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By:

Abhijit Mulye

21 August 2024 at 11:29:11 am

The Unequal Cousins

Raj Thackeray’s ‘sacrifice’ saved Shiv Sena (UBT) but sank the MNS Mumbai: In the volatile theatre of Maharashtra politics, the long-awaited reunion of the Thackeray cousins on the campaign trail was supposed to be the masterstroke that reclaimed Mumbai. The results of the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) elections, however, tell a story of tragic asymmetry. While the alliance has successfully helped the Shiv Sena (UBT) stem the saffron tide and regain lost ground, it has left Raj...

The Unequal Cousins

Raj Thackeray’s ‘sacrifice’ saved Shiv Sena (UBT) but sank the MNS Mumbai: In the volatile theatre of Maharashtra politics, the long-awaited reunion of the Thackeray cousins on the campaign trail was supposed to be the masterstroke that reclaimed Mumbai. The results of the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) elections, however, tell a story of tragic asymmetry. While the alliance has successfully helped the Shiv Sena (UBT) stem the saffron tide and regain lost ground, it has left Raj Thackeray’s Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS) staring at an existential crisis. The final tally reveals a brutal reality for the MNS - Raj Thackeray played the role of the savior for his cousin, but in the process, he may have become the sole loser of the 2026 mandate. The worse part is that the Shiv Sena (UBT) is reluctant to accept this and is blaming Raj for the poor performance of his party leading to the defeat. A granular analysis of the ward-wise voting patterns exposes the fundamental flaw in this tactical alliance. The vote transfer, the holy grail of any coalition, operated strictly on a one-way street. Data suggests that the traditional MNS voter—often young, aggressive, and driven by regional pride—heeded Raj Thackeray’s call and transferred their votes to Shiv Sena (UBT) candidates in wards where the MNS did not contest. This consolidation was critical in helping the UBT hold its fortresses against the BJP's "Infra Man" juggernaut. However, the favor was not returned. In seats allocated to the MNS, the traditional Shiv Sena (UBT) voter appeared hesitant to back the "Engine" (MNS symbol). Whether due to lingering historical bitterness or a lack of instructions from the local UBT leadership, the "Torch" (UBT symbol) voters did not gravitate toward Raj’s candidates. The result? The UBT survived, while the MNS candidates were left stranded. ‘Second Fiddle’ Perhaps the most poignant aspect of this election was the shift in the personal dynamic between the Thackeray brothers. Decades ago, they parted ways over a bitter dispute regarding who would control the party helm. Raj, refusing to work under Uddhav, formed the MNS to chart his own path. Yet, in 2026, the wheel seems to have come full circle. By agreeing to contest a considerably lower number of seats and focusing his energy on the broader alliance narrative, Raj Thackeray tacitly accepted the role of "second fiddle." It was a pragmatic gamble to save the "Thackeray" brand from total erasure by the BJP-Shinde combine. While the brand survived, it is Uddhav who holds the equity, while Raj has been left with the debt. Charisma as a Charity Throughout the campaign, Raj Thackeray’s rallies were, as always, electric. His fiery oratory and charismatic presence drew massive crowds, a sharp contrast to the more somber tone of the UBT leadership. Ironically, this charisma served as a force multiplier not for his own party, but for his cousin’s. Raj acted as the star campaigner who energised the anti-BJP vote bank. He successfully articulated the anger against the "Delhi-centric" politics he accuses the BJP of fostering. But when the dust settled, the seats were won by UBT candidates who rode the wave Raj helped create. The MNS chief provided the wind for the sails, but the ship that docked in the BMC was captained by Uddhav. ‘Marathi Asmita’ Stung by the results and the realisation of the unequal exchange, Raj Thackeray took to social media shortly after the counting concluded. In an emotive post, he avoided blaming the alliance partner but instead pivoted back to his ideological roots. Urging his followers to "stick to the issue of Marathi Manoos and Marathi Asmita (pride)," Raj signaled a retreat to the core identity politics that birthed the MNS. It was a somber appeal, stripped of the bravado of the campaign, hinting at a leader who knows he must now rebuild from the rubble. The 2026 BMC election will be remembered as the moment Raj Thackeray proved he could be a kingmaker, even if it meant crowning the rival he once despised. He provided the timely help that allowed the Shiv Sena (UBT) to live to fight another day. But in the ruthless arithmetic of democracy, where moral victories count for little, the MNS stands isolated—a party that gave everything to the alliance and received nothing in return. Ironically, there are people within the UBT who still don’t want to accept this and on the contrary blame Raj Thackeray for dismal performance of the MNS, which they argue, derailed the UBT arithmetic. They state that had the MNS performed any better, the results would have been much better for the UBT.

Why Maharashtra Needs a Special Public Safety Act

Updated: Mar 20, 2025

When extremism moves from the jungle to the city, the laws of engagement must evolve too.

