top of page

By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 3:00:19 am

Who Owns the South China Sea?

The South China Sea has become the testing ground for the future of global trade and the balance of power in Asia. For centuries, great powers have understood a simple truth that whoever controls the seas shapes the destiny of nations. In the twenty-first century, that proposition has acquired renewed urgency in the waters of the South China Sea, a vast maritime crossroads through which the arteries of global commerce flow. It has emerged as one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical...

Who Owns the South China Sea?

The South China Sea has become the testing ground for the future of global trade and the balance of power in Asia. For centuries, great powers have understood a simple truth that whoever controls the seas shapes the destiny of nations. In the twenty-first century, that proposition has acquired renewed urgency in the waters of the South China Sea, a vast maritime crossroads through which the arteries of global commerce flow. It has emerged as one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical fault lines. Nearly four-fifths of all internationally traded goods by volume travel by sea. From crude oil and liquefied natural gas to automobiles, electronics, grain, and manufactured products, modern life depends on uninterrupted access to maritime trade routes. Among these routes, few are more important than those traversing the South China Sea. Nearly a quarter of global maritime trade passes through these waters. The region handles roughly 45 percent of the world’s crude oil shipments, more than 40 percent of propane trade, and over a quarter of global automotive commerce. The economic value of goods transiting the South China Sea annually is estimated at more than $5 trillion. Any prolonged disruption would reverberate far beyond East Asia. High Stakes The stakes have become even higher as global trade patterns evolve. New South-South trade corridors linking Asia with Africa and Latin America are expanding rapidly. Intra-Asian commerce continues to grow. Consequently, the South China Sea has become not merely a regional waterway but a central hub of an increasingly multipolar global economy. At the heart of the tensions lies China’s expansive territorial claim. Beijing asserts sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, relying on historical claims that overlap extensively with the exclusive economic zones of neighbouring states, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. These claims have generated persistent friction and deep anxiety across Southeast Asia. The international community’s legal position appears clear. In 2016, an international arbitral tribunal in The Hague ruled that China’s sweeping claims lacked legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Beijing rejected the ruling outright and has continued to consolidate its position through a combination of military, coast guard, and maritime militia activities. Over the past decade, China’s transformation of disputed reefs into fortified artificial islands has altered the strategic landscape. Airstrips, missile systems, radar installations, and naval facilities now dot parts of the contested region. Meanwhile, encounters between Chinese and Philippine vessels have become increasingly frequent and confrontational, raising fears that a localized incident could escalate into a broader conflict. The United States has repeatedly reaffirmed its security commitments to the Philippines and conducts regular Freedom of Navigation Operations to challenge excessive maritime claims. Other countries including Japan, Australia and several European powers, have increased their naval presence and surveillance activities in support of an open maritime order. Yet the South China Sea is not solely a contest between China and the United States. For India, too, these waters carry profound strategic significance. Maritime Security Traditionally viewed as a continental power preoccupied with its land borders, India increasingly recognizes that its economic future is inseparable from maritime security. More than $200 billion worth of Indian trade passes through the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. By value, this represents well over half of India’s total international trade. These waters connect India to some of its most important economic partners, including Japan, South Korea, China, and the member states of ASEAN. A substantial portion of India’s energy imports, particularly crude oil and liquefied natural gas sourced from the broader Asia-Pacific region, transits these sea lanes. The same routes facilitate the flow of electronics, industrial inputs, and manufactured goods that are essential to India’s growth. Consequently, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is not a distant diplomatic concern for New Delhi. It is a vital national interest. India has consistently expressed concern regarding China’s militarization of disputed territories and its reluctance to adhere fully to international maritime norms. At diplomatic forums, New Delhi has repeatedly emphasized respect for international law, particularly UNCLOS, as the basis for resolving maritime disputes. The Indian Navy has simultaneously expanded its operational presence across the Indo-Pacific. Regular deployments into the South China Sea signal India’s determination to protect its economic interests and contribute to regional stability. New Delhi has also strengthened security partnerships with Southeast Asian countries, most notably the Philippines, to which it has supplied BrahMos missile systems. Such moves reflect India’s willingness to assume a more active strategic role in the region. Economic engagement has complemented these security initiatives. Indian public-sector enterprises, including ONGC Videsh, have maintained investments in offshore energy exploration projects in Vietnamese waters despite Chinese objections. This engagement forms part of a larger strategic architecture. Through its Act East Policy, India has deepened economic and diplomatic ties with Southeast Asia. Through the SAGAR initiative (Security and Growth for All in the Region), it has promoted cooperative maritime security. And through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, alongside the United States, Japan, and Australia, India has supported the vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, formidable challenges remain. China’s economic influence across Asia is vast. ASEAN countries often seek a delicate balance between economic dependence on Beijing and strategic cooperation with external powers. India’s own leverage remains constrained by resource limitations and competing strategic priorities closer to home. These realities suggest that New Delhi must continually refine its South China Sea strategy. The objective is not confrontation but resilience: safeguarding trade routes, strengthening partnerships, supporting international law, and ensuring that no single power can unilaterally dictate the terms of maritime access. As the late American senator John C. Stennis once observed, cooperation among navies demonstrates a collective resolve to defend maritime security against emerging threats. In an era of rising geopolitical rivalry, the South China Sea is a test of whether the international order can preserve openness in the very waters upon which global prosperity depends. (The writer is a retired naval aviation officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

