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By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 3:00:19 am

A Veto That Shakes NATO

France’s surprise veto with Russia and China exposes a fraying Western consensus, raising awkward questions about NATO’s future. For seven decades, the choreography of great-power diplomacy has been comfortingly predictable: when push came to shove at the United Nations, France stood with the United States and United Kingdom, balancing the habitual dissent of Russia and China. That symmetry has now been disrupted. In a jarring diplomatic turn, France recently joined Russia and China to veto...

A Veto That Shakes NATO

France’s surprise veto with Russia and China exposes a fraying Western consensus, raising awkward questions about NATO’s future. For seven decades, the choreography of great-power diplomacy has been comfortingly predictable: when push came to shove at the United Nations, France stood with the United States and United Kingdom, balancing the habitual dissent of Russia and China. That symmetry has now been disrupted. In a jarring diplomatic turn, France recently joined Russia and China to veto an American-backed resolution on tensions in the Strait of Hormuz - the first such alignment in over two decades. While the immediate casualty was the resolution itself, the deeper damage may be to the idea of a coherent West. The resolution, tabled by Bahrain and backed by Washington and London, sought to censure Iran for its role in disrupting traffic through one of the world’s most vital oil arteries. Roughly a fifth of global petroleum passes through the narrow strait; any blockade is, by definition, a global problem. American and British diplomats argued that Iran’s actions demanded a firm, formal response from the Security Council. Few expected Moscow and Beijing – Iran’s global allies - to oblige. But fewer still expected Paris to demur. Surprise Decision Yet demur it did. By casting its veto alongside Russia and China, France ensured the proposal’s emphatic defeat, granting Iran valuable diplomatic breathing room at a moment of acute regional strain. The symbolism was as potent as the substance. The familiar 3–2 split within the Security Council’s permanent members had inverted, if only for a vote. For Washington, it was a stinging rebuke. Why did France break ranks? Part of the answer lies in the increasingly prickly relationship between the White House and the Élysée. Public barbs by Donald Trump aimed at Emmanuel Macron have not helped. Nor has Washington’s habit, as seen in this crisis, of consulting allies late or selectively. French officials have privately bristled at American obstreperousness. Paris, long jealous of its strategic autonomy, appears to have decided that assent was no longer automatic. There is also a substantive disagreement about ends as well as means. France has leaned towards de-escalation in the Gulf, wary of steps that might entrench confrontation or tip the region into a wider war. It has resisted American pressure for a more muscular European military role against Iran. Voting against the resolution allowed Paris to signal that its priority is lowering the temperature, even if that meant an awkward alignment with powers whose broader aims it does not share. Complicating matters further is France’s increasingly uneasy relationship with Israel. Recent French restrictions on airspace for flights suspected of carrying military supplies to Israel, coupled with pointed criticism over human-rights concerns, have cooled ties. Israel’s response in suspending some defence contracts has added a commercial edge to the dispute. The result is a subtle but real distancing from the informal American-Israeli axis in the region, and a greater willingness in Paris to explore alternative diplomatic postures. Furthermore, French trade flows depend heavily on secure passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Reports that a French-owned container vessel was recently granted safe transit by Iranian authorities hint at a quiet understanding. For any trading nation, stability in chokepoints matters more than rhetorical alignment in council chambers. NATO Cohesion The episode dents American influence in the Middle East by showing that even close allies may defect on high-stakes votes. More broadly, it sharpens questions about the cohesion of NATO at a moment when its largest member is already sending mixed signals. Trump has periodically threatened to reassess America’s commitments to the alliance, railing against what he sees as insufficient European burden-sharing. A formal withdrawal remains legally and politically fraught. But a ‘soft decoupling’ would have similar effects over time. European governments are taking note. The prospect of an unreliable security guarantor has revived talk of a more autonomous European defence capability which is NATO-like in function, but less dependent on Washington. Such ambitions have surfaced before, only to be stymied by cost, politics and duplication. This time may be different. Russia’s assertiveness, China’s global reach and America’s mercurial posture together make a stronger case for hedging. None of this implies an imminent rupture. Transatlantic ties remain dense and in many domains, indispensable. Nor does France’s vote herald a durable Franco-Russian-Chinese bloc; their interests diverge too widely for that. What it does suggest is a world in which middle powers assert their preferences more openly, even at the expense of alliance neatness. The episode also carries a warning about process. Allies who feel sidelined are more likely to freelance. Had France been more closely consulted or more convinced by the strategy it might have chosen differently. In the end, the veto is best read as a reassertion of interests. France sought de-escalation, protected its commercial lifelines and signalled displeasure with American unilateralism in one stroke. That it did so alongside Russia and China is less important than why it did so at all. The West’s unity has always rested on a mix of shared values and converging interests. When the latter diverge, the former are tested. More than a century ago, Lord Palmerston observed that nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests. The line is often quoted because it is often true. Paris’s veto is a contemporary illustration that alliances are not immune to the gravitational pull of self-interest. In an era of shifting power and uncertain leadership, that pull is becoming harder to resist. (The writer is a retired naval aviation officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

Indian Shipbuilding A Must Win Marathon

Shipbuilding

With a coastline of 7500 KM, it is hard to imagine, that for the first 20 years (1947-1967) India had no ‘shipping ministry’. In 1967 a Shipping ministry “coupled” with ROAD transport was established. Since then, this ministry has been on a name changing ride, not once, not twice but six times. In 2009 the “ROAD Transport and Highways” was de-coupled and ‘Shipping’ ministry was formed. Turning point came in 2015 with a clear maritime vision for 2030 and 2047. Ministry was re-christened, aptly to Ministry of “Ports, Shipping and Waterways” in 2020.


