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By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger...

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre. The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington. Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension. Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence. Balancing Challenge India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem. There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises. While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington. The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West." However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion. Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil? India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people? If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience. This is where BRICS enters the larger picture. India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight. More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US. (The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

The Road Not Taken: Could Eastern Europe Have Forged Its Own Path?

It is tempting to speculate if Ukraine and its historically-scarred neighbours had forged a pragmatic regional bloc instead of hankering after NATO membership.

In the chessboard of post-Cold War geopolitics, few gambits have been as costly as Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership. It was an aspiration long in the making, spurred by historical grievances against Russia, stoked by the promise of Western security and ultimately culminating in a brutal war that has left the country battered, its cities in ruins and its future uncertain. But what if Ukraine, and indeed much of Eastern Europe, had charted a different course?


History seldom offers clean hypotheticals, yet it is tempting to imagine an alternative - one where these ‘bloodlands’ once caught between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (to borrow the title of Timothy Snyder’s powerful book) had coalesced into a bloc of their own, independent of both Western and Eastern hegemonies. A hypothetical ‘East European Union’ that could have prioritized regional security, economic cooperation and mutual defence without becoming entangled in the power struggles between NATO and Russia. Such a path was never truly considered. Instead, countries of the former Eastern Bloc drifted westward, seeking solace in the institutions that had once viewed them as Cold War pawns.


The region has, for centuries, been the fault line of empires - Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, German and Soviet. The breaking of Nazi Germany’s stranglehold over this region was followed by tightening of Moscow’s iron grip under Joseph Stalin. To quote Churchill, an ‘Iron Curtain’ descended on this region, and for nearly half a century, as the Cold War raged, Eastern Europe was reduced to a collection of satellite states, ruled by Kremlin-appointed puppets who siphoned national wealth to serve Soviet ambitions.


When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the region’s nations found themselves adrift, struggling to redefine their identities in a rapidly changing world. While Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika cracked open the Soviet monolith, they also exposed the economic stagnation and political repression plaguing Eastern Europe for decades.


Missed Opportunity

In the 1990s, as Western Europe cemented its unity through the European Union, Eastern Europe remained fragmented. Countries like Poland, Hungary and Romania sought EU and NATO membership as a means of securing their newfound sovereignty. Ukraine, however, found itself in a precarious position being too large, too geopolitically sensitive and too entangled with Russia to make a clean break. Had Ukraine, along with its regional neighbours, sought to build a separate coalition, one neither beholden to Moscow nor dependent on Washington, could it have averted its current crisis?


Ukraine’s flirtation with NATO was always going to be provocative. The military alliance’s constitution permits the installation of lethal intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) within member states - an intolerable prospect for Russia when placed right across its border. NATO’s gradual expansion eastward had already set off alarm bells in Moscow, and Ukraine’s growing Western orientation was the final straw.


Imagine, for a moment, if China were to establish a missile base in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, mere miles from India’s southern coast. The outcry from New Delhi would be deafening, and a military response almost inevitable. This is precisely how Russia viewed Ukraine’s potential NATO membership: an existential threat.


Thus, in 2022, Vladimir Putin acted pre-emptively, launching an invasion under the guise of protecting Russian interests. Ukraine, now three years into a devastating war, has paid the price of its NATO ambitions with thousands of lives. Entire cities lie in ruins. The economy has been shattered. The U.S. under Trump has curtailed its military aid, and while Europe and the UK remain sympathetic, their financial and military capacities are limited. Meanwhile, peace talks remain elusive, trapped in a cycle of accusations, counter-accusations, and failed negotiations.


It is tantalizing to speculate what might have happened had Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours pursued a path that prioritized regional unity over alignment with global superpowers instead of chasing NATO membership. The idea is not without precedent. Regional alliances have long shaped global politics, instances being the Nordic Council, the Gulf Cooperation Council, ASEAN. An Eastern European Union, had it existed, might have provided Ukraine with the safety and stability it so desperately sought, without the antagonism that NATO membership entailed.


Such a bloc could still be conceivable today. If Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Hungary and other regional players came together in a strategic alliance, they might be able to strike a security deal with Russia - one that preserves their sovereignty while maintaining economic ties with the West. This approach would require pragmatic leadership, diplomatic finesse and a departure from the entrenched Cold War mentality that continues to shape East-West relations.


But geopolitics is rarely governed by reason alone. It is driven by ambition, fear and historical grievances. And so, while an Eastern European coalition remains an intriguing possibility, the more likely reality is that Ukraine will continue to suffer the consequences of its NATO aspirations.


In the end, Ukraine’s NATO dream may not have been a mistake in principle, but in execution. A dream pursued without sufficient power to defend it, without full commitment from allies, and without a clear understanding of Russia’s red lines, can quickly turn into a nightmare. For Ukraine and the world, the cost of this miscalculation is still being counted.

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