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By:

Pulind Samant

29 November 2025 at 1:07:15 pm

How India can stay relevant in the South China Sea

As China tightens its grip over the South China Sea and America looks away, New Delhi must rethink how to remain a balancing force in Asia. Narendra Modi Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro When India embarked on its Look East policy in the early 1990s, and when the nation wasalmost immediately accommodated within the ASEAN framework as a dialogue partner, it waswidely commented upon as the ASEAN’...

How India can stay relevant in the South China Sea

As China tightens its grip over the South China Sea and America looks away, New Delhi must rethink how to remain a balancing force in Asia. Narendra Modi Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro When India embarked on its Look East policy in the early 1990s, and when the nation wasalmost immediately accommodated within the ASEAN framework as a dialogue partner, it waswidely commented upon as the ASEAN’ move towards seeking balance of power, in the faceof the overwhelming China, which had entered the said framework not very long ago. This thinking was, of course, not baseless, especially in view of two background factors,complementing each other. First, local anxiety set in motion by gradually vanishing presence ofthe Western colonial powers’ security cover post second world war, complete upon withdrawalof the last British forces in the mid-1980s (on Brunei’s independence). Second, the rapidly increasing and potentially threatening presence of China, backed by the latter’s historically infamous reputation of meddling in others’ affairs as well as loathing equality-based coexistence. Against this backdrop, India’s entry into ASEAN’s overall framework could comfortably be viewed as such, though India was no match for China even then. India was rather a needy nation, seeking association with ASEAN for financial stability through increased trading opportunities, following the then recent disintegration of its all-weather supporter, the USSR. However, going by India’s known though understated reputation as a great civilisational entity and supporting the early civilisational growth of almost all the regional states to varying degrees during ancient times, and its respectable modern position as the world’s largest democracy, did certainly add some weight in its favour. India too appears to have been well aware, since the beginning of this phase, of the ‘responsibility’ cast upon its shoulders to provide ‘balance’ in the region; but being primarily needy, it obviously was not in a position to flex its muscles in that direction during the early period of the policy. India’s different posturing actually started showing after the announcement of its Act East policy in 2014, through supporting official statements issued from time to time, found in repetitive utterances of certain terms and phrases by high office-bearers such as India’s external affairs and defence ministers, and even the Prime Minister. These have been the typical assurances of moral support towards the necessity of ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight through the South China Sea, which was troubled by nothing else but Chinese manoeuvres. Resisting Beijing However, much water has flowed through the South China Sea over the passing decades, and continues to do so. The story starts with China announcing its so-called Nine-Dash Line to the world in 1952, alerting all to its own sense of, and self-proclaimed right to, an unduly vast share of the sea touching its southern shores, historically called the South China Sea. This announcement naturally conflicted with the rightful interests of four Southeast Asian littoral states and ASEAN member states - Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei - in terms of fishing and mineral deposits at the seabed, including crude oil. Of these, the interests of Vietnam and the Philippines were affected most substantially. While Vietnam has been resisting Chinese encroachment through a few confrontations at sea and also through the involvement of outside actors such as India’s ONGC in oil-rig operations, the Philippines chose to challenge it at the International Court of Justice in 2013. Although the ICJ delivered its verdict in favour of the Philippines in 2016, China refused to abide by it and continued not only to encroach but also to consolidate its overall grip on the sea by erecting military bases on the encroached islands, reefs and atolls. ASEAN, the collective body of Southeast Asian states, politically carved up by China through some client states within, does not seem willing to take up the matter with China assertively to protect the interests of its member states. And even if it were willing, China pre-emptively (in 2016) refused to recognise it as a matter of ASEAN’s interest, declaring its willingness to deal only bilaterally with the concerned states. This leaves the affected with no option whatsoever but to watch helplessly as things unfold further to their detriment. Symbolic protest on the part of the affected has been shown in renaming the sea as the ‘East Sea’ by Vietnam and the ‘West Philippine Sea’ by the Philippines in 2011. Although Indonesia was never a party to the sea-related disputes, it too has suffered from time to time from the aggression of Chinese fishing boats, accompanied by naval ships misleadingly labelled as ‘coast guard,’ exceeding even the self-declared so-called Nine-Dash Line. That prompted Indonesia to officially rename the sea touching its northern shores the North Natuna Sea, after its bordering Natuna Islands, in 2017. These symbolic gestures point not only to the scale of the overall menace and panic caused by Chinese aggression but also to the state of helplessness of the affected. Against this backdrop, things seem only to have worsened for the sufferers and improved from China’s viewpoint in maintaining its current position of undue advantage over all others. An indication to that effect was found during the 47th ASEAN Summit last October. The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting took place a day earlier, where the chair, Malaysia’s Defence Minister Mohd Khaled Nordin, showered praise on China, admiring the latter’s “vision reflected through its initiatives for global development, security, civilisation and governance, underscoring its leadership, wisdom and commitment to build a better and more inclusive world.” This amounts to little more than total surrender at the feet of an aggressive power that has been gradually and steadily destroying, limiting and curtailing the due rights of its southern neighbours day after day, by violating their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) from time to time, thereby blatantly violating the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on a regular basis. Suffocating Control Such violations of ASEAN states’ rights, and the resulting suffocating Chinese control over the South China Sea, seem likely to continue in view of the consistently declining interest and attention of the United States in this geography, which in turn appears sealed by the new National Security Strategy declared last week. This new NSS views China as a ‘near peer’ and declares its own inhibition about “wasting blood and treasure to curtail the influence of the world’s great and middle powers” as well as an intention to move “away from theatres whose relative import to American national security has declined in recent decades.” These are clear signs of America’s unwillingness to pay attention to China’s growing grip over the South China Sea. Is this NSS a green signal to China to adopt a ‘Monroe Doctrine’ in its immediate neighbourhood? What should India be doing in this case to stay relevant and in the reckoning? Should it follow Japan’s path, where the latter, as if sniffing out America’s new NSS in advance, has quickly asserted itself to warn China of consequences should it dare violate the sovereignty of Taiwan? Not exactly, perhaps, given geographical realities. But these developments nevertheless call upon India to review the circumstances anew and strategize its positioning in the region to stay relevant geopolitically, and to be counted upon as a provider of the ever-elusive balance. (The writer is a research scholar in international relations. Views personal.)

