Europe’s Nuclear Awakening

With America in retreat, Germany and France seek to fortify Europe’s nuclear deterrence.

Germany’s likely next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, is not known for radical departures in foreign policy. Yet his recent remarks about expanding France’s nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe reflect the most consequential shift in European security since the end of the Cold War. The continent finds itself at a precarious juncture. With U.S. President Donald Trump openly questioning NATO’s future, Europe must now decide whether it can rely on Washington’s nuclear shield or if it must forge its own.

In an interview with Deutschlandfunk radio, Merz stressed on the need to become stronger together in nuclear deterrence in Europe. His comments came just days after French President Emmanuel Macron pledged to open a debate on extending France’s nuclear deterrent to other European nations. For decades, Europe’s nuclear security has rested on America’s commitment to its NATO allies. Now, Trump’s second presidency has unsettled that foundation.

During the Cold War, the American nuclear umbrella, backed by the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, provided Europe with strategic stability. France and Britain, Western Europe’s only nuclear powers, maintained their arsenals as a national prerogative rather than a collective security mechanism. The idea of a shared European nuclear deterrent never gained traction, largely due to German reluctance. Berlin’s historical aversion to military assertiveness and its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ensured that Germany would not seek nuclear weapons of its own.

But with Trump’s foreign policy pivot, Europe faces an uncomfortable reality - an American president who has threatened to abandon NATO allies unwilling to meet their financial obligations.

Merz’s position remains cautious. He insists that any discussions on European nuclear deterrence must “complement the American nuclear umbrella, which we of course want to maintain.” Yet his acknowledgment that Germany cannot rely indefinitely on U.S. protection signals a historic shift in thinking within the German establishment. The far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has long argued for Germany to acquire its own nuclear weapons, a prospect still unthinkable for mainstream politicians. However, even centrists now recognize that Europe can no longer afford strategic complacency.

Macron has long positioned himself as a champion of European sovereignty. In 2020, he had proposed a strategic dialogue on Europe’s nuclear future, arguing that France’s arsenal could serve broader European security interests. His calls were largely met with polite dismissal in Berlin. Today, the mood has changed. Merz’s openness to discussions suggests that a consensus is forming in Germany’s political mainstream: Europe must assume greater responsibility for its own defence.

Yet any effort to build a European nuclear deterrent will require delicate diplomacy. France’s nuclear doctrine is fiercely independent, designed to serve French interests first. Extending its nuclear umbrella would mean entangling Paris in the defence of countries beyond its borders, something French leaders have traditionally resisted. Moreover, Britain, now outside the European Union, maintains its own independent nuclear arsenal and has not signalled enthusiasm for nuclear-sharing arrangements with the continent.

A Franco-German-British framework would be the logical nucleus of a European deterrent, but London’s reluctance and Paris’s caution complicate matters. However, the more Washington wavers, the stronger the case for Europe to develop an alternative deterrence mechanism.

A serious European nuclear initiative would come at an enormous financial and political cost. France’s arsenal is modest compared to America’s: it possesses around 300 nuclear warheads. Expanding its reach would require massive investment in missile systems, warhead production and delivery mechanisms. Germany, still constrained by post-war pacifism, would have to make an unprecedented leap in its defence spending and strategic doctrine.

Berlin has already taken tentative steps. Merz’s CDU/CSU bloc is in coalition negotiations with the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD), and both parties have signalled support for a major increase in defence spending. This marks a dramatic shift from Germany’s traditional reluctance to invest in hard power. However, building a credible nuclear deterrent will require long-term commitments and a fundamental reassessment of European security priorities. Either way, the days of European strategic passivity are coming to an end.