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By:

Sagari Gupta

24 March 2026 at 2:16:04 pm

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty. Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to...

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty. Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to the Union Budget. SpaceX raised the near-equivalent of that annual allocation in one day. The investors who participated were not buying into a rocket company. They were pricing control over satellite infrastructure, global internet access, launch capability, and an integrated AI platform at a level exceeding the GDP of most countries. Roughly 30 percent of the shares, worth approximately $22.5 billion, went to retail investors, three times the proportion typical of a US listing. India has no private entity in this category. What SpaceX actually controls Starlink, SpaceX’s satellite internet division, operated approximately 7,000 active satellites globally as of early 2026. It counts over nine million subscribers worldwide, and following a 2026 merger, SpaceX also owns xAI, the developer of the Grok AI system. A company that controls satellite connectivity, launch capacity, and a frontier AI model occupies a position no regulator has previously had to classify. It is not a telecom operator, not a defence contractor, and not a technology platform. It is all three at once, under common ownership. In June 2025, SpaceX received authorisation from India’s Department of Telecommunications, followed by a licence from IN-SPACe in July 2025. As of June 2026, Starlink’s commercial operations in India remain pending, with the company in active discussions with the Government of India on security clearances, a process slowed by concerns linked to Starlink terminal use in the Iran conflict. That delay is itself revealing. A foreign company’s service continuity in India depends on negotiations that India does not fully control. Satellite communications, launch systems, and AI-integrated data infrastructure are the functional equivalents of roads and electricity grids in a digital economy. States that built those grids in the twentieth century retained control over access, pricing, and service continuity. States that depend on foreign corporations for digital infrastructure in the twenty-first century do not. The dependence question is already live for India India’s digital public infrastructure, covering Aadhaar, UPI, and the Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission, processes billions of transactions monthly. Aadhaar covers nearly the entire adult population, and UPI carries the bulk of India’s retail digital payments. The system’s design is sound: public architecture, state-controlled data governance, open standards. The next connectivity layer is the problem. TRAI data shows rural internet penetration at 44.2 percent as of March 2024, with only 3.8 percent of rural households connected through high-speed fixed infrastructure. Approximately 630 million Indians remain offline, with primary barriers being awareness, affordability, and limited local-language content, according to the Kantar ICUBE 2024 survey. That gap will not close through terrestrial fibre rollout alone. Satellite broadband, through Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb, or Amazon’s Project Kuiper, will carry a large share of that load over the next decade. None of these are Indian entities. Their pricing decisions, service continuity choices, and data routing practices sit outside Indian jurisdiction. A farmer in Chhattisgarh receiving crop advisory data through a satellite connection does not know that a pricing decision made in California affects whether that signal arrives tomorrow. She will notice only when it stops. Foreign private capital has built connectivity infrastructure in India before. Reliance Jio brought down mobile data costs after its 2016 launch, extending internet access to hundreds of millions of Indians who had not been able to afford it before. Jio’s rollout also created large-scale domestic employment in network maintenance, retail, and customer service, jobs that remain within India’s economy. Private investment in connectivity is not a threat to sovereignty. Structural Gap The difference with SpaceX is structural. Jio operates under Indian law, pays taxes in India, employs Indian engineers, and answers to Indian regulators when disputes arise. Its towers and fibre sit on Indian soil. Starlink’s constellation orbits at 550 kilometres, outside any single national jurisdiction. Under the Telecommunications Act 2023, existing Starlink operators in India continue under the legacy Unified Licence framework, with their licences remaining valid. But no Indian regulatory instrument contains a binding service continuity obligation for satellite operators. If Starlink suspends Indian operations, no domestic legal mechanism compels continuation or requires a managed transition for the users left without service. The $1.75 trillion valuation amplifies this structural gap. India’s external debt stood at $736.3 billion at end-March 2025, according to the Reserve Bank of India. SpaceX’s market valuation now exceeds India’s total external debt by a wide margin. A corporation at that scale does not face the same regulatory friction as a domestic operator. It does not need to negotiate from a position of dependence. India’s satellite communications framework, updated through the Indian Space Policy 2023 and the Telecommunications Act 2023, governs licensing and spectrum allocation in detail. It does not contain binding service continuity or exit-transition obligations for foreign satellite operators. That gap needs closing through explicit licence conditions before Starlink and its competitors reach commercial scale in India. India’s Semiconductor Mission has made genuine progress. Pilot production started in three plants in 2025, and the government confirmed that four plants commenced commercial production in 2026. Kaynes Semicon’s OSAT unit in Sanand reached commercial production in March 2026. India also inaugurated its first 3-nanometer chip design centres in Noida and Bengaluru in 2025, a step toward design capability even as fabrication capacity remains limited. These are real milestones, not announcements. They do not yet constitute a domestic supply chain for the advanced chips needed for satellite infrastructure, AI systems, or next-generation communications hardware. India’s domestic semiconductor market was approximately $45-50 billion in 2024-25, according to industry estimates cited by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. Closing the gap between consumption and domestic production is a decade-long task requiring sustained capital commitment. India’s competition framework does not treat foreign satellite infrastructure concentration as a market power question. The Competition Commission of India has a clear mandate over domestic pricing and merger activity. It has no instrument to act when a foreign entity’s control over orbital infrastructure creates de facto monopoly conditions for remote connectivity within India. That regulatory gap needs explicit legislative attention before dependence deepens further. Market Signals SpaceX’s $1.75 trillion valuation is not a data point about one company. It is a market signal about what global capital considers most valuable in 2026: not oil fields or shipping lanes, but control over the systems through which economies communicate, compute, and transact. India entered the hydrocarbon era as a net importer and spent decades building the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and domestic refining capacity to reduce that dependence. The programme continues to expand today, a reminder that infrastructure sovereignty is an ongoing commitment. The response was slow and expensive. It was also the right call. The digital infrastructure era has well and truly arrived. India is already a net importer of the connectivity and computing systems that will define the next phase of its economic growth. The SpaceX IPO makes the scale of that dependence visible in a single number. And policymakers do not have decades to respond this time. (The writer is an independent public policy researcher. Views personal.)