The Enduring Logic of ISRO

PART II: India’s strategic autonomy in space depends on an ISRO equipped to serve both civilian and strategic needs in an increasingly unstable world.

Recently, a certain segment within the Indian space ecosystem, motivated by vested interests and operating clandestinely, has begun to undermine ISRO’s future significance. This segment argues that the commercial sector will lead innovation and that the era of the publicly operated civilian agency ISRO has concluded. However, given the current circumstances, the commercial space sector is unable to replace or overshadow the nationalised space industry. In India, the government-run space industry remains resilient to sanctions and can operate across competing geoeconomic blocs. If India intends to procure the RD-191 semi-cryogenic engines from Russia, the state-controlled space sector would facilitate the acquisition. The Indian commercial sector, particularly startups embedded within Western space ecosystems, is likely to be hesitant in engaging with nations regarded as pariahs by Western states, as such interactions would contravene their existing commercial agreements. Therefore, India’s space program cannot rely on entities that non-state actors prohibit from engaging in business with significant portions of the international economy solely because those entities are considered pariahs.


Institutional Memory

The Indian space programme itself was forged during decades when access to critical technologies was routinely restricted by advanced industrial powers. Following the 1974 nuclear test and later during the technology-denial regimes of the 1980s and 1990s, Indian scientists were compelled to develop indigenous capabilities in launch vehicles, remote sensing and satellite applications. The institutional memory of those years explains why strategic autonomy remains deeply embedded within ISRO’s organisational culture.


Although the Indian commercial space sector is eager to position the Indian government as its primary client, given the government’s encouragement and support over the past six years, there exists a discrepancy between the government’s pace and the sector’s ambitious objectives.


The principal catalyst for innovation in the global space industry is the pioneering endeavours of leading spacefaring nations, supported by substantial financial investments. Indian commercial space entities, particularly nascent startups, derive considerable advantage from the ecosystem in the United States, which enables expedited market penetration, lucrative contractual engagements, cutting-edge research and development, reduced regulatory obstacles, and a more sustainable commercial environment—often exceeding the immediate benefits offered by the Indian government.


Although a match is emerging between the capabilities of India’s startups and the requirements of the US space program, this alignment does not benefit India. Presently, Indian commercial space operators engage minimally, if at all, with many in the non-US ecosystems. As a result, Indian commercial space entities remain heavily reliant on a market that seeks to surpass the Indian government as its primary customer; this market is a significant yet challenging talent magnet, even for other NATO and Five Eyes nations.


