Enter the Dragon

India and China edge closer as America’s tariffs push Delhi into Beijing’s arms.

For years Washington cast itself as India’s indispensable partner: a counterweight to China, a market for its goods, a guarantor of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Now, thanks to Donald Trump’s latest outburst of economic nationalism, America risks squandering that role. With tariffs of up to 50 percent slapped on Indian exports, and further duties threatened in retaliation for Delhi’s oil and arms purchases from Russia, the White House has turned an awkward ally into a bruised one. Into the breach steps China, once India’s fiercest regional rival, now making conciliatory noises about solidarity and shared destiny.

The rhetoric has been striking. Xu Feihong, China’s ambassador in Delhi, recently accused Washington of being a “bully” that long enjoyed the fruits of free trade but now weaponizes tariffs for leverage. He declared that Beijing “firmly stands with India” in resisting unilateral trade restrictions and called for the two Asian giants to become “double engines” of growth. His remarks followed a high-level visit by Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, who urged India to see China as a partner, not a threat. Wang’s talks with S. Jaishankar, the foreign minister, and Ajit Doval, the national security adviser, produced ten points of consensus on border management and even tentative steps towards a framework for settling the boundary dispute.

This sudden thaw is remarkable given the bloody clashes at Galwan in 2020, which froze relations and left Delhi bristling with suspicion of Chinese intent. Since then, the two sides have managed only cautious disengagement, with troops still facing each other at multiple friction points along the Himalayan frontier. The new consensus to create additional general-level mechanisms for the eastern and middle sectors, reopen traditional border trading posts, and form expert groups on delimitation suggests a willingness to compartmentalise the border dispute in the interests of wider cooperation.

America’s tariff tantrums have accelerated this shift. American policymakers, once content to see India soak up Russian barrels to stabilise markets, now bridle at the optics of an ally fuelling Vladimir Putin’s war machine. Negotiations on a trade deal have stalled.

For Beijing, the opportunity is obvious. By siding vocally with India against America’s tariffs, China casts itself as a defender of multilateralism and the WTO, while hoping to loosen Delhi from Washington’s embrace. It offers investment, market access and a vision of an equal and orderly multipolar world.

Chinese companies, bruised by Western decoupling, now want space in India’s market, while Beijing seeks to blunt Delhi’s protectionist instincts against its tech and infrastructure champions.

India, for its part, will be cautious. Memories of Chinese aggression are fresh, and the trust deficit remains wide. Delhi’s strategic elite still views Beijing as the principal long-term challenger in Asia. Yet India has always prized ‘strategic autonomy’ while playing great powers off against each other rather than aligning fully. For PM Modi, cultivating a temporary rapprochement with China not only secures leverage over America but also reassures domestic audiences that India’s foreign policy is not hostage to any single partner. His upcoming visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit will be closely watched for signals of just how far this courtship might go.

The implications extend beyond South Asia. If India and China succeed even modestly in compartmentalising their disputes, they could inject new momentum into regional groupings such as BRICS and the SCO, which both prize as platforms for challenging Western dominance. A functioning ‘dragon–elephant’ partnership would complicate American efforts to stitch together an Indo-Pacific coalition aimed at containing China.

That said, the obstacles are formidable. Border tensions, trade imbalances (India runs a deficit of over $100bn with China), and competing visions of Asia’s security architecture will not vanish. Nor will America easily cede its strategic foothold in Delhi: defence ties, technology transfers, and intelligence cooperation remain deeper with Washington than Beijing can yet offer. The likeliest outcome is not a full-fledged India–China entente but a careful hedging with India drawing closer to China just enough to extract concessions from America, while keeping its options open.