What If Eisenhower Had Raced for Berlin?

Updated: Oct 21, 2024

Eisenhower

Imagine a Cold War without the Berlin Wall – that iconic symbol of a stark ideological divide adorned in the covers of books by every major spy thriller writer from John le Carré to Joseph Kanon. A divided Berlin has been emblematic of the Cold War (1945-91). In this context, one cannot help asking a counterfactual often asked in the past – what if the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, had opted to push east and race the Soviets to Berlin?

In the spring of 1945, as Hitler’s Third Reich lay in ruins, Eisenhower made a fateful decision: to halt American and Allied forces at the Elbe River and allow the Soviet Red Army to take Berlin.

Had Eisenhower pushed for Berlin, the Cold War might still have occurred, but it would have been a different conflict. A united Germany, neutral or aligned with the West, would have weakened Soviet power in Europe. Berlin, without its iconic wall, would not serve as the stark symbol of ideological rivalry.

The nature of Postwar Europe would have been profoundly altered. The Cold War would have swung in a way favourable to the West, or perhaps its inception may have been prevented altogether.

The absence of Berlin as a flashpoint could have led to fewer tensions in Europe, and NATO’s formation might have shifted in focus.

What prevented Eisenhower from ordering the dash to Berlin? In his thrilling classic ‘The Last Battle’ (1966), author Cornelius Ryan shows how Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin cleverly outmanoeuvred Eisenhower diplomatically, convincing the Allied Supreme Commander that Berlin was not worth the cost. Through a campaign of misdirection, Stalin minimized the military significance of Berlin, presenting it merely as another urban battleground while emphasizing other military priorities.

Eisenhower, pragmatic by nature, thought it prudent to avoid a bloodbath in Berlin and focus on defeating the remaining German armies across central and southern Europe. Another factor in Eisenhower’s decision to forego Berlin was the intelligence, later revealed to be exaggerated, suggesting that Hitler, along with remaining SS units and German divisions would make a last stand in his ‘Alpine Redoubt’ bastion. As it turned out, the Allies found no well-organized Nazi stronghold and Hitler, far from fleeing to the Austrian Alps, remained holed in his Berlin bunker, awaiting the end.

In a noted book-length essay, Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe (1967), historian Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower’s official biographer, critiqued Ryan’s work by underscoring that the general saw no value in sacrificing American lives for symbolic prizes like Berlin.

However, if Eisenhower had ordered the armies of Field Marshal Montgomery and Gen.Omar Bradley to take Berlin, the post-war landscape would have looked very different. This does not mean the Cold War would vanish. But the intensity of the Cold War, that characterized postwar Europe, would have been channelized in other regions, such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa (where it eventually did with great intensity and loss of life).

That said, Stalin’s paranoia about Western intentions, evidenced by his brutal consolidation of power in Eastern Europe, would still persist. Moscow would still desire a buffer zone, likely seeking control over Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. However, with Berlin in Western hands, Stalin’s expansion might have been less aggressive, and the tension between East and West more political than militarized.

Eisenhower’s pragmatic decision to halt at the Elbe had profound implications for the postwar order. The question of whether a bolder approach might have significantly altered the geopolitical landscape of the 20th century is now an academic one.

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