption and urban form matter.

A larger population living in compact cities with efficient public transport, cleaner energy and better water management will have a different resource footprint from a smaller population living in sprawling, vehicle-dependent urban settlements.


This matters for Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra because fertility decline is occurring alongside urbanisation and industrialisation.


A government that encourages larger families must therefore also plan for the physical consequences of additional housing, schools, hospitals, water supply, electricity and transport. Otherwise, demographic policy is being designed separately from urban and environmental policy even though the outcomes are directly connected.


Migration Valve

India’s greatest demographic advantage may be that its states are ageing at different speeds. A state with a young population does not have to keep every worker within its borders. A worker from a high-fertility state can move to an ageing, economically stronger state where labour demand is greater.


Internal migration can therefore partially compensate for low fertility. But this requires a different approach to urban policy. Migrant workers need housing, healthcare, schools and social protection. Migrants are not simply labour inputs. They become residents, parents and taxpayers.


If Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu or Andhra Pradesh increasingly depend on migrant labour, their demographic policies will have to include migrant households as part of the population rather than treating them as temporary additions to the workforce.


If governments genuinely want people to have the number of children they prefer, the policy objective should be to reduce the economic penalty attached to family formation.


That means affordable childcare, good public education, accessible healthcare, housing, parental leave, stronger female employment and social security for older people.


India’s demographic transition has therefore produced a strange policy reversal. For much of the country’s modern history, governments worried about too many births. Some states are now worrying about too few. But the answer should not be a simple shift from population control to population expansion.


India needs different demographic strategies for different states. Younger states need jobs and human capital. Low-fertility states need productivity, migration and preparation for ageing. All states need stronger care systems.


The central question is not how many children a government wants its citizens to have. It is whether citizens can afford the children they want. India’s population debate now is no longer really about population but about the kind of society we will be able to sustain when the demographic dividend begins to fade.


(The writer is an independent public policy researcher. Views personal.)

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