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By:

Rajendra Joshi

3 December 2024 at 9:20:26 am

Sugar industry strains as traders reap profits

Gap between ex-mill prices, retail rates raised questions Kolhapur: The Indian sugar industry is caught in a deepening crisis, with sugar mills struggling to secure remunerative prices for their produce even as traders and middlemen appear to be making substantial profits. While sugar mills are receiving between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal through recent sale tenders, retail prices have remained as high as Rs 58 per kg. The widening gap between ex-mill prices and retail rates has...

Sugar industry strains as traders reap profits

Gap between ex-mill prices, retail rates raised questions Kolhapur: The Indian sugar industry is caught in a deepening crisis, with sugar mills struggling to secure remunerative prices for their produce even as traders and middlemen appear to be making substantial profits. While sugar mills are receiving between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal through recent sale tenders, retail prices have remained as high as Rs 58 per kg. The widening gap between ex-mill prices and retail rates has raised serious questions about the role of intermediaries and the effectiveness of the Centre’s efforts to contain sugar prices. The margins available to traders and intermediaries have reportedly crossed 20 per cent, leaving sugar millers perplexed. At a time when both sugarcane growers and mill operators are under financial pressure, the trading chain appears to be benefiting disproportionately. The Centre must examine this growing disparity and take corrective measures to prevent speculative profiteering. Retail sugar prices began rising sharply in August, touching nearly Rs 70 per kg in some markets. The escalation added to inflationary pressures and caused concern among consumers, particularly ahead of the festive season. In response, the Centre introduced a series of measures to improve domestic availability and moderate prices. These included permitting duty-free sugar imports, initially until October 31, a deadline subsequently extended to December 31. The government also directed sugar mills to commence the crushing season from October 15 and tightened monitoring of sugar stocks. In another significant intervention, it modified the ethanol policy, restricting the diversion of sugarcane juice, sugar syrup and B-heavy molasses for ethanol production. Following these measures, sugar mills began witnessing a decline in the prices offered through their sale tenders. Recent transactions have fetched between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal. Going by the conventional relationship between ex-mill prices and retail rates, sugar should ideally have been available to consumers at less than ₹50 per kg. However, retail prices continue to hover around Rs 58 per kg, pointing to a substantial disconnect between the mill gate and the consumer market. Traditionally, sugar retailing operated on relatively thin margins. Since sugar is an essential commodity, retailers often treated it as a low-margin product to attract customers who would subsequently purchase other household provisions. The margin was sometimes informally equated with the resale value of the empty 50-kg jute bags in which sugar was supplied. This was considered a nominal return for retailers. That traditional pricing mechanism, however, appears to have undergone a significant change. The widening gap between mill-level tender prices and retail rates has created considerable scope for intermediaries to extract higher margins. The critical question is whether the additional amount paid by consumers is reaching the sugar mills or remaining within the trading chain. The issue assumes particular significance in Maharashtra, where the sugarcane pricing dispute has intensified ahead of the new crushing season. Farmers’ organisations have been demanding a minimum price of Rs 5,500 per tonne for sugarcane. Millers, meanwhile, are preparing to agitate for a revision in the Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) framework and the restoration of a more supportive ethanol policy. The Swabhimani Shetkari Sanghatana, led by Raju Shetti, has taken a firm position that sugar mills should not be allowed to commence operations until farmers receive an acceptable price for their cane. Shetti has also drawn the state government’s attention to the unusually high retail prices of sugar, questioning why consumers continue to pay more even as mills are forced to sell at relatively lower rates. The Centre’s sudden changes to the ethanol policy have further complicated the industry’s financial position. Ethanol production had emerged as an important revenue stream for sugar mills, enabling them to diversify operations, improve cash flows and enhance their capacity to pay farmers. Restrictions on the diversion of sugarcane-based raw materials have weakened this support at a critical juncture. The resulting contradiction is difficult to ignore: farmers are demanding better cane prices, millers are struggling with shrinking realisations and policy uncertainty, while intermediaries appear to be benefiting from the gap between wholesale and retail prices. The government cannot address the sugar crisis merely by regulating mill stocks, imports and ethanol diversion. It must also examine the entire supply chain, identify where the widening margins are accruing and ensure that the benefits of market interventions reach both sugarcane growers and consumers. With nearly Rs 2 lakh crore riding on the sugar economy, allowing intermediaries to thrive while the industry’s primary stakeholders struggle would be a serious policy failure.

A Year of Strife: Israel, Hamas, and the Shadow War of Intelligence

Oct 6, 2024
4 min read

Updated: Oct 22, 2024

Israel, Hamas, and the Shadow War of Intelligence

Exactly a year ago, Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups launched a blitzkrieg on Israel, killing over 1,200 civilians and foreign nationals while taking several hostages. It was a brutal reminder of Israel’s vulnerability and a haunting echo of the surprise attack in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Egypt and its allies caught Israel off guard.

Since the ‘Black Sabbath’ or the ‘October 7’ attacks as it has come to be known, Israel, recovering its nerve, has struck back hard, subjecting Gaza to its scorching wrath. It has simultaneously taken on and decapitated the leadership of the Hezbollah, dealing the Iran-backed Lebanese militant outfit a body blow by killing its longtime general-secretary Hassan Nasrallah. Once again, Israel's intelligence apparatus, often touted as the best in the world, proved its lethal efficiency.

