What If Aurangzeb Had Lost the War of Succession?

Counterfactual history, though generally disdained by scholars, can be valuable in exploring alternate historical outcomes by respecting historical evidence as stressed by historian Niall Ferguson.

While the question of what might have happened had Aurangzeb lost the ‘War of Succession’ (1658-59) may seem asinine, contemplating an alternate outcome is fascinating as it doubtless would have altered the trajectory of Indian history. Aurangzeb’s triumph over his elder brother Dara Shikoh in the decisive battles of Dharmat, Samugarh, and Deorai paved the way for his 49-year reign, marked by territorial expansion and religious orthodoxy.

Aurangzeb’s military prowess was undeniable. His victories were not the result of mere luck, but of superior generalship, tactical expertise, and an ability to remain calm under pressure. His defeat of not only Dara but also his other brothers, Shah Shuja and Murad Baksh, set the stage for his reign, which historian Sir Jadunath Sarkar describes as bringing the Mughal Empire to its greatest extent. In his monumental five-volume ‘History of Aurangzib’ (1912-24), Sarkar notes how Aurangzeb’s empire stretched from Ghazni to Chittagong and Kashmir to the Karnatak—an expanse unmatched by any Indian state prior to British rule.

Yet, the cost of this expansion was immense and the socio-religious tensions it fostered left lasting scars on the subcontinent. Had Dara Shikoh won, the ethos of the empire would have been fundamentally different. Known for his deep intellectual curiosity and his commitment to fostering religious inclusivity, his translation of the Upanishads, the ancient Hindu philosophical texts, from Sanskrit into Persian in Sirr-e-Akbar (‘The Greatest Mystery’), aimed to reconcile the mystical elements of Hinduism with Islam. He boldly asserted that the Upanishads held the key to understanding the esoteric aspects of the Quran, a view that placed him at odds with the more orthodox Islamic factions of the Mughal court.

Dara’s deep respect for Hindu culture and close relationships with Rajput rulers set him apart from Aurangzeb, who later alienated the Rajputs with his aggressive policies. It is conceivable that the Rajput revolt of 1679, which saw Durgadas Rathore rise against Aurangzeb after the Mughal emperor attempted to annex Marwar, would never have occurred under Dara’s rule.

Beyond the Rajput rebellion, the protracted Mughal-Maratha war in the Deccan (1681-1707), which bled the empire of its wealth and resources, could also have been avoided. Aurangzeb’s execution of Chhatrapati Sambhaji in 1689 incited widespread resistance among the Marathas, turning the Deccan into a quagmire that drained Mughal coffers and military might. Sarkar, in his comparison of this conflict to Napoleon’s Peninsular War, remarked that “the Deccani ulcer killed Aurangzeb.” A more diplomatically inclined Dara might have sought a peaceful resolution to the Deccan problem, sparing the empire from this debilitating war.

The execution of Guru Tegh Bahadur in 1675 solidified Sikh resistance, with Guru Gobind Singh transforming the Sikhs into a militant community through the founding of the Khalsa in 1699. Dara’s more inclusive policies might have prevented this radicalization, preserving the Sikhs as a spiritual movement rather than a military force.

The Jat rebellion in Agra, led by Churaman and later his nephew Badan Singh, was another consequence of Aurangzeb’s oppressive rule. The Jats, emboldened by the emperor’s preoccupation with other fronts, rose in defiance, destabilizing Mughal authority in northern India.

While François Bernier, the 17th-century French physician and traveller, dismissed Dara as politically naïve, Sarkar was critical of Dara’s limitations as a ruler of men. Nonetheless, had he triumphed, he would have left behind his vision for a pluralistic India. Aurangzeb’s orthodox reign, by contrast, left the empire weakened by internal strife, setting the stage for its eventual decline.