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By:

Bhalchandra Chorghade

11 August 2025 at 7:24:18 pm

CIDCO struggles to find takers for its homes

Mumbai: The City and Industrial Development Corporation’s (CIDCO) latest housing scheme has exposed a recurring challenge for the planning authority: finding buyers for its large housing inventory despite its affordable-housing focus. The August 2026 scheme offered 4,793 homes in Taloja, Kharghar and Kalamboli and received 4,180 confirmed applications before bookings closed on September 3. While CIDCO described the response as strong, 613 homes—nearly 13 per cent of the inventory—had no...

CIDCO struggles to find takers for its homes

Mumbai: The City and Industrial Development Corporation’s (CIDCO) latest housing scheme has exposed a recurring challenge for the planning authority: finding buyers for its large housing inventory despite its affordable-housing focus. The August 2026 scheme offered 4,793 homes in Taloja, Kharghar and Kalamboli and received 4,180 confirmed applications before bookings closed on September 3. While CIDCO described the response as strong, 613 homes—nearly 13 per cent of the inventory—had no confirmed applicant. This follows earlier schemes with similar gaps. In January 2025, CIDCO’s ‘My Preferred Home’ scheme, offering around 26,000 homes across Navi Mumbai, attracted 1.36 lakh initial applications. However, only about 55,000 applicants paid the registration fee and around 22,000 deposited the required earnest money, leaving serious participation below the number of homes offered. A CAG-linked report on two CIDCO housing schemes in Kharghar found that, of 4,814 saleable tenements, allotment letters had been issued to 3,733 applicants and possession handed over to 3,317. Four years after the draw, 1,081 tenements remained unsold. CIDCO has also faced scrutiny over marketing expenditure. In 2023, reports questioned the appointment of private agencies to market and allot PMAY homes, stating that the agencies had received advances of more than Rs 100 crore before sales took place. CIDCO officials said external support was necessary given the scale of the programme. The scale of investment adds to the concern. CIDCO’s mass-housing programme envisaged 68,515 homes at an estimated cost of around Rs 15,300 crore. A 2024 report noted that thousands of completed homes were awaiting sale, locking up capital and increasing the authority’s financial burden. The latest homes are located in Taloja Sector 39, Kalamboli Bus Depot and Kharghar Bus Depot. Taloja accounts for 4,229 homes, followed by 257 in Kalamboli and 293 in Kharghar. Indicative prices range from around Rs 23.50 lakh in Taloja to Rs 37.70 lakh in Kalamboli and Rs 43.50 lakh in Kharghar. The figures point to a possible mismatch between what CIDCO considers affordable and what its target buyers can finance. Industry experts have noted that EWS homes priced at Rs 25 lakh or more may be difficult for households within the prescribed income ceiling, particularly after registration, stamp duty, floor-rise charges and other costs. Location may also influence demand. Taloja has seen rapid development and improved connectivity, including metro access, but buyers continue to weigh its distance from established employment centres and social infrastructure, as well as commuting costs. CIDCO maintains that its housing programme meets a genuine need in Navi Mumbai. Ashwin Mudgal, Vice Chairman and Managing Director, CIDCO, said, “The overwhelming response to the housing scheme reflects the aspirations of citizens to own a home in Navi Mumbai and their continued confidence in CIDCO’s planned development initiatives. CIDCO remains committed to providing affordable and quality housing opportunities in well-planned locations, enabling citizens to benefit from the region’s growing infrastructure and connectivity.” The authority has also highlighted the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana-Urban (PMAY-U) subsidy, under which eligible beneficiaries can receive Rs 2.5 lakh, subject to applicable guidelines and eligibility criteria. However, the repeated unsold inventory suggests that CIDCO’s challenge extends beyond construction. Pricing, apartment configurations, location, payment flexibility and connectivity may need to be reassessed before further public resources are committed.

A Border in Flames

Updated: Jan 29, 2025

Despite years of counterinsurgency efforts, the endless struggle against ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria has ensured the country remains a war zone with soldiers and civilians alike caught in the crossfire.

Nigeria

Fighters from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) recently attacked a Nigerian Army base in Malam-Fatori, a border town in Borno State, killing more than 20 soldiers, including a commanding officer, and wounding several others after a three-hour gun battle. The town, already a tenuous link between Nigeria and its northern neighbour, has once again become a symbol of the Nigerian military’s precarious position in the battle against insurgency.


This tragic episode is but one chapter in a protracted and brutal conflict that has gripped northeastern Nigeria for over a decade. The region has become a cauldron of violence, where groups like ISWAP and Boko Haram operate with near impunity, targeting soldiers and civilians alike. Since Boko Haram’s emergence in 2009, the insurgency has morphed into a hydra-headed monster. The splintering of the group into factions, most notably ISWAP, has intensified the bloodshed. Together, these groups have killed and displaced tens of thousands, transforming Borno into a theater of horror.


Historically, Borno’s troubles are rooted in more than the rise of extremist ideologies. This region has long been one of Nigeria’s most economically and politically marginalized. Decades of underdevelopment, weak state institutions, and endemic corruption created a fertile ground for discontent. When Boko Haram first appeared under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, it gained traction by exploiting grievances over poverty, unemployment, and poor governance. What began as a movement ostensibly advocating for Islamic governance quickly devolved into an insurgency marked by atrocities: mass abductions, bombings, and targeted killings.


The Nigerian government’s response to this crisis has been both forceful and faltering. Former President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno and neighbouring states in 2013, launching a military offensive against Boko Haram. While the group suffered initial losses, it regrouped and intensified its attacks. By 2015, Boko Haram had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, leading to the creation of ISWAP. Unlike its predecessor, ISWAP has adopted a more sophisticated and pragmatic approach, focusing its attacks on military and government targets while presenting itself as a provider of services in areas under its control. This shift has made it an even deadlier adversary.


Under President Muhammadu Buhari, a former military general elected in 2015 partly on his promise to crush the insurgency, there have been some gains. The Nigerian military, backed by regional forces and international partners, has reclaimed territory once held by Boko Haram and ISWAP. Yet, the insurgency has proven resilient. The recent attack in Malam-Fatori underscores the challenges that remain. ISWAP’s ability to mount a coordinated assault on a military base demonstrates not only its tactical capabilities but also the weaknesses in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency strategy.


At the heart of the problem is a lack of trust between the military and local communities. Reports of human rights abuses by security forces, ranging from extrajudicial killings to forced disappearances, have alienated the very people whose cooperation is essential for effective counterinsurgency. Moreover, corruption within the military has siphoned resources away from the frontlines, leaving soldiers ill-equipped and demoralized.


The international community has lent its support, but its involvement has been limited. While the United States and other nations have provided military aid and training, the broader geopolitical focus has often shifted away from Nigeria’s crisis. As global attention gravitates toward flashpoints like Ukraine and the Middle East, northeastern Nigeria risks becoming a forgotten conflict.


The implications of this neglect are dire. The insurgency in Borno is not an isolated issue but part of a broader instability across the Sahel region. Groups like ISWAP are adept at exploiting porous borders and weak governance to expand their reach. Without sustained local and international efforts to address the root causes of extremism, Nigeria’s northeast will remain trapped in a cycle of violence.

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