But how did Israel’s intelligence apparatus, with its three arms – Mossad, Shin Bet and Aman – come to develop this ruthless efficiency, enabling it to carry out some of the most stunning intelligence coups in the last century and the present time?

The recent attacks on Hezbollah’s pager and walkie-talkie communications not merely paralyzed the organisation’s operations but also underscored the depth of Israeli infiltration. Such successes are not merely the product of modern intelligence techniques but tap into a long-standing tradition of espionage deeply embedded in Jewish history.

In ‘The Secret World’ (2018) - his magisterial survey of the history of intelligence and espionage, Dr. Christopher Andrew – the doyen of intelligence studies – observes how the Jewish Tanakh, or the Christian Old Testament, contains a wealth of references to spies that outnumbers those found in many other national histories. From Moses dispatching agents to scout the Promised Land to Joseph, the Egyptian vizier, feigning ignorance of his brothers while accusing them of espionage, these narratives illustrate the centrality of intelligence in Jewish lore. Yet another early espionage tale is the betrayal of Jesus of Nazareth by Judas Iscariot, who became a paid informant for the high priests on what has been dubbed ‘Spy Wednesday.’

As Andrews observes, Moses himself is a figure of significant importance not only in Judaism but also in Islam, where he is known as Musa. The Quran mentions him 136 times, more than any other human figure. In both scriptures, God commands Moses to send twelve spies into the Promised Land, marking what would become one of the earliest recorded intelligence failures. This failure was less about the quality of the intelligence gathered and more about how it was utilized. It was not until forty years later, following a more organized intelligence operation, that Moses’ successor, Joshua, successfully led the Israelites into Canaan.

The foundational texts advocating for the centrality of intelligence in matters of war and peace emerged not in Greece or Rome, but in ancient China and the Indian subcontinent, in form of Chinese general Sun Tzu seminal ‘The Art of War’ and the ‘Arthashastra’ ascribed to Kautilya.

In this sense, India’s is lucky to have a splendid survey of its intelligence history by Vappala Balachandran, whose superb ‘Intelligence Over the Centuries’ (2022) also mentions the Land of Canaan as the fount of successful spycraft. Balachandran’s lively work offers a compelling exploration of intelligence, tracing the origins of the craft from Ancient Israel to modern-day Ukraine while being packed with thrilling anecdotes of the history of India’s intelligence agency, R&AW, which marked 50 years in 2018.

Since its founding in 1948, Israel has relied heavily on intelligence to safeguard its borders, often resorting to pre-emptive strikes and targeted killings. In what is probably the first comprehensive history of its kind, investigative journalist Ronen Bergman’s ‘Rise and Kill First’ provides a chilling account of Israel's targeted assassination strategy. Through extensive interviews and classified documents, Bergman reveals how Israel’s intelligence agencies—Mossad, Shin Bet, and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) — have executed a vast campaign of extrajudicial killings aimed at pre-empting threats to the Jewish state.

The book traces this practice from pre-state Jewish underground movements to today’s high-tech precision strikes, illustrating how assassination has become both a tactical weapon and a cornerstone of Israel’s defense doctrine.

Bergman highlights that the Israeli intelligence community maintains strict secrecy, enforced through a complex web of laws, military censorship, and intimidation of journalists, fostering a strong sense of solidarity among its personnel.

Since World War II, Israel has conducted more assassinations than any other Western nation, with leaders often opting for clandestine operations as the primary means of ensuring national security. In many instances, Israeli leaders have justified the endangerment of innocent lives as a necessary evil to eliminate threats.

The figures are striking: prior to the Second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, Israel had carried out approximately 500 targeted killing operations, resulting in around 1,000 deaths, both civilian and combatant. During the Second Intifada, around 1,000 more operations were conducted, with 168 successful hits. Since then, about 800 targeted killings have occurred, primarily against Hamas in Gaza during conflicts in 2008, 2012, and 2014, and against Palestinian, Syrian, and Iranian targets in various covert operations. In contrast, during George W. Bush’s presidency, the U.S. executed an estimated 48 targeted killings, while under Barack Obama, there were 353.

Israel’s reliance on assassination stems from the revolutionary roots of the Zionist movement, the trauma of the Holocaust, and the belief that the nation is under constant threat of annihilation. This sense of vulnerability has propelled the development of a highly effective military and arguably the world’s most proficient intelligence community, resulting in a formidable assassination apparatus.

Strikingly, the United States has adopted Israeli intelligence techniques as a model, particularly after 9/11 when President Bush initiated targeted killings against Al-Qaeda. Many of the command-and-control systems, information-gathering methods, and drone technologies employed by American forces were developed in Israel.

In his riveting history of intelligence operations during WW2, Max Hastings, in ‘The Secret War,’ points out that intelligence is far from an exact science. For all the success stories, there have been colossal failures. In Hastings’ view, the only question that really matters is how far has secret knowledge changed outcomes? While intelligence might have saved Israel from crises, the unintended consequences have been profound. Assassinations ultimately breed more enemies, radicalizing future generations and perpetuating cycles of violence that undermine peace prospects.

Israel’s reliance on assassination as a military tool is understandably born out of necessity—a small nation surrounded by enemies since its founding. But as the butcher’s bill continues to mount, so does the moral cost.

(Tomorrow, we look at Israel and the Yemen-based Houthi rebel movement, and the global response to this terror outfit)

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