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By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 3:00:19 am

A Diplomatic Detour

The Japanese Prime Minister’s decision to skip Assam is a setback for the Northeast, but not for the larger India-Japan partnership. India and Japan share one of Asia’s most understated yet enduring partnerships. Long before the relationship acquired strategic significance, it rested on the quiet foundations of culture and civilisation. Buddhism travelled from the Indian subcontinent to Japan over many centuries, leaving an imprint that still shapes Japanese society. In the modern era, that...

A Diplomatic Detour

The Japanese Prime Minister’s decision to skip Assam is a setback for the Northeast, but not for the larger India-Japan partnership. India and Japan share one of Asia’s most understated yet enduring partnerships. Long before the relationship acquired strategic significance, it rested on the quiet foundations of culture and civilisation. Buddhism travelled from the Indian subcontinent to Japan over many centuries, leaving an imprint that still shapes Japanese society. In the modern era, that cultural affinity has been reinforced by expanding economic ties, institutional cooperation and an increasingly convergent strategic outlook. Strong Bonds The architecture of this relationship is extensive. Organisations such as the Indo-Japanese Association have nurtured cultural and intellectual exchanges since the 1950s, while the Indo-Japanese Economic Cooperation Council has promoted investment, technology transfer and commercial collaboration. Diplomatic forums on both sides have steadily deepened mutual trust, reflecting a shared commitment to peace, stability and prosperity across the Indo-Pacific. Security cooperation has become an equally important pillar. A turning point came in 2008, when India and Japan signed their Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Tokyo. Since then, bilateral ties have expanded to include regular “2+2” ministerial dialogues, defence exchanges, coast guard cooperation and joint military exercises. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, which entered into force in 2021, has further strengthened operational cooperation between the Indian armed forces and Japan’s Self-Defence Forces. Together with their collaboration through the Quad, these initiatives underscore how the two democracies increasingly view each other as indispensable strategic partners. The diplomatic warmth between the two countries, however, predates the present geopolitical moment. One of the earliest symbols of goodwill came in 1949, when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru gifted an Indian elephant to Tokyo’s Ueno Zoo. At a time when Japan was struggling to recover from the devastation of the Second World War, the gesture carried emotional significance far beyond diplomacy. Three years later, India signed one of the first post-war peace treaties with Japan, formally establishing diplomatic relations on April 28, 1952. India’s exports of iron ore contributed to Japan's post-war industrial recovery, while Japan gradually emerged as one of India's most dependable development partners. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s visit to India in 1957 marked another milestone, paving the way for decades of Japanese official development assistance. Today, that legacy is visible in projects ranging from metro rail systems to the Mumbai-Ahmedabad high-speed rail corridor, one of the largest Japanese-backed infrastructure investments overseas. Against this backdrop, the decision by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to cancel the Guwahati leg of her July 2026 India visit has understandably generated disappointment, particularly in Assam. The annual India-Japan summit will now be held entirely in New Delhi. Official explanations have cited parliamentary commitments in Tokyo and scheduling constraints. Diplomacy often leaves little room for certainty, and itinerary changes are not uncommon. Yet symbolism matters in international relations, especially when a region is striving to position itself as a gateway to Southeast Asia. Past Incidents This is not without precedent. In 2019, then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was forced to cancel his visit to Assam amid protests over the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. That cancellation deprived the Northeast of an opportunity to showcase its growing strategic relevance within Japan’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. It also served as a reminder that domestic political turbulence can sometimes carry unintended diplomatic costs. The latest cancellation comes at an equally delicate moment. Assam has spent years projecting itself as an emerging investment destination. Improved law and order, expanding infrastructure and greater connectivity have encouraged the state government to court foreign investors with unusual vigour. Preparations for the Japanese delegation reflected those ambitions. Guwahati witnessed beautification drives, road improvements and hospitality planning. Japanese officials reportedly spent weeks assessing the local ecosystem, infrastructure and investment climate ahead of the proposed visit. The economic stakes were hardly insignificant. Prime Minister Takaichi was expected to be accompanied by executives from more than 50 Japanese companies and organisations, including Suzuki Motor. Discussions were expected to cover industrial investment, energy resilience initiatives and financing mechanisms that could support infrastructure development in India and Southeast Asia. For Assam, hosting such a delegation would have provided a valuable opportunity to present itself not merely as a peripheral state but as a strategic hub connecting India to East and Southeast Asia. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has understandably expressed disappointment while indicating that the state would seek greater clarity from the Ministry of External Affairs. Such restraint is prudent. More importantly, one cancelled visit should not be mistaken for a weakening of Japanese interest in the Northeast. Indeed, there are indications that a high-level Japanese business delegation may still visit Assam separately. If that materialises, much of the economic momentum generated by the preparations could yet be preserved. The larger trajectory of India-Japan relations remains firmly positive, driven by strategic necessity as much as by historical goodwill. Both countries seek resilient supply chains, diversified manufacturing, secure maritime routes and greater stability across the Indo-Pacific. These interests transcend the calendar of summit diplomacy. For India, however, the episode offers a useful lesson. The Northeast has acquired unprecedented geopolitical significance as New Delhi's gateway to ASEAN and as an integral component of the Act East policy. Maximising that potential requires not only infrastructure and connectivity but also careful diplomatic management and political stability. Foreign investment is ultimately attracted by predictability as much as by opportunity. While a cancelled visit may disappoint, but it need not derail a partnership built patiently over seven decades. If both New Delhi and Dispur draw the right lessons, the next Japanese delegation may arrive not merely as honoured guests but as long-term partners in the economic transformation of India’s Northeast. (The author is a retired naval aviation officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

