Caught in the Crossfire: Capt. Ajay Pant The prosecution of Indian Master Capt. Ajay Pant, following Britain’s seizure of the tanker SMYRTOS, deserves closer international scrutiny. Calling it simply a campaign against Russia’s so-called shadow fleet is highly misleading. Britain itself has, and continues to, benefit from Russian oil trade. According to an investigation by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), between the beginning of Britain’s Russian oil ban and the first quarter of 2025, the UK imported an estimated £3 billion of petroleum products from five refineries in India and Türkiye processing Russian crude. An estimated £1.4 billion of that was derived from Russian crude. So, while Britain criminally prosecutes the Master of a tanker carrying Russian crude, Russian-origin crude has indirectly entered Britain’s own supply chain after being refined in third countries—and, importantly, with the permission of the UK government. The Russia-Ukraine war and the ensuing sanctions began on 24 February 2022. In December 2023, the IMO adopted Resolution A.1192(33), calling for action against illegal operations by shadow-fleet vessels. The G7 subsequently committed, in March 2025, to establish a Shadow Fleet Task Force involving G7 and Nordic-Baltic countries. SMYRTOS sailed on 4 June 2026 with about 100,000 tonnes of Russian crude. Its route to Asia was via the English Channel. By 10 June, Lloyd’s List had publicly reported Cameroon’s purge of 36 vessels. Britain, therefore, did not discover the flag problem with SMYRTOS accidentally on 14 June 2026. The arrest of the vessel and its Master cannot be viewed in isolation from international law, particularly at a time when geopolitical considerations and domestic political pressures can increasingly influence decisions with far-reaching consequences for individuals caught in circumstances well beyond their control. Uncomfortable Contradiction On 14 June, Royal Marines and National Crime Agency officers boarded SMYRTOS. Prime Minister Keir Starmer personally presented the operation as a blow against Russia and told Parliament that, in the days preceding the interdiction, British forces, supported by allies including France, had “closely tracked and monitored” SMYRTOS because it was suspected of using a false flag. Yet a month earlier, on 19 May, the UK government had announced new measures aimed at closing what it itself described as the “back door” through which Russian crude, after being refined in third countries such as India or Türkiye, could enter Britain as petroleum products. That prohibition was followed by the UK government issuing General Trade Licence GBSAN0004, permitting the continued import of specified diesel and jet fuel even if those products had been produced from Russian crude in third countries, until 1 January 2027. For other covered petroleum products, a refinery that processes both Russian and non-Russian crude may continue supplying the UK, provided the product exported to Britain can be demonstrated to have been produced from segregated non-Russian crude. This creates an uncomfortable contradiction worth debating: Britain is prosecuting an Indian Master for carrying Russian crude to a third country, while its own sanctions regime temporarily permits British importers to bring diesel and jet fuel into the UK that have actually been refined from Russian crude in third countries. What one would have expected the UK government to do was disembark the entire crew, transfer the oil ashore and tie up the ballast vessel in a location protected from wind and weather, rather than arresting the Master while the Owner and Charterer of the vessel could be sipping Bordeaux wine. Now, the UK government will have to manage not just the legal issue but also the weather, which is expected to worsen over time with a loaded tanker. Are we headed for another Torrey Canyon disaster of 1969? The lesson of earlier maritime disasters is that responsibility does not necessarily stop at the bridge. In his judgment on the 1987 Herald of Free Enterprise capsizing, which caused around 200 deaths among passengers and crew, the Honourable Judge criticised the Board of Directors for negligence in vessel management. Although there were shipboard failures, he observed that “the underlying or cardinal faults lay higher up in the Company”. He might have understood that the Master, as an employee with limited authority, could have been reluctant to take full control, fearing that doing so would threaten his livelihood. It would be deeply troubling if sanctions enforcement were to place disproportionate criminal responsibility on individual seafarers while insufficient attention is paid to the corporate entities that arrange, control and profit from the trade. If seafarers can be called upon to risk their lives carrying the world’s energy through war zones and areas of geopolitical conflict, the international maritime community must equally be prepared to defend them when they become caught in disputes far beyond the normal authority of a ship’s Master. Soft Targets Should the world’s seafarers consider a lawful and safety-conscious 12-hour global stoppage to remind governments and regulators that Masters and crews cannot become convenient targets in geopolitical conflicts? This is about a fundamental principle of justice: responsibility should follow authority, knowledge and control. If the commercial decisions were made ashore, if the cargo was fixed ashore, if the voyage was ordered ashore, and if information concerning the vessel’s deregistration was known ashore, then the international maritime community should ask a simple question: Why should the seafarer standing on the bridge become the principal face of criminal responsibility while those who organised and profited from the commercial venture remain largely out of public view? Capt. Ajay Pant deserves a fair trial. He did not own SMYRTOS. He did not impose sanctions on Russia. He did not control the Cameroon registry. He did not fix the charter. He did not receive any commission for the charter. An employed Master does not decide which cargo his owners or charterers commercially fix, or where that cargo is bought and sold. We are in 2026, not the 1750s, when the Master owned the vessel, selected his crew, paid its expenses and also selected which cargo he wished to carry. I call upon the ITF and seafarers’ unions to decide whether this is the moment to run with the hare or hunt with the hounds. (The writer is a marine consultant and member of the Singapore Shipping Association. Views personal.)
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