India’s Quiet Pivot: How Strategic Ties with Israel are Redefining Its Role in the Middle East

India’s relationship with Israel has traversed a remarkable arc, evolving from a largely passive distance to a powerful, albeit quiet, camaraderie. At the heart of this shift lies India’s complex domestic politics, its historical solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and a contemporary realpolitik that now closely aligns it with the Jewish State. The transition has been most stark since 2014 under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose tenure has reshaped the Indo-Israeli relationship in ways that reflect broader global trends but also signal India’s deepening role in the Middle East.

The transformation of India’s relationship with Israel, though, did not begin with Narendra Modi’s government, nor was it solely a post-Cold War phenomenon. In fact, the earliest signs of a thaw appeared during the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi.

Rajiv, who came to power in 1984 after the assassination of his mother, Indira Gandhi, inherited a foreign policy deeply entrenched in non-alignment and staunch support for the Palestinian cause. However, as the Cold War was slowly winding down, Rajiv’s government recognized the need to recalibrate India’s diplomatic outlook to match its emerging security and economic priorities.

It was during this time that quiet diplomatic channels were opened between India and Israel. Although India officially remained committed to the Palestinian cause - underscored by Rajiv’s continued support for Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) - a more nuanced approach was starting to take shape.

For decades after its independence in 1947, India maintained a pro-Palestinian stance that mirrored the moral aspirations of its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. It was a period when India’s foreign policy was couched in anti-colonial solidarity, and aligning with Palestine seemed natural. The Indian National Congress, with its socialist leanings and emphasis on global justice, viewed Israel’s establishment through the lens of Western imperialism. Nehru himself, though not hostile toward Israel, could not fully endorse the new Jewish state given India’s significant Muslim population and the rising tide of non-alignment across the Global South. India’s official position was thus firmly pro-Palestinian, though there was no outright hostility towards Israel.

During Indira Gandhi’s tenure, the tilt towards Palestine became even more pronounced. India was a vocal critic of Israeli actions in the Middle East, particularly after the Six-Day War in 1967 and Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian territories. In 1975, India went so far as to support the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism. India’s leadership, then rooted in the Non-Aligned Movement, saw Israel as an extension of Western imperialism in the Middle East.

The Palestinian struggle against Israel mirrored, in India’s eyes, the anti-colonial fights of Asia and Africa. Despite this publicly pro-Palestinian stance, by the late 1980s, cracks were beginning to show in India’s foreign policy. Israel was rapidly becoming a technological powerhouse, with advanced capabilities in agriculture, defence, and intelligence - all areas where India, struggling with internal security issues and a stagnant economy, needed support.

Rajiv Gandhi’s government also faced growing domestic challenges that prompted this shift. The rise of militancy in Punjab and the Kashmir Valley necessitated better intelligence and security measures. Israel, with its reputation for counterinsurgency prowess, began to emerge as a valuable partner. Although formal diplomatic ties were still a decade away, under-the-table exchanges and covert collaborations in intelligence and defence were initiated during this time.

It was a cautious beginning, one that allowed India to maintain its public solidarity with Palestine while quietly exploring new strategic partnerships. This dual-track diplomacy laid the groundwork for the more formal engagement to follow in the 1990s. In many ways, Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure was a period of quiet, strategic recalibration with Israel.

Thus, while Rajiv Gandhi remained outwardly committed to the traditional pro-Palestinian stance, his tenure marked the first subtle shift towards pragmatism in India’s Middle East policy. This early groundwork would later be capitalized on by Prime Ministers like P.V. Narasimha Rao, who, in 1992, formally established diplomatic relations with Israel, further accelerating the thaw that had started during Rajiv’s time.

Quiet diplomatic exchanges were initiated between New Delhi and Tel Aviv, and in 1992, India finally established full diplomatic relations with Israel under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. This was a pragmatic shift, but India still maintained its official pro-Palestinian stance in multilateral forums.

Thus, the seeds sown during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure blossomed into a more comprehensive and public partnership under subsequent governments, culminating in the full embrace of Israel under Modi’s current leadership.

This ‘quiet pivot’ continued through the 1990s and 2000s, as Israel began to emerge as an important partner for India in defence and technology. The Kargil War of 1999 was another turning point with Israel providing India with critical military supplies during the conflict, cementing its role as an indispensable partner. Yet, even as the Indo-Israeli relationship blossomed behind closed doors, India publicly reiterated its commitment to the Palestinian cause, a delicate balancing act that reflected its desire to maintain ties with Arab nations and its own sizable Muslim population.

Modi’s visit to Israel in 2017 was historic - not only because he was the first Indian prime minister to visit the country, but because of the symbolism it carried. This was no quiet diplomatic affair; it was a public celebration of a relationship that had long been kept in the shadows. Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walked the beaches of Tel Aviv together, their camaraderie displayed for the world to see. The shift was not just in optics but in substance: trade between the two nations surged, defence cooperation deepened, and there was a marked shift in India’s rhetoric regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The unspoken logic was clear: Israel could offer India what the Arab world could not, especially in terms of defence technology and expertise in areas like counterterrorism.

Yet, this growing closeness with Israel has not resulted in a complete alienation from the Arab world. Modi has skilfully managed to maintain strong ties with countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, positioning India as a significant player in the Middle East.

As India’s global stature rises, its role in the Middle East is evolving in tandem. The region has long been a theater of great power competition, with the U.S., Russia, and China all vying for influence. India, by deepening its ties to both Israel and the Gulf states, is positioning itself as a bridge-builder, a nation that can talk to all sides. New Delhi’s participation in the I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE, and the U.S.) grouping is emblematic of this approach that seeks to leverage synergies between these nations in trade, technology and security.

However, India’s ability to shape the future of the Middle East faces significant challenges. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, with no imminent peace process in sight. While India has been careful not to take sides, the longer this conflict festers, it may be hard for India to maintain its balancing act. The Abraham Accords, brokered by the Trump administration in 2020, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, have opened new possibilities for cooperation, but they have also exposed rifts within the Arab world itself. India will need to navigate these delicate dynamics, balancing its ties to Israel with its historical relationships in the Arab world.

Concludes