“No terrorist operation can succeed without ground-level help”

In the wake of the deadly Pahalgam massacre that shook the Kashmir Valley, Vijay Manohar Gore, a veteran Border Security Force officer who retired as Second-in-Command, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India in 2024, spoke to Ruddhi Phadke, News Editor, ‘The Perfect Voice’. Gore has closely witnessed the evolution of terrorism in Kashmir. Having served at both eastern and western borders, he spent nearly 19 years at the J&K frontier and was instrumental in a series of anti-militancy operations, including one in 1993 that led to the surrender of four JKLF militants to the BSF. In this wide-ranging interview, Gore speaks on the pattern of cross-border terrorism Pakistan has been accused of fomenting since 1947, and why Kashmir continues to be its theatre of choice. Excerpts…

What is the theory behind Pakistan’s involvement in the Pahalgam attack?

There is a strategic pattern behind the timing and location of the attack, and we must understand it in the broader context of recent events. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) had ambushed Pakistan’s Jaffar Express on March 11, 2025, in Bolan district, targeting over 400 passengers. According to Pakistani officials, most of those killed were army and paramilitary personnel. This incident severely embarrassed the Pakistani military establishment.

Predictably, they have blamed India for orchestrating the attack via BLA operatives, something India has categorically denied. But instead of investigating their internal lapses, Pakistan’s military leadership often opts for external distraction. General Syed Asim Munir, the current Pakistan Army chief, has ambitions that remind me of General Zia-ul-Haq. This political ambition, coupled with the embarrassment in Balochistan, likely prompted him to plan a retaliatory strike in India to shift domestic attention.

Why Pahalgam, and specifically Baisaran meadows?

The decision to target Pahalgam was tactical. Pakistan-backed terror planners likely weighed their options between Kashmir and Jammu. In today’s context, Kashmir being a Muslim-majority area has been relatively more peaceful than Jammu. Tourism has flourished in Kashmir, and the hotel industry has been making crores thanks to the surge in visitors. Around 400–500 locals in Pahalgam directly depend on tourism for their livelihoods.

This boom created an illusion of normalcy, which terrorists aimed to shatter. Pahalgam was a soft target as the influx of tourists far outnumbered the security presence. Terrorists, as always, prefer to strike where security is thinnest. Baisaran valley, being slightly outside the main tourism hub, falls outside the standard security perimeter. It was a calculated decision to strike where the state was least prepared and to remind India that militancy in the Valley is not over.

What about the timing? Why now?

Timing was crucial. The attack was executed ahead of the annual Amarnath Yatra, which begins in July. During the Yatra, the deployment of security forces increases exponentially along the pilgrimage route. In contrast, April and May are relatively less militarized, offering an operational advantage to militants.

Moreover, heavy security tends to concentrate around major urban or well-frequented tourist areas like Srinagar, Gulmarg, and Sonmarg. Baisaran does not attract the same attention, which made it an ideal target. The intent was clear: to spread fear just before Amarnath Yatra and signal that the area is unsafe, even for pilgrims and tourists.

What are the factors that are making it difficult to catch the terrorists?

The geography of Pahalgam makes counter-insurgency operations particularly difficult. It is close to the Line of Control (LoC), and the surrounding terrain is rugged and forested. Once the attackers dispersed into the hills, tracking them became a logistical nightmare.

Another major hurdle is their disciplined use of technology or the lack of it. The attackers used minimal electronic devices, which makes them harder to trace. This level of operational discipline suggests they were not just local recruits but professionally trained terrorists. Their familiarity with the terrain, combined with high-grade planning, has complicated efforts to neutralize them.

What is the root cause of recurring terror attacks in Kashmir?

The roots of conflict in Kashmir trace back to the partition of British India in 1947. Although the region had a Muslim-majority population, its accession to India under Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh sowed long-term discontent. Many Kashmiris harboured cultural and religious ties with Pakistan.

Organised militancy emerged in the late 1980s. In the controversial 1987 J&K elections, Yusuf Shah, better known as Syed Salahuddin, contested as a candidate of the Muslim United Front in Srinagar. His campaign was backed by the Islamic Students League, with Yasin Malik as his campaign manager. The election, widely believed to have been rigged, saw the National Conference’s Ghulam Mohiuddin Shah declared the winner despite Shah’s apparent lead.

Subsequently, Salahuddin founded Hizbul Mujahideen with Pakistani support, while Malik established the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front. These events mark the inception of the militancy that has since plagued the region. More recently, the abrogation of Article 370 and the recent Waqf Amendment Act have fuelled further discontent.

Why were tourists specifically targeted in Pahalgam?

Tourism in Kashmir is viewed with mixed feelings. While many locals benefit economically, there is an undercurrent of cultural anxiety. Some political voices, like NC MP Aga Syed Ruhullah Mehdi, have publicly accused the BJP and RSS of using tourism as a cultural invasion. They allege that Hindu tourists are being sent to Kashmir in large numbers to dilute the Valley’s Muslim identity.

Moreover, certain tourist behaviours like alcohol consumption clash with Islamic sensibilities. Alcohol is legally and socially restricted in most parts of Kashmir. Locals want economic development, but not at the cost of losing their cultural and religious identity. This ideological discomfort sometimes mutates into hostility.

Did the terrorists have local support in Pahalgam?

Absolutely. No terrorist operation can succeed without ground-level help. The silence of the local population - no mobile footage, no public condemnation - is telling. Someone provided them shelter, guided them through the terrain, and helped them escape.

Local support may not always be ideological. Sometimes it is coerced. But in this case, the absence of any backlash from residents suggests complicity. The terrorists chose a location with minimum surveillance and maximum familiarity. It was not accidental but was enabled.

How do we resolve the issue of local support for terrorists?

There has to be a calibrated mix of deterrence and education. Measures like demolishing the homes of overground workers (OGWs) or terror sympathizers have their place. Losing one’s home is a severe emotional and economic blow that can deter future support.

But deterrence alone will not solve the problem. We must also invest in civic education. Locals need to be made aware of how their lives and futures are tied to peace. Security forces alone cannot solve this crisis. A grassroots movement, driven by truth and consequences, is essential. They must be shown what lies at the end of the path they are supporting is ruin, not liberation.

(Tomorrow: Is war a solution?)