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By:

Quaid Najmi

4 January 2025 at 3:26:24 pm

Rs 1,136-cr digitisation contract under scanner

Disclosures on pricing and volumes in a five-year modernisation project have raised questions about costs and oversight. Mumbai: A project described as a routine “digital transformation” of Maharashtra’s registration machinery has raised eyebrows after regulatory disclosures indicated that its billing could reach a staggering Rs 1,136 crores over five years. The Inspector General of Registration & Controller of Stamps (IGR), which comes under the state’s revenue department, has issued a...

Rs 1,136-cr digitisation contract under scanner

Disclosures on pricing and volumes in a five-year modernisation project have raised questions about costs and oversight. Mumbai: A project described as a routine “digital transformation” of Maharashtra’s registration machinery has raised eyebrows after regulatory disclosures indicated that its billing could reach a staggering Rs 1,136 crores over five years. The Inspector General of Registration & Controller of Stamps (IGR), which comes under the state’s revenue department, has issued a Letter of Intent to a consortium led by the Navratna public-sector firm RailTel Corporation of India Ltd., alongside the Nashik-based infrastructure company Ashoka Buildcon Ltd. The consortium has been appointed as managed service provider for a comprehensive modernisation of IGR offices across the state. The five-year turnkey contract covers end-to-end operation and maintenance of IT systems, networks, cloud services and application infrastructure, as well as the scanning of official documents. Execution is scheduled to run until March 19, 2032. It is the financial structure, rather than the scope, that has prompted unease. The approved rate for scanning registered documents is Rs 24.75 per page. Industry sources say prevailing market prices for bulk document scanning typically range between Rs 3 and Rs 6 per page - roughly a quarter of the contracted rate. Costly Contract In identical filings with the NSE and BSE last week, the consortium partners referred to historical data in the request for proposals showing that an average of 9.18 crores pages were scanned annually over the past five years. At the agreed rate, this would translate into payments of around Rs 227 crores a year, taking the projected total to about Rs 1,136 crores over five years. The contract does not specify a ceiling, and payouts are expected to vary with actual volumes. Critics and watchdogs argue that the absence of a fixed cap, combined with a per-page charge well above market levels, leaves room for inflated bills or padded volumes. Prafful Sarda, a Pune-based social worker, questioned the rationale for outsourcing the task. Even if Rs 10 per page were taken as a generous benchmark using advanced machines, Sarda asked, “what is the need to award the scanning contract at a massive cost to outsiders when the state government can itself do it at a much lower cost.” He also raised doubts about the composition of the consortium. “What is the expertise in IT-related work of Ashoka Buildcon Ltd., which is a road infra developer. Moreover, scanning is an easy process – a 100-page file can be scanned and uploaded in barely five minutes. Massive discounts are offered for bulk works. Are the IGR staffers so over-burdened that scanning work has to be outsourced at exorbitant public cost?” Sarda said. According to him, contractors would gain access to sensitive land and property records, as well as information on real-estate preferences and market trends, potentially giving them an early advantage in identifying future development opportunities. He compared the case to what he described as the IRCTC spending Rs 2,619 crores on website upkeep and maintenance over three years, along with Rs 1,950 crores in UPI fees, figures cited in an RTI reply and reported earlier by this newspaper. When contacted, a spokesperson for Ashoka Buildcon said the company was a minority partner in the RailTel-led consortium and that “hence, we are not allowed to speak in the matter.” The spokesperson also declined to comment on when the five-year contract would commence, noting only that the stipulated completion date is March 2032.

The GIUK Gap: A Maritime Chokepoint Through History

The Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap has long been a key maritime chokepoint, shaping naval strategy from the World Wars to today and remains central to NATO’s security calculus.

The GIUK Gap’s strategic importance emerged during the World Wars when securing North Atlantic sea lanes was vital to the Allied war effort. The UK and US recognised that safeguarding routes between North America and Europe required early detection and neutralisation of German U-boats. Surveillance and airbases in Iceland and Greenland enhanced the Allied’s ability to track and intercept submarines, laying the foundation for a more systematic maritime defence in the following decades.