Special Public Safety Act

On 12 September 2004, two Maoist groups - the Maoist Communist Centre and the CPI (ML) (People’s War) - merged to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). In the decades since, the movement, once confined to the dense forests of central and eastern India, has found a new battleground: the cities.


There are different opinions about the term ‘Urban Naxal.’ But to dispel misconceptions about this phenomenon, it is necessary to study Maoist literature. The Maoist ideology, long sustained by rural guerrilla tactics, has adapted to urban landscapes, where it exploits democratic freedoms to undermine the very foundation of the Indian state. This is not a matter of academic debate but a pressing national security concern. Maharashtra, a state with a deep history of left-wing extremism, now faces an urgent need for legislative action. The proposed Maharashtra Special Public Safety Act seeks to address this evolving threat, not by stifling dissent but by preventing insidious efforts to dismantle democracy from within.


To understand the gravity of the situation, one must look beyond rhetoric and into the strategic doctrine of Maoist insurgency. The CPI (Maoist) outlines its urban strategy in Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution, a manifesto that has been seized repeatedly during counterinsurgency operations. This document describes a three-pronged approach: the party, the army and the united front. The last of these - the united front - is the most potent weapon in the urban theater. It operates through student groups, labour unions, cultural organizations and civil rights collectives, all ostensibly legitimate but serving a deeper revolutionary cause. Their goal is to erode faith in constitutional democracy, creating conditions ripe for armed struggle.


Unlike the jungle warfare of the past, urban Maoism functions in subtler, more insidious ways. It recruits students, the unemployed, the disenfranchised and even professionals into its ideological fold. It infiltrates legitimate protests, converting them into flashpoints of radicalization. It spreads anti-state narratives through art, theater and academia. The Maoist cultural front, epitomized by banned groups like the Chetna Natya Manch (CNM) uses songs and plays to indoctrinate youth, as documented in multiple intelligence reports. Former Maoist cadres like Milind Teltumbde, who began as a labour union leader in Maharashtra’s coal belt, exemplify this trajectory from activism to insurgency.


India has stringent anti-terror laws, including the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). Yet, these laws primarily target direct acts of terrorism. The legal framework struggles to address the subtler, preparatory stages of urban Maoist activity. Courts have often found it difficult to convict individuals associated with Maoist front organizations unless a direct link to violence is established. This legal loophole allows insurgent networks to operate with impunity, cloaked in the language of civil liberties.


In Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, proactive bans on Maoist-affiliated groups led to a sharp decline in insurgent activities. Maharashtra, however, has lagged in taking similar action. According to a Union Home Ministry report, Maharashtra harbours the highest number of Maoist front organizations - 64 in total. Intelligence assessments indicate that the Maoist movement, stifled in rural areas due to successful counterinsurgency efforts, is shifting focus to cities. The materials seized in recent raids confirm that urban warfare is now a central tenet of Maoist expansion strategy.


Necessary Safeguard

Critics argue that any expansion of state power poses a risk to civil liberties. While vigilance against misuse is necessary, equating a targeted counterinsurgency law with authoritarianism is a fallacy. The proposed Maharashtra Special Public Safety Act includes robust checks and balances to prevent abuse. An advisory board, led by members appointed by the judiciary, will oversee bans on organizations. Senior police officers, not junior officials susceptible to political pressures, will be responsible for authorizing arrests and filing chargesheets.


Most importantly, the law is designed to differentiate between genuine dissent and orchestrated subversion. Freedom of speech remains sacrosanct. However, when speech is weaponized to incite violence, recruit insurgents, and delegitimize democratic institutions, it ceases to be a matter of free expression. This distinction is crucial. Maoist organizations do not merely oppose policies; they seek to dismantle the entire constitutional framework. Their goal, as articulated in their own documents, is to replace parliamentary democracy with a totalitarian ‘people’s government.’ The ultimate aim is not incremental reform but revolution by force.


Looming Threat

Maharashtra has fought Maoism in its rural heartlands for over four decades, but urban Maoism has flourished unchecked for nearly fifty years. The failure to recognize this shift has allowed the insurgency to adapt, metastasizing into the urban fabric. The consequences of inaction are dire. If left unaddressed, Maharashtra risks becoming the nerve-centre of an urban insurgency that could destabilize governance on a massive scale.


The necessity of the Maharashtra Special Public Safety Act is not a matter of ideological preference but of national security. A democracy cannot afford to be naive about those who seek its destruction. Vigilance is not repression. It is the price of survival in an age where insurgency wears the mask of activism. The battle against Maoism has moved from the jungle to the city, and our laws must evolve to meet the challenge.


(The writer is DGP (retd.) Maharashtra and recipient of the President’s Medal for Distinguished Service. Views are personal)

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