Two Democracies, One Dialogue

Shaped by foreign domination and wary of new dependencies, India and Poland are discovering overlapping interests in a fractured world.

Separated by geography but joined by experience, India and Poland are slowly recognising in each other the familiar survival habits. They are both states that have endured domination, rebuilt institutions and are now seeking autonomy in an unsettled international order. The recent visit to India by Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, was a confirmation that ties between the two countries have moved beyond pleasantries into the harder terrain of strategic conversation.

The relationship is not new. India established diplomatic relations with Poland in 1954, when Warsaw lay firmly behind the Iron Curtain and New Delhi was charting a non-aligned path between Cold War blocs. Poland’s own history of being partitioned in the 18th century and then absorbed into the Soviet sphere after the second world war, has left it with a deep suspicion of great-power coercion. India’s colonial experience under Britain has produced a similar instinct.

Shared Memories

That shared memory matters today. Poland is now a frontline state of NATO, acutely alert to Russian aggression after the invasion of Ukraine. India, while condemning civilian suffering, has pursued a more ambivalent approach, maintaining energy ties with Russia to protect its own economic interests. These differences surfaced during Sikorski’s visit. Polish criticism of India’s purchases of Russian oil, and Indian unease about Poland’s renewed engagement with Pakistan, revealed the limits of easy alignment. Yet such candour is not a weakness. On the contrary, it suggests a relationship maturing enough to absorb disagreement without collapse.

India’s foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, has made a habit of plain speaking, especially on terrorism. His insistence that democratic countries show zero tolerance towards cross-border militancy reflects India’s long-standing grievance that moral clarity is often selectively applied. Poland, for its part, has framed the war in Ukraine as a colonial one.

Beyond geopolitics, the substance of the relationship lies increasingly in economics. Bilateral trade has grown by nearly 200 percent over the past decade, reaching roughly $5.7 billion in 2023. That figure is modest by India’s standards, but impressive given Poland’s size and one that is growing fast. Cooperation now spans mining, digital technologies, defence manufacturing, agriculture and clean energy. Poland has emerged as one of India’s most significant partners in eastern Europe, a region India once neglected but now courts actively.

The timing is telling. India faces a more hostile global trade environment, with renewed protectionism in the United States and lingering uncertainty over tariffs. As New Delhi pushes for a free-trade agreement with the European Union, Poland’s support matters. Warsaw is influential within the EU, particularly on questions of security, supply chains and industrial policy. Sikorski’s visit, occurring amid a review of the 2024–28 India–Poland action plan, was thus as much about Brussels as about Delhi.

Soft power has played its part too. Before his official meetings, Sikorski attended the Jaipur Literature Festival. His appearance at there, denouncing the Ukraine war as a ‘colonial’ enterprise by Putin’s Russia before an approving liberal audience had the air of a well-rehearsed sermon delivered to the already converted. As the husband of Anne Applebaum, the American historian and doyenne of Atlanticist opinion, Sikorski is fluent in the idiom of moral outrage but less comfortable with the untidiness of others’ strategic compulsions.

The future of the Indo-Polish partnership will depend on follow-through. Ambitions are expansive: cooperation in artificial intelligence, cyber-security, higher education, health services, transport connectivity and climate protection all feature prominently. So does defence, where Poland’s rapid military modernisation offers opportunities for Indian manufacturers eager to integrate into European supply chains. Regular biennial reviews of the action plan suggest an attempt to institutionalise momentum rather than rely on episodic enthusiasm.

There will be frictions. India’s strategic autonomy will continue to irritate some European partners; Poland’s security priorities will not always align with India’s regional calculations. Yet both countries believe in international law, democratic procedure and the slow accumulation of trust. In a world where alliances are increasingly transactional and norms contested, that counts for something.

India and Poland are unlikely to become indispensable to one another. But they are discovering that being useful economically, politically and intellectually is enough. Two dynamic democracies, shaped by old wounds and new ambitions, have found in dialogue not just agreement, but durability.

(The author is a researcher and expert in foreign affairs. Views personal.)