Gulf Tensions, Fertiliser Risks and India’s Natural Farming Hedge

India’s dependence on West Asian fertiliser routes has turned the Iran war into a domestic agricultural risk.

When geopolitics intrudes upon agriculture, the consequences are measured in delayed sowing, rising costs and anxious farmers scanning uncertain skies. With no sign of the ongoing Iran war receding anytime soon, the prospect of a prolonged disruption in fertiliser supply, particularly through the narrow maritime chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz, poses a tangible threat to India’s Kharif 2026 season. The vulnerability is structural, long-standing and potentially severe.

India’s fertiliser economy is built on a delicate balance between domestic production and imports. Nowhere is this more evident than in nitrogenous fertilisers such as urea. Annual consumption hovers between 35 and 38 million tonnes, while domestic output lags at roughly 30–31 million tonnes. The gap is bridged through imports, typically between 6 and 10 million tonnes a year, sourced largely from the Gulf. Diammonium phosphate (DAP), equally vital, is also heavily imported. In aggregate, roughly two-thirds of India’s nitrogen fertilisers and a substantial share of its phosphatic inputs depend on maritime routes threading through geopolitically sensitive waters.

Cascading Effect

The ongoing conflict can disrupt between a fifth and a third of India’s fertiliser supplies. Such a shock, arriving on the eve of Kharif sowing in June and July, would not merely tighten availability but would trigger cascading effects across prices, subsidies and farm incomes. Fertiliser imports, already projected to cost nearly $18bn in the coming fiscal year, would become costlier or scarcer or both.

The fiscal implications are no less daunting. India’s fertiliser subsidy bill is expected to exceed Rs. 1.2 trillion in FY2025-26. Urea alone is sold to farmers at a heavily controlled price, far below its production and import cost, implying a subsidy of over Rs. 30,000 per tonne. A supply shock would force the government into an unenviable position: either absorb higher global prices, further inflating the subsidy burden, or risk domestic shortages and farmer distress.

It is against this fraught backdrop that a seemingly modest idea gains strategic relevance: reducing dependence on synthetic fertilisers through natural farming. In states such as Maharashtra, where fertiliser use per hectare is already below the national average, the scope for such a transition is both practical and potentially impactful.

Natural farming, often described in India through the rubric of Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF), relies on locally sourced inputs such as cow dung, cow urine, compost and biological cultures to replace synthetic fertilisers. Its advocates argue that it not only reduces input costs but also improves soil health over time. Critics, however, caution that it may not supply sufficient nitrogen at scale, particularly for high-yield, input-intensive crops.

The evidence is, as is often the case in agriculture, mixed but suggestive. Field trials in Andhra Pradesh have shown that ZBNF can maintain yields in the short term when compared with conventional farming, particularly in rain-fed systems. Yet modelling studies indicate that, if adopted wholesale, such methods might replace only between half and four-fifths of current nitrogen use. The implication is clear: natural farming is not a silver bullet. But neither is it irrelevant.

Compelling Calculus

For Maharashtra, the calculus is compelling. The state’s urea consumption, which is estimated at around 2–3 million tonnes annually, is modest relative to its agricultural footprint. Average application rates are significantly lower than in states such as Punjab, suggesting that farmers are already accustomed to relatively lean input regimes. This creates a favourable baseline for partial substitution.

Consider a set of illustrative scenarios. If roughly 10 percent of the state’s farmers were to adopt natural farming practices on a meaningful scale, urea consumption could fall by approximately 250,000 tonnes. At current subsidy rates, this would translate into savings of around Rs. 800 crore. A 30 percent adoption rate could yield savings approaching Rs. 2,400 crore; at 60 percent, the figure could exceed Rs. 4,700 crore.

These sums represent fiscal space that could be redirected towards training, extension services and the development of local bio-input ecosystems.

With the Kharif season approaching, the window for intervention is narrow. The months of April to June 2026 will be decisive. Policy incentives must be activated swiftly, leveraging central schemes such as PM-PRANAM, which encourages states to reduce chemical fertiliser use by sharing subsidy savings. Maharashtra can augment this with its own programmes, offering targeted support for farmers willing to experiment with natural inputs.

Equally critical is the machinery of agricultural extension. Training programmes through Krishi Vigyan Kendras, farmer field schools and peer networks must be scaled up rapidly. Farmers need practical guidance: how to prepare bio-inputs such as Jeevamrit, how to manage mulching, how to integrate legumes into cropping systems. In the absence of such support, adoption will remain hesitant and uneven.

Input supply, too, must be addressed. Natural farming is often described as ‘zero budget,’ but this is something of a misnomer. While it reduces reliance on purchased fertilisers, it still requires access to biological cultures, organic matter and, in many cases, livestock-derived inputs. Ensuring the availability of these through cooperatives, local enterprises and dairy networks will be essential.

None of this obviates the risks. Farmers are, by necessity, conservative in their practices, particularly when faced with uncertainty. A sudden shift away from synthetic fertilisers, even if encouraged, may be perceived as risky - especially if the memory of past shortages looms large. Early adopters may encounter teething troubles, including modest yield declines or pest pressures. These must be mitigated through insurance mechanisms, targeted support and clear communication.

Meanwhile, the geopolitical risk itself remains unpredictable. Should a conflict escalate and disrupt shipments, India will need to activate contingency measures: diversifying import sources, ramping up domestic production and, if necessary, rationing supplies. Bio-fertilisers such as Azotobacter and Azospirillum could provide partial relief, but they cannot fully substitute for synthetic nitrogen in the short term.

Rebalancing Equation

The broader lesson is one of resilience. India’s fertiliser strategy has long prioritised availability and affordability, often at the expense of diversification and sustainability. The result is a system that functions efficiently in normal times but is exposed to external shocks. Natural farming, for all its limitations, offers a way to modestly rebalance this equation.

It would be naïve to suggest that a few months of policy push can transform agricultural practices across a state as large and diverse as Maharashtra. But it is equally mistaken to dismiss incremental change. Even a partial reduction in fertiliser demand that can be achieved through targeted adoption can help ease pressure on supply chains, moderate subsidy outlays and, perhaps most importantly, buy time.

In an era where geopolitics increasingly shapes economic outcomes, agriculture cannot remain insulated. The fields of Maharashtra may seem far removed from the tensions of West Asia, but the fertilisers that sustain them are not. It is high time to recognise and act upon this interdependence. By doing this, India has an opportunity to turn a looming vulnerability into a measured, if modest, strength.

(The writer is a member of Maharashtra Agriculture Price Commission. Views personal.)