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By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger...

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre. The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington. Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension. Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence. Balancing Challenge India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem. There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises. While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington. The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West." However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion. Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil? India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people? If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience. This is where BRICS enters the larger picture. India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight. More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US. (The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

Indian Shipbuilding A Must Win Marathon

Shipbuilding

With a coastline of 7500 KM, it is hard to imagine, that for the first 20 years (1947-1967) India had no ‘shipping ministry’. In 1967 a Shipping ministry “coupled” with ROAD transport was established. Since then, this ministry has been on a name changing ride, not once, not twice but six times. In 2009 the “ROAD Transport and Highways” was de-coupled and ‘Shipping’ ministry was formed. Turning point came in 2015 with a clear maritime vision for 2030 and 2047. Ministry was re-christened, aptly to Ministry of “Ports, Shipping and Waterways” in 2020.


Why is Shipbuilding important for a country?

a. A Shipyard becomes an opportunity hub and like a queen bee requires the support of an industrial colony to manufacture machinery and equipment.

b. National Shipyards support fleet renewal needs of the Navy.

c. Contributes to national GDP, increases inflow of FOREX.


Korea shipbuilding is 8% of GDP. Japan’s automobile industry is 2.9% of GDP. India’s shipbuilding a meagre 0.000578% of GDP. In context, India’s pharmaceutical industry, ranked third largest in the world is 1.72% of India’s GDP.


International Shipbuilding Market

The market is estimated to reach around USD 200 billion by 2029, growing at a CAGR of 4.84%. While India is at bottom with 0.07% of world share, behind Philippines 1.5% and Vietnam 1%, however on the positive side, India has done well in taking care of its defence needs, with 37 of 39 Naval ships being built in India yards. Rear Admiral S Shrikhande researching on maritime as a Fellow at Wollongong University, Australia, says “Shipbuilding in India needs both, serious incentivisation and dogged determination and not harping on being a big ship breaking country. That Garden Reach shipyard has a $54 million order for merchant ships from a German owner, is a good sign.”


Were Shipyards of 20th century in Flight mode?

Prominent shipyards in India were built in the colonial period. Mazagon Dock 1774, Garden reach 1884, Hindustan shipyard 1941 to cater to British navy and merchant fleet needs. Cochin shipyard 1972, Adani Katupalli 2013, Reliance Naval and Engineering, Rajula Gujarat 1997 and others have limited capacity, hence a lot more work to do. Capt. Subhangshu Dutt (Singapore) a mariner and now a shipowner, says “GOI should hold hands in any collaboration till the marriage with the foreign entity is reasonably stable. He also suggests that “new shipbuilding sites should be given to existing successful shipyards since they have decades of experience and talent. Consortium of 3 or more parties may also be good idea”.


Shipbuilding GOLD

As per SPLASH report the demand for LCO2 carriers could reach 2,500 ships by 2050. As per other estimates, 40% of global fleet of ships could have wind propulsion by 2050. A surge in such vessels is due to an unparallel waves of decarbonization in the shipping industry. Demand for ships with ‘carbon neutral’ badges, such as Dual fuel, Wind assisted, Nuclear fuel ships, Hydrogen powered ships, Liquified CO2 (LCO2) carrier, is outstripping supply. A must in the ‘bucket list’ of every Shipyard. Pinning down a standard ROI in shipbuilding is not easy, but experts suggest it could range from 4% to 15% for the high demand ‘carbon neutral’ ships. While an LNG new build vessel could cost US$ 250 million upwards.


International collaboration

On China’s shipbuilding success story, Manoj Pandalanghat (Singapore) a mariner and ship owner believes that “China has around 50 active Shipyards. Each have a few large dry docks. In each dock two or more large vessels are built simultaneously. Thus, a single yard is able to roll out 2/3 vessels/month, 36 vessels/year and 50 shipyards roll out 1800 vessels/year”.


China could be a jaldi-5, but India needs a sturdy Mount Fiji. Besides technology, Japanese bring the most important hand baggage of soft-skills and culture, essential for success from keel laying to delivery. Maruti’s is a standing example.


Food for thought for New Delhi

a. Expertise: Hire Naval Architects and shipbuilding experts with current international experience.

b. Government assistance: Land, Financial support, subsidies and timebound clearances.

c. Monitoring: PMO should monitor the first 5 to 10 years till Shipbuilding takes-off on this long-haul flight to destination 2047.


India’s Shipbuilding is expected to grow to $237 billion by year 2047. On a back of the envelope calculations this works out to about 4% of India’s 2047 projected GDP of $ 5 trillion. While cars are driven on roads, however the Ministry of roads and transport has little to do with “Automobile manufacturing”. On a similar note, ‘Shipbuilding’ as an industry has little to do with Ports, Shipping and Waterways, thus it may be worthwhile to consider a separate ‘Ship-building’ wing in the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways headed by a dynamic cabinet rank minister. Since 2047 targets are stiff and an uphill task, so in all probabilities, the officials in Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways are likely to push beneath the carpet, delays and failures of Shipbuilding with sweet success stories of “Ports, Shipping and Waterways” and if this does happen then India will not only miss the Shipbuilding bus of 21st century but a lot more from a national security and strategic perspective.


(The author is a Shipping and Marine consultant. Member Singapore Shipping Association and empaneled with IMO as a specialist consultant. Views personal.)

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