Amid a decade characterised by a global polycrisis, the concentration risk within our commercial space ecosystem substantially hampers India’s strategic autonomy. To maintain its role as a primary customer, India must promote the growth of indigenous startups engaged in its implicit space strategy. Anchor customers are vital in supporting commercial space enterprises. Such support can be effectively achieved through the development of a clear agenda that mandates government ministries and state governments to utilise these entities’ services comprehensively, thereby fostering socio-economic development, enhancing both cross-border and domestic security, securing supply chains, and ensuring political stability. Additionally, commercial space stakeholders should seek to explore new markets equitably, particularly within the Global South and among near-peer counterparts in the Global North, thereby indirectly promoting India’s strategic interests.


Dual-Purposing ISRO

Civil-military fusion functions reciprocally. During periods of relative peace, the civilian sector benefits from innovations resulting from this integration. Conversely, in anticipation of extended conflicts, it is the military sector that adopts these innovations. Should, as Prime Minister Modi has implied, the forthcoming global conditions pose significant challenges, then the Indian space program - encompassing its civilian, military, and commercial aspects - must be adequately prepared to serve national defence.


India’s commercial, civil, and military space ecosystems must not become isolated systems; their integration is intended to serve the overarching national objective. The amalgamation of civil, military, and commercial space sectors among prominent spacefaring nations has contributed to recent conflicts in Ukraine, West Asia, Africa, and South Asia. Should these conflicts intensify and spread, major space powers are likely to employ their space capabilities to incite kinetic and non-kinetic hostilities and to develop defensive mechanisms in response.

The role of ISRO holds paramount significance in contemporary times. Maintaining an exclusive pacifist stance for ISRO is as counterproductive as utilising it solely for vanity projects. ISRO is the originator of early-stage technological innovations suitable for subsequent commercialisation and adoption by commercial space entities. Additionally, ISRO develops technologies aligned with India’s national security requirements, which could be integrated by the DSA-DSRA-DGA coalition. While fulfilling these objectives, ISRO also contributes to socio-economic development through space initiatives, a practice it has successfully undertaken, now approached with a strategic resolve.


Formal Restructuring

India now requires an ISRO that actively serves the national interest in both peacetime and wartime and effectively addresses all forms of crisis. The organisation must undergo a formal restructuring to facilitate efficient dual-use research. Any reform in the space sector must include a revision of ISRO’s overarching vision and mission. ISRO’s capacity to undertake comprehensive, non-military, and dual-purpose security projects would be of immense strategic value to India in overcoming the global polycrisis. The polycrisis also demands that the Indian government establish a ‘joint space picture’ by amalgamating sensor data from civilian, commercial, and military space assets, thereby creating a more comprehensive and interoperable space architecture. Moreover, to safeguard this joint-space picture, India must implement all essential security measures across ground-to-space, air-to-space, and intra-orbit communications. There is a lot to do, now that the Prime Minister has articulated the threat he sees emanating from his towering vantage point and the national need to ensure that the Indian growth story remains adaptable but unhindered.


The future of India’s rise will depend not only upon economic growth rates or military expenditures, but on whether the Indian state can build resilient technological systems capable of functioning amid systemic global disorder. Space infrastructure increasingly underpins banking systems, telecommunications, navigation, climate monitoring, military operations, agricultural forecasting, disaster management, and supply-chain coordination. Any disruption to these systems during a prolonged international crisis would carry cascading domestic consequences.


In that sense, the restructuring of ISRO is no longer merely an institutional question; it is becoming a civilisational necessity tied to India’s aspiration of emerging as a leading power during the Amrit Kaal. The coming decade may well determine whether India remains dependent on external technological architectures designed by competing powers, or whether it develops an autonomous and integrated space ecosystem capable of protecting national interests across an era of turbulence.


(The writer is a Space and Emerging Technology Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation, Mumbai. Views personal.)

Comments

bottom of page