Can ASEAN Turn Vision into Action?

ASEAN’s strength lies in unity — but its greatest weakness may be its own consensus.

Kuala Lumpur is under its tightest security in years, with 16,000 policemen deployed and major roads sealed for the 47th ASEAN Summit. The event brings together global leaders — including the US President, Chinese Premier, and Indian PM — alongside regional counterparts. Timor-Leste will also join as ASEAN’s 11th member, marking the bloc’s first expansion in over two decades.

The summit comes as ASEAN faces overlapping pressures—Myanmar’s civil war, intensifying US–China rivalry, and the challenge of turning Vision 2045 from aspiration into action.

As host, Malaysia has set the agenda around the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, built on four pillars—Political-Security, Economic, Socio-Cultural, and Connectivity. The plan aims to make ASEAN the world’s fourth-largest economy by 2045, up from its current $4 trillion base.

At its core is the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA), the bloc’s first region-wide digital pact, projected to unlock a $2 trillion market by 2030. DEFA seeks to align standards for e-commerce, digital trade, AI governance, and cybersecurity—a tall order for a region where Singapore’s digital infrastructure far outpaces Laos and Cambodia.

Also on the agenda are upgrades to the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) and a review of the RCEP to deepen integration beyond tariff cuts. Yet intra-ASEAN trade remains just 21% of total trade, far below the EU’s 60%. With the secretariat operating on only a $20 million annual budget, Vision 2045 risks staying ambitious but unrealised without stronger institutions.

ASEAN’s credibility

Myanmar’s four-year civil war has become a test of ASEAN’s credibility. The bloc’s Five-Point Consensus has stalled — ceasefire efforts are symbolic, and humanitarian access remains blocked. Public trust is low ahead of the junta’s planned December 2025 elections.

ASEAN’s quiet diplomacy has repeatedly failed. Refugee flows, human trafficking, and cross-border crimes are rising, spilling into Thailand and Malaysia, while Myanmar’s ungoverned territories have turned into hubs for online fraud syndicates exploiting the wider region.

The presence of both Donald Trump and Li Qiang in Kuala Lumpur highlights ASEAN’s delicate balancing act. Trump’s planned role in a Thailand–Cambodia ceasefire ceremony — reportedly demanding that Chinese officials be excluded — shows how US diplomacy often blends spectacle with zero-sum rivalry.

China, meanwhile, remains ASEAN’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $680 billion annually. Talks on the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area 3.0 aim to expand cooperation in green growth and digital trade, though South China Sea tensions continue to overshadow progress. Regular clashes between Chinese and Philippine vessels reveal how quickly economic engagement can yield to confrontation.

The Philippines best reflects ASEAN’s strategic divide. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s expanded defence ties with the US—granting access to nine military bases—mark a clear tilt, while Vietnam’s “omnidirectional” diplomacy represents the balanced neutrality most members prefer. Yet sustaining that balance is growing harder as both Washington and Beijing intensify pressure on the region’s economic and security frameworks.

Fragmented progress

ASEAN’s economic integration has progressed more on paper than in practice. The RCEP—the world’s largest trade bloc—reduced tariffs but left non-tariff barriers largely intact. The ASEAN Single Window for digital customs operates across members but unevenly.

Climate goals also lag. The target of 23% renewable energy by 2025 is unlikely to be met, while projects such as the ASEAN Power Grid remain stalled by financial and political hurdles.

ASEAN’s founding principles — consensus, non-interference, and informality — once ensured unity but now constrain flexibility. Its outreach through ASEAN+3, the EAS, and new forums like the ASEAN–GCC–China dialogue reflects growing ambition but also increasing dependence on external powers. As “centrality” is increasingly shaped from outside the region, ASEAN risks drifting from convenor to bystander.

In the best case, ASEAN adapts strategically — advancing Vision 2045, deepening digital and economic integration, resolving the Myanmar crisis pragmatically, and preserving strategic autonomy.

The middle path is managed decline: ASEAN remains a dialogue platform with slow but steady progress and persistent gaps. Crises like Myanmar stay unresolved, though diplomacy may prevent further collapse. This appears to be the most likely outcome.

In the worst case, Myanmar’s conflict spills across borders, worsening the humanitarian crisis. Intensifying US–China rivalry could split ASEAN into rival camps — some leaning toward Washington, others toward Beijing. Economic ambitions would stall as members turn to bilateral deals, reducing ASEAN to a symbolic body with little real influence.

For both the US and China, the stakes are paradoxical: a strong ASEAN supports regional stability, yet their own policies often undermine its autonomy. The next decade will test whether Southeast Asia’s collective diplomacy can endure in a world where neutrality itself has become an act of strategic resistance.

(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)