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By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

How Sovereign Resistance Is Challenging US Tech Hegemony

From colonial-era control of trade routes to today’s contest over satellites, data and digital infrastructure, India’s confrontation with American tech power exposes the growing tension between global connectivity, corporate dominance and national sovereignty. The historical memory of colonialism is long, deeply etched into the collective consciousness of the Global South. For centuries, foreign powers arrived on distant shores under the banner of trade, infrastructure, and philanthropy, only...

How Sovereign Resistance Is Challenging US Tech Hegemony

From colonial-era control of trade routes to today’s contest over satellites, data and digital infrastructure, India’s confrontation with American tech power exposes the growing tension between global connectivity, corporate dominance and national sovereignty. The historical memory of colonialism is long, deeply etched into the collective consciousness of the Global South. For centuries, foreign powers arrived on distant shores under the banner of trade, infrastructure, and philanthropy, only to strip sovereign nations of their resources, redraw their laws, and compromise their independence. Today, that old expansionist playbook has been digitised. Instead of physical gunboats and chartered trading companies, the instruments of modern dominion are satellite constellations, algorithms, and cloud infrastructure. The colonial empires of the past understood that control over ports, railways, shipping routes, and communications networks could translate into political authority and economic dependence. In the contemporary world, control over cloud computing, satellite communications, semiconductor supply chains, and the platforms through which societies exchange information can exercise a comparable structural influence, even without territorial occupation. The difference is that the new frontier is governed not only by states, but also by corporations whose technological reach increasingly rivals the capabilities of governments. The brewing geopolitical conflict between the United States and India has brought this “digital colonialism” into sharp, unmistakable focus. The current US administration, executing a hyper-aggressive, unilateral “America First” strategy, has increasingly aligned itself with tech billionaires to treat foreign sovereignty as an administrative hurdle. The recent high-stakes standoff over Elon Musk’s satellite internet service, Starlink, coupled with crushing US economic sanctions and visa freezes, demonstrates how tech monopolies and state power now operate as an interlocking machine. However, the heavy-handed approach has triggered an intense, grassroots nationalistic backlash, proving that the digital architecture of the 21st century cannot be built on the submission of sovereign nations. Digital Colonialism Digital colonialism refers to a structural system where a handful of technologically advanced nations, primarily the United States, use their corporate monopolies to control the digital ecosystem, data pipelines, and critical infrastructure of other countries. Under this model, developing nations are treated merely as data goldmines to be extracted and passive consumer markets to be dominated. For years, Silicon Valley executives utilised a standard “Twitter diplomacy” model to bypass foreign regulations. By leveraging massive digital footprints, corporate giants routinely bullied smaller or less tech-reliant nations into granting sweeping concessions under the guise of “bringing connectivity to the unconnected.” This corporate philanthropy is frequently a Trojan horse designed to secure data monopolies and hook local populations on proprietary, foreign-owned infrastructure. When this corporate pressure fails, the full weight of US state power is brought to bear. The Trump administration’s integrated economic squeeze—imposing massive $100,000-plus surcharges on H-1B visas, threatening universal tariffs on Indian goods, and suddenly freezing Indian tech firms out of the PERM Green Card application process—functions as an economic club. Obviously, it is a deliberate effort to create an asymmetric trap: utilising state tools to strangle a nation’s domestic industries from above, while corporate spearheads like Musk launch high-pressure campaigns to break open its regulatory defences from below. This struggle also belongs to a much longer history of post-colonial economic resistance. The Non-Aligned Movement emerged during the Cold War from the determination of newly independent nations to avoid becoming instruments of competing superpowers. Today, strategic autonomy must extend beyond military alliances and diplomatic manoeuvring to encompass control over data, digital payments, communications networks, and the technological standards that shape economic life. For India and much of the Global South, the challenge is not to reject foreign technology, but to ensure that access to it does not become a new instrument of external leverage. Aggressive Rhetoric The immediate flashpoint of this conflict ignited when Musk publicly accused Indian telecom regulators of committing a “crime against the people of India.” In an aggressive rhetorical campaign, Musk alleged that domestic regulations were designed to maintain a “monopolistic chokehold,” directly targeting Indian business leaders by asking on social media, “Is Ambani the real boss of India?” The underlying reality, however, is a matter of strict national security, not corporate favouritism. The Indian Ministry of Communications flatly rejected the billionaire’s claims, reiterating that Starlink, alongside all domestic and international competitors, must undergo mandatory data security audits and satellite gateway localisation assessments. In a world where data is the definitive currency of national power, allowing a foreign corporation to operate an autonomous, unmonitored satellite network that transmits domestic data directly to overseas servers is a fundamental national security risk. The US strategy fundamentally miscalculates the unique nature of India’s digital landscape. Unlike many regions that rely entirely on Western tech infrastructure, India has systematically built one of the world’s most advanced, self-reliant, and affordable digital public infrastructures, highlighted by the open-source Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and a hyper-competitive, hyper-affordable 4G/5G cellular network. Because India built its own digital foundations, its public and policymakers view foreign attempts to dictate regulatory terms not as a gift of modern technology, but as an existential threat to economic sovereignty. India’s experience carries wider significance because it challenges the assumption that technological modernisation must follow a model designed and controlled by Western corporations. Whether Silicon Valley or Washington understands it or not, the aggressive, top-down strategy has backfired at the grassroots level. In India, corporate bullying by foreign tech magnates does not intimidate the population; it unites them. Consumer groups, digital rights advocates, and everyday internet users have reacted with an intense nationalistic backlash, reframing the dispute from a telecom technicality into a defence of sovereign dignity. Indian consumers are uniquely sensitive to foreign encroachment. When a Western billionaire uses public threats to demand a bypass of national security laws, the public quickly recognises the echo of historical exploitation. This has sparked a growing sentiment that if Starlink refuses to respect the laws of the land, it will be banned not by the paperwork of the government, but by a quiet, devastating boycott by the consumers themselves. The global order is rapidly fracturing. By treating long-standing allies as economic targets and dismantling the international treaties that governed global behaviour, the US is alienating the very markets it seeks to dominate. The stakes extend well beyond the India–US relationship. As the European Union pursues digital regulation, China builds alternative technological ecosystems, and emerging economies seek greater control over their data, the world is moving towards a more contested digital order. Satellite internet is only one part of this struggle; artificial intelligence, cloud infrastructure, digital currencies, and access to critical computing resources will increasingly determine who sets the rules of the global economy. The unfolding resistance in India proves that the days of unchallenged digital colonialism are over. If a foreign entity wishes to operate in the world’s largest open internet market, it must do so as an equal partner, under local laws, and with explicit respect for the sovereignty of the people. No amount of geopolitical leverage from Washington can force a proud, independent nation to buy products from a corporate empire that views them with contempt. Critics argue that these developments point towards a broader, coordinated squeeze on the nation. On one front, the US administration’s shifting stance towards Pakistan signals an attempt to alter regional balances. On the domestic front, a recent public exchange between Elon Musk and opposition leader Rahul Gandhi regarding corporate monopolies has fuelled intense political debate. Sceptics view this digital alignment with caution, arguing that combining foreign corporate pressure with aggressive domestic political protests—which have previously disrupted parliamentary proceedings—risks destabilising the country’s economic and democratic momentum at a critical juncture. Now is the time to be on alert. (The writer is an advocate and a public policy analyst. Views personal)

