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By:

Abhijit Mulye

21 August 2024 at 11:29:11 am

Red flag to green steel

Ex-Maoists forge new destiny in Gadchiroli Gadchiroli: The rugged, forested terrain of Gadchiroli district, long synonymous with the violence and deep-rooted anti-establishment tenets of the ‘Red Ideology’, is now witnessing a remarkable social and industrial transformation. At the Lloyds Metals and Energy Ltd. (LMEL) plant in Konsari, once-feared Maoist operatives are shedding their past lives and embracing a new, respectable existence as skilled workers in a cutting-edge Direct Reduced Iron...

Red flag to green steel

Ex-Maoists forge new destiny in Gadchiroli Gadchiroli: The rugged, forested terrain of Gadchiroli district, long synonymous with the violence and deep-rooted anti-establishment tenets of the ‘Red Ideology’, is now witnessing a remarkable social and industrial transformation. At the Lloyds Metals and Energy Ltd. (LMEL) plant in Konsari, once-feared Maoist operatives are shedding their past lives and embracing a new, respectable existence as skilled workers in a cutting-edge Direct Reduced Iron (DRI) and pellet plant. This ‘green steel’ project, part of LMEL’s push for an integrated steel complex in the region, is functioning not just as an industrial unit but as a crucial pillar in the Maharashtra government’s surrender-cum-rehabilitation policy. So far, LMEL, in coordination with the state government and the Gadchiroli Police, has provided employment and training to 68 surrendered Maoists and 14 members of families affected by Naxal violence, a total of 82 individuals, offering them a definitive pathway back to the mainstream. The Shift The transformation begins at the company’s dedicated Lloyds Skill Development and Training Centre at Konsari. Recognizing that many former cadres had limited formal education, the company implements a structured, skill-based rehabilitation model. They are trained in essential technical and operational skills required for plant administration, civil construction, and mechanical operations. For individuals like Govinda Atala, a former deputy commander, the change is palpable. “After surrendering, I got the right to live a new life,” Atala said. “I am very happy to get this job. I am now living my life on my own; there is no pressure on me now.” Suresh Hichame, who spent over a decade in the movement before surrendering in 2009 too echoed the sentiments. He realized the path of violence offered neither him nor his family any benefit. Moreover, his self-respecct was hurt. He knew several languages and carried out several crucial tasks for the banned organization remaining constantly under the shadow of death. Today, he works in the plant, receiving a steady monthly salary that enables him to care for his family—a basic dignity the ‘Red Ideology’ could never provide. The monthly salaries of the rehabilitated workers, typically ranging from Rs 13,000 to Rs 20,000, are revolutionary in a region long characterized by poverty and lack of opportunities. Trust, Stability The employment of former Maoists is a brave and calculated risk for LMEL, an industry that historically faced stiff opposition and even violence from the left wing extremist groups. LMEL’s management, however, sees it as an investment in inclusive growth and long-term stability for the district. The LMEL has emphasized the company’s commitment to training and facilitating career growth for the local populace, including the surrendered cadres. This commitment to local workforce upskilling is proving to be a highly effective counter-insurgency strategy, chipping away at the foundation of the Maoist movement: the exploitation of local grievances and lack of economic options. The reintegration effort extends beyond the factory floor. By providing stable incomes and a sense of purpose, LMEL helps the former rebels navigate the social transition. They are now homeowners, taxpayers, and active members of the community, replacing the identity of an outlaw with that of a respected employee. This social acceptance, coupled with economic independence, is the true measure of rehabilitation. The successful employment of cadres, some of whom were once high-ranking commanders, also sends a powerful message to those still active in the jungle: the path to a peaceful and prosperous life is open and tangible. It transforms the promise of government rehabilitation into a concrete reality. The plant, with its production of iron ore and steel, is physically transforming the region into an emerging industrial hub, and in doing so, it is symbolically forging the nation’s progress out of the ashes of extremism. The coordinated effort between private industry, the state government, and the Gadchiroli police is establishing a new environment of trust, stability, and economic progress, marking Gadchiroli’s transition from a Maoist hotbed to a model of inclusive and sustainable development.