How Is ISIS Influencing Terrorism?

ISIS Influencing

At 3:15 am on New Year's Day, a 42-year-old US citizen and army veteran from Texas called Shamsud-Din Jabbar drove a rented pickup truck into a crowd on Bourbon Street in New Orleans, killing 15 people and injuring at least 35 more.


The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) called the attack an “act of terrorism” and said that Jabbar appeared to have been motivated by the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organisation. The group's infamous black flag was recovered from the back of his vehicle, and he had posted videos online proclaiming his support for IS.


We do not know whether Jabbar, who was fatally shot by police, was a genuine IS operative. But the style of his attack was consistent with those committed on behalf of the group in the past. Vehicles were used to target civilians in the 2017 attack on London's Westminster Bridge, as well as in Berlin and the French city of Nice in 2016.


Jabbar's attack demonstrates the resilience of IS despite its lack of territorial control, as well as its commitment to inspire lone-wolf attacks in an attempt to gain widespread coverage.


IS gained global attention in 2014 when it captured large parts of Iraq and Syria and established a so-called Islamic caliphate. Between 2014 and 2016, when the group was at the height of its powers, IS spread fear worldwide and managed to recruit thousands of men and women from nearly 80 countries.


Ten organisations classified as “IS affiliates” by the US National Counterterrorism Centre committed more than 1,000 attacks combined during this period.


By 2019, IS had lost all of its territory due to the efforts of a US-led military coalition, alongside Kurdish and Iraqi forces. However, the group had already begun preparing for a new structure.


The group transitioned towards a more clandestine network of decentralised cells, and takes advantage of unstable states primarily in sub-Saharan Africa to facilitate the movement of weapons, equipment and fighters.


IS has continued to focus on the mobilisation and online recruitment of men and women to sustain its operations, too. This is done almost entirely through the dissemination of information and propaganda online. The result has been several high-profile attacks by recruits of the group and its affiliates over the past few years, including on Moscow's Crocus City Hall concert venue in March 2024, which resulted in the deaths of 145 people.


Intelligence agencies have foiled many more. In August, for example, three Taylor Swift concerts in Vienna, Austria, were cancelled after the authorities arrested two people who were allegedly planning an attack. The suspects had been radicalised by extremist Islamist propaganda from IS and Al-Qaida.


Challenges moving forward

Jabbar's attack demonstrated an ability to keep up with technological developments. Security camera footage shows Jabbar cycling through the Bourbon Street area a few months before the attack while filming on Meta smart glasses to record a video. This enabled Jabbar to become familiar with the area and assess its security measures.


On the day of the attack itself, Jabbar also drove an electric truck. This enabled him to cause as many casualities as possible as electric vehicles can accelerate faster than their gas-powered counterparts. The use of emerging technologies by terrorists clearly presents a significant challenge for law enforcement and intelligence officials moving forward.


Another important point to consider is Jabbar's background in the US military. The involvement of military personnel in far-right extremism and terrorism has become an increasing concern over recent years. Research has found that the proportion of terrorist attacks in the US involving people with a military background jumped from 0.8% in 2018 to 6.4% in 2020.


The attack on the US Capitol Building on January 6, 2021 brought the issue of extremism within the armed forces firmly into the spotlight. A former air force officer called Larry Brock was sentenced to two years in prison in 2023 for his role in the riots. Of the 400 people who have been sentenced for their role in the attack, at least 70 had served in the military.


Similarly, in 2022, a German soldier named Franco Albrecht was found guilty of plotting to carry out attacks on senior politicians and anti-racist activists while posing as a Syrian refugee, hoping the blame would be placed on migrants. Albrecht's case triggered an attempt to seek out more far-right networks in the German military.


At the time of writing, there is not much information about how Jabbar himself became radicalised. But there is enough evidence to suggest that radicalisation is not a linear process and differs from one person to another. It could happen to anyone and individuals may not even realise the process they have gone through.


Causes of radicalisation vary. They are not limited to people with certain types of vulnerabilities or grievances, and cannot be attributed to people with mental health issues. This is simply because not everyone experiencing mental health problems or grievances will resort to violence to address their problems.


The FBI continues to gather information about the motive behind the attack and Jabbar's potential affiliations with terrorist groups. But the findings related to the technology he used and his military background of highlight the challenge states face moving forward in their efforts to combat and eliminate the threat posed by terrorism.

-The Conversation

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