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

Writer: Sagari Gupta
Sagari Gupta
Jun 15
5 min read

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty.

Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to the Union Budget. SpaceX raised the near-equivalent of that annual allocation in one day. The investors who participated were not buying into a rocket company. They were pricing control over satellite infrastructure, global internet access, launch capability, and an integrated AI platform at a level exceeding the GDP of most countries. Roughly 30 percent of the shares, worth approximately $22.5 billion, went to retail investors, three times the proportion typical of a US listing. India has no private entity in this category.

 

What SpaceX actually controls

Starlink, SpaceX’s satellite internet division, operated approximately 7,000 active satellites globally as of early 2026. It counts over nine million subscribers worldwide, and following a 2026 merger, SpaceX also owns xAI, the developer of the Grok AI system. A company that controls satellite connectivity, launch capacity, and a frontier AI model occupies a position no regulator has previously had to classify. It is not a telecom operator, not a defence contractor, and not a technology platform. It is all three at once, under common ownership.


In June 2025, SpaceX received authorisation from India’s Department of Telecommunications, followed by a licence from IN-SPACe in July 2025. As of June 2026, Starlink’s commercial operations in India remain pending, with the company in active discussions with the Government of India on security clearances, a process slowed by concerns linked to Starlink terminal use in the Iran conflict.


That delay is itself revealing. A foreign company’s service continuity in India depends on negotiations that India does not fully control.


