India’s Amphibious Awakening

For decades, India’s navy has been a force defined as much by restraint as by reach. It has excelled in sea denial, in guarding chokepoints, and in projecting quiet deterrence across the Indian Ocean. However, it lacked the ability to decisively shape events ashore. That omission is being remedied.

Recently, India’s Defence Acquisition Council chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has granted a fresh Acceptance of Necessity for the procurement of four Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) at an estimated cost of Rs. 33,000 crore. The decision revives a long-stalled programme and, more importantly, signals a shift in how India intends to wield maritime power.

LPDs, which are amphibious assault ships capable of deploying troops, helicopters, and mechanised equipment, have traditionally been seen as auxiliary assets, useful but not decisive. That view is now obsolete. Modern LPDs have evolved into floating ecosystems of warfighting capability, integrating aviation, logistics, command-and-control, and medical support into a single, mobile platform.

Strategic Shift

India’s need for such platforms is hardly new. A previous attempt to procure four LPDs collapsed amid financial troubles at a participating private shipyard. A subsequent Request for Information in 2021 envisioned ambitious vessels - 200 metres long, electrically propelled, capable of carrying 900 troops and operating multiple helicopters, while being heavily armed. The revised requirements are more pragmatic but no less consequential. The new ships will displace roughly 29,000 tonnes, stretch to around 220 metres, and be equipped with multi-function radars, landing craft, unmanned systems, and integrated electric propulsion. They are to serve not just as troop carriers, but as motherships for a future fleet of drones and autonomous platforms.

This recalibration reflects a deeper doctrinal shift. For much of its history, the Indian Navy has prioritised sea control and deterrence by keeping adversaries at bay rather than projecting force onto land. The recast LPD programme suggests a move towards sustained expeditionary capability: the ability to insert, support, and sustain forces far from home shores.

The timing is significant. Across the Indo-Pacific, amphibious power has become a central pillar of military strategy. Nowhere is this more evident than in China’s rapid naval expansion. Over the past decade, Beijing has built the world’s fastest-growing amphibious fleet, centred on the Type-071 landing platform docks and the larger Type-075 helicopter assault ships. These vessels are explicitly designed for large-scale island seizure operations, a capability with obvious relevance to scenarios involving Taiwan Strait.

Contested Environment

China’s ambitions, however, are not confined to its immediate periphery. Through a network of ports, logistics hubs, and military facilities stretching from Gwadar in Pakistan to Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, it has steadily extended its operational reach into the Indian Ocean. The result is a maritime environment that is more crowded, more contested, and more uncertain than at any point in recent memory.

India, by contrast, has until now lacked the means to deploy large, mechanised forces rapidly into distant theatres. Its fleet of surface combatants and submarines is formidable, but its ability to translate naval presence into influence ashore has been limited. This constraint is increasingly untenable. India’s strategic geography, which straddles vital sea lanes and proximate to fragile littorals from East Africa to Southeast Asia, imposes responsibilities that go beyond mere surveillance.

Consider the range of contingencies that now define the region: the protection of energy routes, the security of undersea communication cables, the defence of island territories, and the management of crises in politically unstable coastal states. Add to this the growing frequency of natural disasters, from cyclones in the Bay of Bengal to humanitarian emergencies across the Indo-Pacific. In each case, speed, scale, and self-sufficiency are paramount. Few platforms offer that combination as effectively as LPDs.

The utility of such vessels extends well beyond war. They are, in effect, instruments of statecraft. Equipped with hospitals, helicopters, and command centres, LPDs can function as floating relief hubs, evacuation platforms, and symbols of reassurance. For a country with one of the world’s largest diasporas and an expanding diplomatic footprint, the ability to evacuate citizens from conflict zones or deliver aid in times of crisis is a necessity.

Other navies have already embraced this logic. Italy’s Trieste (LHD), commissioned in December 2024, exemplifies the modern conception of amphibious power. It is not merely a ship but a system capable of integrating air, sea, and land operations into a coherent whole. The Indian Navy’s new LPDs, while unlikely to match Trieste, are clearly inspired by the same philosophy.

India’s move towards amphibious capability does not imply an abandonment of traditional strengths in sea denial or deterrence. Rather, it complements them. Maritime supremacy in the 21st century will belong not to those who can merely control the seas, but to those who can seamlessly translate that control into influence ashore.

With four LPDs in service, India would gain the ability to conduct sustained amphibious operations, reinforce distant territories, and establish mobile command hubs in times of conflict. More subtly, it would acquire a capacity to shape events across the Indian Ocean rather than merely react to them.

Whether this ambition is realised will depend on execution. India’s defence procurement process is notoriously slow, and the integration of such complex platforms will test both industry and doctrine. Yet the strategic logic is compelling. In an era defined by grey-zone conflicts, contested commons, and fluid alliances, flexibility is power.

The revival of the LPD programme is a statement of intent. India, long a continental power with maritime aspirations, is beginning to act like a truly amphibious state that understands that the line between sea and land is no longer a boundary, but a bridge.

(The author is a retired naval aviation officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)