The Empire That Fell in Pieces

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When the British dismantled what they called the Indian empire, they shattered it repeatedly, unevenly and often inadvertently. ‘Partition’ is usually remembered as a single cataclysm in 1947 - the vivisection of British India into India and Pakistan. Yet, as Sam Dalrymple reminds readers in his ambitious and meticulously crafted ‘Five Partitions and the Making of Modern Asia’, that rupture was only one act in a longer imperial unravelling. Between 1937 and 1971, the empire splintered five times, ultimately giving rise to a dozen modern states. Each break brought trauma, dispossession, political improvisation and the kind of border-making whose consequences outlived the flag that once flew above them.


Dalrymple begins with what he calls the “forgotten partition”: the detachment of Burma from India in 1937. For the ethnic Bamar majority, this separation fulfilled a long-held desire to extricate their politics from the gravitational pull of the Indian National Congress. For Hindu nationalists on the subcontinent, it also appealed to a vision of “Bharat” purged of non-Hindu territories. Dalrymple shows that neither side anticipated the social shock that followed.


Burma’s severance set off famine, shredded its labour markets (he notes how hundreds of thousands of Indian workers suddenly found themselves stranded) and sowed the seeds of insurgencies that still simmer. Nor was separation popular among all Burmese: a surprising number of nationalist leaders, he writes, imagined their future firmly tethered to India.


A second partition, even less remembered, began that same year. Aden and the Gulf states, long administered as appendages of British India, were hived off, formally completing their transfer in April 1947. In imperial paperwork, this seemed an administrative tightening. In practice, it marked the beginning of the Arabian peninsula’s geopolitical divergence from the subcontinent, altering the arc of labour migration, energy politics and the strategic calculations of London and New Delhi alike.


Then came the third and most violent rupture: the birth of Pakistan through the division of the Muslim-majority districts of India’s east and west. Dalrymple neither romanticises nor sanitises the devastation. He returns readers to the grisly mechanics of mass flight, revenge killings and communal triumphalism that accompanied hurriedly drawn boundaries. Mountbatten’s decision to advance the transfer of power by a full year by compressing administrative preparation for the world’s largest forced migration into roughly 70 days, emerges as a case study in imperial haste with disastrous consequences.


But the mapmaking did not end there. The fourth partition unfolded in the princely states, strange sovereignties that dotted the subcontinent. Their rulers were invited to choose between India and Pakistan, or to gamble on independence. Dalrymple retells these episodes with flair. Junagadh, a Hindu-majority kingdom with a Muslim ruler, briefly acceded to Pakistan on the advice of its Diwan, Shahnawaz Bhutto. India responded with what Dalrymple terms “a mixture of diplomacy and arm-twisting,” culminating in a plebiscite that brought Junagadh into the Indian Union. Kashmir, its demographic inversion of Junagadh reversed, with a Muslim-majority populace under a Hindu ruler, became the most explosive of these dilemmas. Elsewhere, the dreams of smaller national groups, from Nagas on both sides of the India–Burma frontier to Baluch sardars, were briskly dismissed.


The fifth and final fracture came in 1971, when Pakistan, riven by civil war and linguistic nationalism, split into two. Bangladesh emerged from the ruins of West Pakistan’s military repression. That same year, Britain withdrew its remaining protectorates from the Gulf: the last princely remnants of an empire long lost.


Dalrymple’s achievement lies not merely in chronicling these partitions but in revealing their cumulative logic. Every new border produced fresh minorities, fresh grievances and fresh claims to historical entitlement. The subcontinent’s communal tensions trace their lineage to decisions made at imperial desks, often with little knowledge of the lands they were meant to reorder.


What elevates the book is Dalrymple’s narrative verve and scholarly maturity - qualities striking in a writer not yet thirty. His prose is racy without being glib, and his command of archival detail is formidable. Anecdotes glide across the pages: Burmese politicians who feared losing their ‘Indianness,’ Indian migrants trudging on foot from Rangoon, princely courtiers juggling impossible choices, and the bureaucrats who believed a civilisation could be reorganised on a timetable.


In presenting the Indian empire’s disintegration as a sequence rather than a singular event, Dalrymple reframes a familiar story. He invites readers to see the modern map of South and West Asia not as the inevitable product of ancient identities but as the residue of hurried decisions, imperial hubris and the tragic arithmetic of partition.

(The writer is a Mumbai based educator. Views personal.)

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