The Cold War made the GIUK Gap one of the world’s most surveilled maritime corridors. The Soviet Northern Fleet, based in Murmansk, used it to deploy ballistic missiles and attack submarines into the North Atlantic. In response, NATO integrated the gap into its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) strategy. The Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), a vast network of underwater listening devices, monitored Soviet submarine activity. The gap became NATO’s tripwire—any hostile movement triggered a rapid military response, supported by air and naval bases in the UK, Iceland, and Norway.


Strategic Revival

After the Cold War, the GIUK Gap faced strategic neglect. With Russian naval power seen as diminished, NATO shifted focus to counterterrorism and regional conflicts, diverting resources from maritime defence. Much of the SOSUS network was decommissioned, and patrols declined, creating a critical vulnerability in NATO’s defence infrastructure.


Over the last decade, geopolitical shifts have renewed focus on the GIUK Gap. Russia has modernised its Northern Fleet, deploying stealthier, long-range submarines. In 2019, a major naval exercise tested their ability to pass undetected through the gap. This assertiveness signals Russia’s intent to regain maritime presence, forcing NATO to recalibrate its posture.


Expanding Threat

Simultaneously, the Arctic is also undergoing unprecedented transformation. Melting sea ice is gradually opening new shipping routes, like the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s coast and potentially a transpolar passage. These developments create new economic opportunities but also complex strategic risks. The GIUK Gap, as the main corridor between the Arctic and the Atlantic, becomes the linchpin through which all maritime movement must pass. This geographical reality reaffirms the gap’s importance as a critical surveillance and control zone.


Beyond Russia, other actors are increasingly present in Arctic affairs. China, while geographically distant, has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and has articulated ambitions through the “Polar Silk Road.” Chinese investments in Arctic research stations, ports, and infrastructure are growing. Though its military presence in the region remains limited, China’s increased activity necessitates greater strategic awareness from NATO states. The possibility of joint Russian-Chinese exercises or dual-use infrastructure supporting undersea operations cannot be discounted.


Strategic Adaptation

To address these challenges, NATO has strengthened its posture in the GIUK Gap. The U.S. re-established the Second Fleet in 2018, reaffirming its Atlantic commitment. Allies have boosted ISR investments, enhancing maritime patrol and undersea monitoring. Radar systems in the Faroes and airbases in Iceland have been upgraded, while the UK has reinforced ASW with advanced P-8 Poseidon aircraft.


Joint exercises like Trident Juncture are becoming more frequent and complex, focusing on rapid response and interoperability in harsh maritime conditions. They simulate contested scenarios involving conventional and hybrid threats. Meanwhile, emerging technologies—AUVs, AI-driven sonar processing, and space-based surveillance—are strengthening NATO’s maritime security.


Operational Challenges

Formidable challenges remain. Russia’s Yasen-class submarines feature stealth capabilities that strain detection technologies. The North Atlantic’s deep trenches, strong currents, and frequent storms further hinder surveillance and response. Maintaining real-time domain awareness over such vast waters demands ongoing investment in human and technological capital.


Iceland, the key to the GIUK Gap, lacks a standing military and depends on alliance support. Greenland, part of Denmark, poses logistical hurdles due to its remoteness and sparse population. Effective defence relies on burden-sharing and pre-positioned NATO resources.


The GIUK Gap must be seen within a broader multidomain defence framework. Modern conflicts extend beyond conventional warfare—cyberattacks on naval communications, space-based GPS disruption, and disinformation campaigns affect maritime readiness. Integrating the GIUK Gap into cyber, space, and information warfare planning is vital to NATO’s deterrence.


The GIUK Gap remains a crucial strategic corridor in today’s shifting security landscape. Linking the Arctic and Atlantic will remain central to any transatlantic conflict. As geopolitical competition, environmental shifts, and technological advances reshape the maritime domain, NATO must reinforce its commitment to this key chokepoint. Investing in infrastructure, strengthening allied cooperation, and integrating new technologies will be vital to safeguarding navigation and collective defence. In the coming decades, the GIUK Gap will not just be a passage but a barometer of North Atlantic stability.


(The author is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)

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