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By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger...

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre. The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington. Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension. Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence. Balancing Challenge India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem. There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises. While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington. The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West." However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion. Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil? India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people? If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience. This is where BRICS enters the larger picture. India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight. More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US. (The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

Bridging Campus and Community

The University Grants Commission’s fresh advisory urging universities and colleges to adopt nearby Anganwadi centres marks a significant shift in how India thinks about early childhood care and education. By asking higher education institutions to integrate these community-based centres into academic programmes, the UGC is attempting to bridge a long-standing gap between classroom theory and grassroots reality. Early childhood education, especially for children aged three to six, lays the foundation for lifelong learning, yet it remains one of the most neglected segments in our education ecosystem. This initiative deserves serious examination, not as another bureaucratic directive but as a potential game-changer for both universities and the millions of young children served by Anganwadis.


Ambitious Initiative

At its core, the advisory is straightforward yet ambitious. Universities are encouraged to adopt five to six nearby Anganwadi centres and weave them into the curriculum of disciplines such as Education, Social Work, Nutrition, Public Health, Child Development, Psychology and Social Welfare. Students would undertake supervised visits, fieldwork, internships, dissertations and structured outreach activities. The stated goals are clear: strengthen Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) for the three-six age group, provide hands-on experiential learning to university students and extend sustained academic and human-resource support to Anganwadi workers. UGC Secretary Prof Manish R Joshi has emphasised that this engagement will foster social responsibility while simultaneously improving the quality of services at the centres. The move aligns with the Union Ministry of Women and Child Development’s broader vision and builds on the National Education Policy’s stress on foundational learning.


Indian universities today operate under heavy pressure. Most undergraduate and postgraduate programmes in social sciences and education remain largely theoretical, with limited opportunities for sustained community engagement. Fieldwork, when it exists, is often short-term and poorly supervised. Anganwadi centres, meanwhile, function as the frontline of the Integrated Child Development Services scheme but grapple with chronic shortages like undertrained workers, inadequate infrastructure, irregular nutrition supplies and low community participation. The result is a fragmented system where universities produce graduates with degrees but little real-world exposure, while Anganwadis struggle to deliver quality ECCE without professional backup. The UGC’s proposal seeks to address both weaknesses simultaneously, turning universities into active partners rather than distant observers.


The potential gains are substantial. Students would acquire the sort of practical understanding of child development, nutrition and community life that classrooms rarely provide, while Anganwadi centres could benefit from fresh ideas, workshops and educational support. Over time, such collaboration may improve early-childhood care for poorer children while nudging universities beyond their increasingly narrow, job-oriented focus. In linking academia with grassroots institutions, the UGC is attempting to restore a broader social purpose to higher education.


Practical Hurdles

Yet good intentions do not guarantee workable policy. Making Anganwadi adoption mandatory risks burdening already overstretched universities, where faculty balance teaching, research and bureaucracy, while students contend with crowded schedules and job anxieties. Coordination between campuses and rural childcare centres would invite logistical headaches involving transport, safety and language. Anganwadi workers, themselves underpaid and overworked, may resent additional responsibilities without incentives or training. Most strikingly, the advisory is silent on funding. Without dedicated grants or monitoring mechanisms, the scheme risks degenerating into yet another bureaucratic ritual.


Another ground reality is the uneven distribution of higher education institutions. While metropolitan universities may find nearby centres easily, colleges in remote or tribal areas could struggle with access. Quality control is equally challenging. Not every student possesses the maturity or sensitivity required to work with young children and their families.


Practical reality, therefore, demands a phased and supported rollout rather than a one-size-fits-all mandate. Pilot programmes in select states, backed by clear memoranda of understanding between universities, district administrations and the Women and Child Development department, would offer valuable lessons. Training modules for both students and Anganwadi workers, modest financial incentives, digital tracking of activities and periodic impact assessments could turn good intentions into measurable outcomes. The UGC must also clarify whether additional resources like grants, faculty workload adjustments or recognition in accreditation will accompany the directive.


The UGC’s call to adopt Anganwadi centres is both timely and necessary. Early childhood education is not a luxury; it is the bedrock of an equitable society. Universities possess the intellectual capital and youthful energy that Anganwadis desperately need. If implemented with adequate planning, flexibility and genuine partnership, this collaboration can produce better-trained professionals, stronger community institutions and most importantly, brighter futures for India’s youngest citizens. The feasibility ultimately rests not on whether the idea is sound but on whether policymakers and university leaders are willing to invest the political will and resources to make it work.


(The writer is a former college Principal and Founder of Supporting Shoulders, an Odisha-based non-profit Trust. Views personal.)

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