SCO Aims to Unite Regional Powers for Trade and Security Gains

Trade and Security Gains

Indian scholar and political commentator, Sudheendra Kulkarni, founder of the Forum for a New South Asia, has underscored the potential of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to break the ice between India and Pakistan. Although bilateral talks between the two countries did not occur during the meeting, Kulkarni highlighted that the SCO’s first article calls for “mutual trust, friendship, good neighbourliness, and cooperation.” By adhering to these principles, the SCO could serve as a catalyst for renewed dialogue between India and Pakistan, he argued.


Kulkarni’s remarks come at a time when global trade and cooperation face significant hurdles because of rising protectionism, sanctions, and geopolitical conflicts. The SCO, which includes India, Pakistan, China, and Russia as key members, stands as a multilateral platform that can counter these challenges by promoting cooperation rather than competition. With India and Pakistan already members, the SCO provides a rare platform for the two nations to engage in regional trade, technology, and security, potentially overriding political differences.


One of the critical points that Kulkarni raised is the growing trade between India and China, which reached over $136 billion last year. Kulkarni believes that India and Pakistan could similarly benefit within the SCO framework. “We hope this will break the ice and open up India-Pakistan dialogue, even though no formal talks took place during this meeting,” he said. The SCO’s mandate to foster good neighbourly relations between member states could be instrumental.


According to Kulkarni, developing countries, particularly those in the SCO and BRICS (another multilateral group that includes India and China), should leverage these platforms to foster trade and technological cooperation that bypasses Western-dominated financial systems. In doing so, these nations can shield themselves from the adverse impacts of Western-imposed sanctions and protectionist policies, which have disrupted global markets and harmed developing economies.


Kulkarni’s critique of Western sanctions goes hand in hand with his call for a more equitable form of globalisation. “The illegitimate, dividing sanctions of Western powers go against the spirit of globalisation, starving developing countries of finance, investment, and access to markets,” he said. For countries like India and Pakistan, which face significant economic challenges, the focus should be on poverty alleviation and sustainable development—not on becoming pawns in the geopolitical games of global powers.


The SCO brings together nations from Eurasia and beyond, offering a framework for cooperation that sidesteps the entrenched political divisions seen in other international forums. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, who described the recent SCO meeting as “productive,” highlighted key areas of cooperation, including business, medicine, food security, and climate action. These are precisely the kinds of issues that transcend borders and political differences, offering a path forward for India and Pakistan to work together under the SCO umbrella.


Moreover, Kulkarni emphasised China’s role in sharing its technological and infrastructural advancements with the world, particularly through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). If India and Pakistan can set aside their hostilities and engage with China constructively, the entire region could benefit from increased connectivity, technological innovation, and economic growth. The SCO’s emphasis on mutual benefit and regional cooperation aligns well with this vision, providing a framework for India, Pakistan, and China to collaborate on shared goals.


However, the long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan, fuelled by border disputes, terrorism, and historical animosities, has often overshadowed efforts at regional cooperation. While the SCO provides a platform for dialogue, real progress will require sustained political will from both sides. Nonetheless, Kulkarni’s optimism offers a glimmer of hope that the SCO could be the venue where India and Pakistan start to re-engage, if not directly, then at least through shared multilateral objectives.


By participating actively in the SCO, India and Pakistan can diversify their economic and political alliances, reducing their dependence on Western-dominated institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. For Pakistan, which has been grappling with economic instability and political unrest, such engagement could offer a way out of its current crises. For India, it provides an avenue to assert itself as a major player in Eurasian geopolitics, independent of Western influence.


Ultimately, Kulkarni’s call for India and Pakistan to embrace the SCO’s potential is a timely reminder that in a world beset by conflict and division, multilateralism remains a viable path forward. The challenges of trade protectionism, sanctions, and geopolitical tensions are too complex for any one country to solve alone. As part of the SCO, India and Pakistan can work together—if not as allies, then at least as partners in the pursuit of shared regional stability and economic growth. If they can seize this moment, the SCO may become the platform where one of the world’s most enduring rivalries finally begins to thaw.


(The author is a senior journalist based in Islamabad. Views personal.)

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