Power tussle threatens cooperative autonomy

Kolhapur: Democracy is not merely about winning elections. It is equally about accepting defeat. The real test of a political party's commitment to democratic principles comes not when it commands a majority, but when voters deny it one.

The unfolding power struggle in the Kolhapur District Cooperative Milk Producers' Union, popularly known as Gokul, exposes an increasingly disturbing tendency in Indian politics: the willingness to manipulate institutional arrangements when electoral arithmetic does not favour those in power.

Gokul is no ordinary cooperative institution. With an annual turnover of approximately Rs 4,500 crore, it is among the most influential dairy cooperatives in Maharashtra. Its electoral outcome was unambiguous.

Of the 25 elected director positions, the Congress secured 13 seats, while the BJP won 12. By the elementary principle of majority rule, the Congress was entitled to command the board.

Electoral Mandate

However, as the prospect of losing control became apparent, the state government reportedly invoked a Governor's ordinance to appoint five additional directors and extend voting rights to them. The move is widely seen as an attempt to alter the electoral arithmetic and bring the cooperative under the control of the ruling Mahayuti alliance.

This raises a fundamental question: can an electoral mandate be rendered ineffective through an executive intervention simply because the ruling political establishment has failed to secure a majority?

The controversy is not merely about five additional directors or the distribution of positions in a cooperative. It concerns the sanctity of elections, the autonomy of cooperative institutions and the constitutional limits of executive power.

If elected representatives are outnumbered through post-election appointments carrying voting rights, the very purpose of conducting elections becomes questionable.

Legal Scrutiny

The legal validity of the ordinance, including its compatibility with the applicable cooperative law, is bound to face judicial scrutiny. Former Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai has reportedly expressed reservations about the legal sustainability of the government's move. The final word, however, will rest with the judiciary.

India's political history offers several examples of governments being formed by parties that did not emerge as the single largest force in an election. In Goa in 2017, the Congress won 17 seats, compared with the BJP's 13.

Yet, the BJP secured the support of smaller parties and independents to form the government. In Manipur, the Congress emerged as the largest party with 28 seats, while the BJP, with 21, cobbled together a coalition and assumed power. In Meghalaya, the Congress won 21 seats, but the National People's Party formed the government with the support of smaller parties, including the BJP, which had secured just two seats.

These developments reflected the post-election coalition politics permitted within India's parliamentary framework. A party may not emerge as the largest electoral force but can legitimately form a government if it demonstrates majority support in the legislature.

The distinction is crucial. Political alliances formed after elections are not inherently undemocratic. But changing the composition or voting strength of an elected institution through executive intervention to reverse an electoral outcome raises an entirely different question of democratic legitimacy.

Maharashtra itself witnessed a dramatic illustration of post-election realignment in 2019. Despite the BJP emerging as the largest party, the breakdown of its alliance with the Shiv Sena led to the formation of the Maha Vikas Aghadi government under Uddhav Thackeray, with the Congress and the NCP joining the coalition.

The political legitimacy of such an arrangement rested on the legislative support commanded by the new alliance. It was a consequence of political realignment, not the retrospective alteration of the election results.

Institutional Integrity

The larger concern, therefore, is not which political party benefits from a particular arrangement. It is whether institutions are being reduced to instruments for securing political control.

The cooperative movement was founded on the principles of collective ownership, democratic participation and the economic empowerment of members. Its institutions cannot be treated as extensions of the ruling party's political machinery. The right of elected representatives to exercise their mandate must not become subordinate to the convenience of governments.

There is also a dangerous precedent involved. If the ruling establishment can alter the voting arithmetic of a cooperative institution when it fails to secure a majority, what prevents similar interventions in other democratically constituted bodies? Today it may be Gokul; tomorrow, another cooperative institution or elected local authority could face a similar predicament.