The Berlin-New Delhi Axis
- Dr. V.L. Dharurkar

- 3 hours ago
- 3 min read
From steel to submarines, Indo-German ties are moving from pure commerce to defence.

Rajnath Singh’s recent visit to Germany signals a shift that has been long in the making between the two countries. From a relationship once defined by trade, the ties between India and Germany are finally moving towards defence. India wants German technology and co-production while the latter, newly alert to hard security after Russia’s war in Ukraine, is more willing to provide both.
The two countries have been partners for decades, though mostly in commerce. Diplomatic ties were established in 1951, and early cooperation produced industrial landmarks such as the Rourkela Steel Plant. By the 2000s, intergovernmental consultations and a formal strategic partnership gave the relationship institutional depth. Yet defence remained marginal, held back by Berlin’s caution on arms exports and Delhi’s habit of diversifying suppliers. Compounding this has been Germany’s post-war strategic culture, which has generally been wary of militarisation. This sat uneasily with India’s appetite for large-scale defence procurement.
Shedding Inhibitions
That restraint is now eroding. India’s push for ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ demands not just imports but technology transfer and domestic manufacturing. Germany, meanwhile, is rethinking its role as a security actor, loosening long-held inhibitions. The overlap has created an opening that both sides appear ready to exploit.
This has been helped by Berlin’s ‘Zeitenwende’ - a proclaimed turning point in defence policy that has begun to ripple outward, reshaping its partnerships beyond Europe. Announced in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it brought with it a €100bn special fund to modernise the Bundeswehr, a commitment to meet NATO’s 2 percent spending target and a loosening of long-standing taboos on arms exports and overseas deployments. Thus, a response to a continental crisis is now informing Germany’s external posture whereby it is exhibiting a greater willingness to engage in defence-industrial cooperation, diversify partners and project stability in regions such as the Indo-Pacific. In that sense, outreach to India is emblematic of a broader recalibration by which Germany is moving from being a largely civilian power to a more assertive, if still restrained, security actor.
Talks during Singh’s visit focused squarely on co-development and co-production. This is significant as India has long sought to escape the limits of buyer–seller arrangements that deliver hardware without know-how. German collaboration, particularly in high-end engineering, offers a way to build capacity at home while reducing dependence on traditional suppliers.
Naval cooperation stands out. Discussions around submarine development for the Indian Navy hint at a more ambitious industrial partnership. Germany’s expertise in conventional submarines is well established, and joint projects would align with India’s goal of strengthening indigenous shipbuilding. A visit to German maritime research facilities reinforced the seriousness of these plans.
Leaping Ahead
The agenda extends beyond platforms. Artificial intelligence, cyber security and drone technologies featured prominently. For India, these domains offer a chance to leap ahead; for Germany, they provide a route into a large and fast-growing defence market.
The strategic logic is straightforward as India seeks partners that can enhance its capabilities without constraining its autonomy. Germany wants to diversify its defence engagements while supporting a stable Indo-Pacific. Neither side is pursuing an alliance; both are hedging in a more volatile world. Defence cooperation thus becomes a practical middle ground.
There are, however, familiar obstacles. Germany’s export controls remain stringent, shaped by domestic political sensitivities. India’s procurement processes are slow and often unpredictable. Bridging these gaps will require more than declarations of intent. Past agreements have sometimes faltered at the level of execution.
Even so, the trajectory is clear. The relationship is acquiring a harder edge, driven by converging interests rather than sentiment. Defence is no longer peripheral; it is becoming central. If co-production projects materialise, they could redefine the partnership, embedding it in shared industrial and technological ecosystems.
The broader context reinforces the shift. Both countries mark over seven decades of ties, but the anniversary coincides with a less forgiving global environment which is marked by conflict in Europe, instability in the Middle East and intensifying competition in Asia. In such a landscape, economic partnerships alone look insufficient.
Rajnath Singh’s visit reflects a mutual recognition that the old template of ‘trade first, security later’ between the two countries needs updating. Whether the new approach delivers will depend on execution. But the intent is unmistakable: Berlin and Delhi are no longer content with merely a ‘comfortable partnership;’ they are testing the terms of a strategic one.
(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)





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