Why is Shipbuilding important for a country?

a. A Shipyard becomes an opportunity hub and like a queen bee requires the support of an industrial colony to manufacture machinery and equipment.

b. National Shipyards support fleet renewal needs of the Navy.

c. Contributes to national GDP, increases inflow of FOREX.


Korea shipbuilding is 8% of GDP. Japan’s automobile industry is 2.9% of GDP. India’s shipbuilding a meagre 0.000578% of GDP. In context, India’s pharmaceutical industry, ranked third largest in the world is 1.72% of India’s GDP.


International Shipbuilding Market

The market is estimated to reach around USD 200 billion by 2029, growing at a CAGR of 4.84%. While India is at bottom with 0.07% of world share, behind Philippines 1.5% and Vietnam 1%, however on the positive side, India has done well in taking care of its defence needs, with 37 of 39 Naval ships being built in India yards. Rear Admiral S Shrikhande researching on maritime as a Fellow at Wollongong University, Australia, says “Shipbuilding in India needs both, serious incentivisation and dogged determination and not harping on being a big ship breaking country. That Garden Reach shipyard has a $54 million order for merchant ships from a German owner, is a good sign.”


Were Shipyards of 20th century in Flight mode?

Prominent shipyards in India were built in the colonial period. Mazagon Dock 1774, Garden reach 1884, Hindustan shipyard 1941 to cater to British navy and merchant fleet needs. Cochin shipyard 1972, Adani Katupalli 2013, Reliance Naval and Engineering, Rajula Gujarat 1997 and others have limited capacity, hence a lot more work to do. Capt. Subhangshu Dutt (Singapore) a mariner and now a shipowner, says “GOI should hold hands in any collaboration till the marriage with the foreign entity is reasonably stable. He also suggests that “new shipbuilding sites should be given to existing successful shipyards since they have decades of experience and talent. Consortium of 3 or more parties may also be good idea”.


Shipbuilding GOLD

As per SPLASH report the demand for LCO2 carriers could reach 2,500 ships by 2050. As per other estimates, 40% of global fleet of ships could have wind propulsion by 2050. A surge in such vessels is due to an unparallel waves of decarbonization in the shipping industry. Demand for ships with ‘carbon neutral’ badges, such as Dual fuel, Wind assisted, Nuclear fuel ships, Hydrogen powered ships, Liquified CO2 (LCO2) carrier, is outstripping supply. A must in the ‘bucket list’ of every Shipyard. Pinning down a standard ROI in shipbuilding is not easy, but experts suggest it could range from 4% to 15% for the high demand ‘carbon neutral’ ships. While an LNG new build vessel could cost US$ 250 million upwards.


International collaboration

On China’s shipbuilding success story, Manoj Pandalanghat (Singapore) a mariner and ship owner believes that “China has around 50 active Shipyards. Each have a few large dry docks. In each dock two or more large vessels are built simultaneously. Thus, a single yard is able to roll out 2/3 vessels/month, 36 vessels/year and 50 shipyards roll out 1800 vessels/year”.


China could be a jaldi-5, but India needs a sturdy Mount Fiji. Besides technology, Japanese bring the most important hand baggage of soft-skills and culture, essential for success from keel laying to delivery. Maruti’s is a standing example.


Food for thought for New Delhi

a. Expertise: Hire Naval Architects and shipbuilding experts with current international experience.

b. Government assistance: Land, Financial support, subsidies and timebound clearances.

c. Monitoring: PMO should monitor the first 5 to 10 years till Shipbuilding takes-off on this long-haul flight to destination 2047.


India’s Shipbuilding is expected to grow to $237 billion by year 2047. On a back of the envelope calculations this works out to about 4% of India’s 2047 projected GDP of $ 5 trillion. While cars are driven on roads, however the Ministry of roads and transport has little to do with “Automobile manufacturing”. On a similar note, ‘Shipbuilding’ as an industry has little to do with Ports, Shipping and Waterways, thus it may be worthwhile to consider a separate ‘Ship-building’ wing in the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways headed by a dynamic cabinet rank minister. Since 2047 targets are stiff and an uphill task, so in all probabilities, the officials in Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways are likely to push beneath the carpet, delays and failures of Shipbuilding with sweet success stories of “Ports, Shipping and Waterways” and if this does happen then India will not only miss the Shipbuilding bus of 21st century but a lot more from a national security and strategic perspective.


(The author is a Shipping and Marine consultant. Member Singapore Shipping Association and empaneled with IMO as a specialist consultant. Views personal.)

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