Satellite communications, launch systems, and AI-integrated data infrastructure are the functional equivalents of roads and electricity grids in a digital economy. States that built those grids in the twentieth century retained control over access, pricing, and service continuity. States that depend on foreign corporations for digital infrastructure in the twenty-first century do not. The dependence question is already live for India


India’s digital public infrastructure, covering Aadhaar, UPI, and the Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission, processes billions of transactions monthly. Aadhaar covers nearly the entire adult population, and UPI carries the bulk of India’s retail digital payments. The system’s design is sound: public architecture, state-controlled data governance, open standards.

 

The next connectivity layer is the problem. TRAI data shows rural internet penetration at 44.2 percent as of March 2024, with only 3.8 percent of rural households connected through high-speed fixed infrastructure. Approximately 630 million Indians remain offline, with primary barriers being awareness, affordability, and limited local-language content, according to the Kantar ICUBE 2024 survey. That gap will not close through terrestrial fibre rollout alone. Satellite broadband, through Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb, or Amazon’s Project Kuiper, will carry a large share of that load over the next decade.

 

None of these are Indian entities. Their pricing decisions, service continuity choices, and data routing practices sit outside Indian jurisdiction. A farmer in Chhattisgarh receiving crop advisory data through a satellite connection does not know that a pricing decision made in California affects whether that signal arrives tomorrow. She will notice only when it stops.

 

Foreign private capital has built connectivity infrastructure in India before. Reliance Jio brought down mobile data costs after its 2016 launch, extending internet access to hundreds of millions of Indians who had not been able to afford it before. Jio’s rollout also created large-scale domestic employment in network maintenance, retail, and customer service, jobs that remain within India’s economy. Private investment in connectivity is not a threat to sovereignty.


Structural Gap

The difference with SpaceX is structural. Jio operates under Indian law, pays taxes in India, employs Indian engineers, and answers to Indian regulators when disputes arise. Its towers and fibre sit on Indian soil. Starlink’s constellation orbits at 550 kilometres, outside any single national jurisdiction. Under the Telecommunications Act 2023, existing Starlink operators in India continue under the legacy Unified Licence framework, with their licences remaining valid. But no Indian regulatory instrument contains a binding service continuity obligation for satellite operators. If Starlink suspends Indian operations, no domestic legal mechanism compels continuation or requires a managed transition for the users left without service.

 

The $1.75 trillion valuation amplifies this structural gap. India’s external debt stood at $736.3 billion at end-March 2025, according to the Reserve Bank of India. SpaceX’s market valuation now exceeds India’s total external debt by a wide margin. A corporation at that scale does not face the same regulatory friction as a domestic operator. It does not need to negotiate from a position of dependence.


India’s satellite communications framework, updated through the Indian Space Policy 2023 and the Telecommunications Act 2023, governs licensing and spectrum allocation in detail. It does not contain binding service continuity or exit-transition obligations for foreign satellite operators. That gap needs closing through explicit licence conditions before Starlink and its competitors reach commercial scale in India.


India’s Semiconductor Mission has made genuine progress. Pilot production started in three plants in 2025, and the government confirmed that four plants commenced commercial production in 2026. Kaynes Semicon’s OSAT unit in Sanand reached commercial production in March 2026. India also inaugurated its first 3-nanometer chip design centres in Noida and Bengaluru in 2025, a step toward design capability even as fabrication capacity remains limited. These are real milestones, not announcements. They do not yet constitute a domestic supply chain for the advanced chips needed for satellite infrastructure, AI systems, or next-generation communications hardware. India’s domestic semiconductor market was approximately $45-50 billion in 2024-25, according to industry estimates cited by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. Closing the gap between consumption and domestic production is a decade-long task requiring sustained capital commitment.

 

India’s competition framework does not treat foreign satellite infrastructure concentration as a market power question. The Competition Commission of India has a clear mandate over domestic pricing and merger activity. It has no instrument to act when a foreign entity’s control over orbital infrastructure creates de facto monopoly conditions for remote connectivity within India. That regulatory gap needs explicit legislative attention before dependence deepens further.

 

Market Signals

SpaceX’s $1.75 trillion valuation is not a data point about one company. It is a market signal about what global capital considers most valuable in 2026: not oil fields or shipping lanes, but control over the systems through which economies communicate, compute, and transact.


India entered the hydrocarbon era as a net importer and spent decades building the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and domestic refining capacity to reduce that dependence. The programme continues to expand today, a reminder that infrastructure sovereignty is an ongoing commitment. The response was slow and expensive. It was also the right call.


The digital infrastructure era has well and truly arrived. India is already a net importer of the connectivity and computing systems that will define the next phase of its economic growth. The SpaceX IPO makes the scale of that dependence visible in a single number. And policymakers do not have decades to respond this time.


(The writer is an independent public policy researcher. Views personal.)

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