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By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger...

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre. The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington. Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension. Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence. Balancing Challenge India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem. There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises. While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington. The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West." However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion. Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil? India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people? If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience. This is where BRICS enters the larger picture. India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight. More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US. (The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

Come On, India, Let's Football!

When football’s new minnows dream big, India stands still.

The ongoing FIFA World Cup has produced one of the most compelling stories in modern football. Nations once dismissed as outsiders are now sharing the world’s biggest stage with traditional powerhouses. Tiny Cape Verde, Curaçao, Jordan and Uzbekistan are making their World Cup debuts. DR Congo has returned after more than five decades, while countries such as Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa and New Zealand have also forced their way into the tournament.


The question every Indian football fan must ask is uncomfortable but unavoidable: if these nations can qualify, why can’t India?


This is not about population. India has over 1.4 billion people. Cape Verde has barely half a million. Curaçao has fewer than two lakh residents. Uzbekistan has around 37 million people; Jordan, about 12 million. India has every conceivable demographic advantage. Yet, when the World Cup begins, Indian fans once again become passionate supporters of Brazil, Argentina, England or Portugal because their own national team is nowhere to be seen.


For decades, Indian football administrators have found convenient excuses. Cricket’s dominance. Lack of infrastructure. Poor weather. Limited sporting culture. None of these explanations survive scrutiny anymore.


Croatia reached a World Cup final with a population smaller than Hyderabad. Morocco became the first African nation to reach the semi-finals in 2022. Japan and South Korea transformed themselves into global football powers through long-term planning. Now Uzbekistan, Jordan and Cape Verde have shown that determined football development matters far more than population size or GDP.


Governance Failure

The domestic football ecosystem remains fragmented. Grassroots development exists largely on paper. School football lacks continuity. Youth academies are too few and often disconnected from professional clubs. State associations function with varying degrees of efficiency, while the professional pyramid remains shallow. Coaching standards are improving but nowhere near the scale required for a country of India’s size. Most talented youngsters still have limited access to quality coaching before their teenage years, by which time the developmental gap with leading football nations has already widened.


The Indian Super League undoubtedly improved infrastructure, television visibility and professionalism. But a successful league does not automatically produce a successful national team. The league has too often prioritised short-term commercial interests over systematic player development. Young Indian footballers frequently struggle for meaningful playing time, while promotion and relegation uncertainties have weakened the competitive pyramid beneath the top division.


Another problem is the absence of a unified national football vision. Countries that qualify consistently work on 10- to 20-year roadmaps. India often changes direction with every administrative transition. Projects begin with great fanfare and quietly disappear before delivering results. Football development cannot depend on personalities; it requires institutions.


Talent identification is another glaring weakness. Millions of children play football across the Northeast, Goa, Kerala, West Bengal, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka and several tribal regions. Yet countless gifted players never enter structured development pathways. A nation of India’s scale should have thousands of certified scouts working across districts. Instead, talent frequently depends on luck rather than an organised system.


The roadmap is neither mysterious nor impossible. Football must become an integral part of school education, with structured inter-school and inter-district competitions. Every professional club should operate genuine youth academies linked to local communities. Coaching education must expand dramatically. State leagues should become stronger and financially sustainable. The national federation must function with transparency, stability and accountability. Above all, youth development, not administrative politics, must become the central mission.


The expansion of the World Cup to 48 teams has created more qualification opportunities than ever before. If India cannot qualify even under this expanded format, it will expose the depth of the crisis rather than the strength of the competition.


India has already proved in cricket, hockey, chess, badminton and athletics that excellence is possible when talent meets planning. Football should be no different.


The real tragedy is not that India has never qualified for a FIFA World Cup. The real tragedy is that after nearly eight decades of independence, with enormous resources and one of the world’s largest youth populations, India still lacks a credible pathway to get there.


Until administrators begin treating World Cup qualification as a national project rather than a distant dream, Indian football will remain exactly where it has been for generations—not on the pitch, but in the stands, cheering for someone else’s success.

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