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By:

Shoumojit Banerjee

27 August 2024 at 9:57:52 am

125 Years of Rise of the Maratha Power

Justice Ranade’s 1900 classic remains a foundational text of Maratha historiography that sought to reinterpret Maharashtra’s past as a disciplined national effort. When Mahadev Govind Ranade published ‘Rise of the Maratha Power’ in 1900, he was better known as a judge and reformer than as a historian. Yet, this book (more accurately, a collection of essays), issued in collaboration with his fellow jurist K. T. Telang, became the founding text of Maratha historiography. In a landscape...

125 Years of Rise of the Maratha Power

Justice Ranade’s 1900 classic remains a foundational text of Maratha historiography that sought to reinterpret Maharashtra’s past as a disciplined national effort. When Mahadev Govind Ranade published ‘Rise of the Maratha Power’ in 1900, he was better known as a judge and reformer than as a historian. Yet, this book (more accurately, a collection of essays), issued in collaboration with his fellow jurist K. T. Telang, became the founding text of Maratha historiography. In a landscape dominated by colonial chroniclers such as Mountstuart Elphinstone and James Grant Duff, whose narratives, to a lesser or greater degree, essentially treated the Marathas as shrewd adventurers in the ruins of Mughal rule, Ranade offered a strikingly different account. His interpretation of the Maratha nation was one whose edifice was built of moral purpose, social awakening and collective agency. As he explained in his preface, his aim was “to present a clear view of the salient features of the history from the Indian standpoint” and to dispel “misapprehensions which detract from the moral interest and political lessons of the story.” The rise of the Marathas, he insisted, was “a genuine effort on the part of a Hindu nationality…to achieve what had not been attempted before.” Ranade’s thesis, steeped in nineteenth-century moralism, gave regional and Indian history an internal logic. Yet the same moral fervour sometimes led Ranade to see continuity where later historians found rupture, and religious revival where evidence pointed to political calculation. Ranade’s career explains much about his method. Born in 1842 and educated in Bombay, he absorbed the analytic habits of the British and European liberal tradition - Gibbon’s irony, Mill’s utilitarianism, Ranke’s critical method, Macaulay’s literary flourish - but turned them to Indian ends. In 1891, he had devised, with Telang and others, an ambitious plan for a collaborative history of the Marathas. It never materialised, but the fragments became ‘Rise of the Maratha Power.’ His judicial discipline gave his prose its measured tone while his reformist temperament, shaped by the Prarthana Samaj (the socio-religious reform movement founded in Mumbai in 1867 by Dr. Atmaram Pandurang and his brother), gave it moral weight. In the opening chapter of ‘Rise of the Maratha Power,’ Ranade, in discussing the importance of Maratha history, rejected the idea that the Maratha confederacy was a band of marauders who prospered by accident. Freebooters, he argued, could not found empires that lasted generations. According to Ranade, the endurance of the Maratha power for nearly a century showed that it rested on deeper foundations like language, religion, local institutions and, above all, a moral sense of collective destiny. In a subtle assertion of indigenous legitimacy, Ranade pointedly reminded readers that the Marathas, and not the Mughals, were the immediate predecessors of the Raj in India’s political hierarchy. “The fact that the Maratha power, taking its rise in western Maharashtra, attained imperial supremacy over the continent of India for a century,” he wrote, “cannot but be a matter of absorbing interest to the British rulers of India.”  Ranade attributed the origins of Maratha power to geography and social organisation as much as to heroism. Maharashtra’s ridged landscape - the Sahyadri and Satpura ranges laced with hill-forts - had trained its inhabitants in the arts of defence and guerrilla war. Village panchayats and ryotwari land tenures had bred habits of independence unknown in other provinces. According to him, centuries of Muslim rule, far from extinguishing autonomy, had paradoxically honed it. By the seventeenth century, “a slow process of national emancipation was being peacefully worked up.” Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, in Ranade’s telling, did not create this energy; he united it. “The power had already been created, though scattered in small centres all over the country,” he wrote. Shivaji’s genius was to consolidate these forces against a common danger - the Mughal advance southward. His sense of mission, “inspired by religious enthusiasm,” distinguished him from mere fortune-seekers. For Ranade, religion was not fanaticism but social cement. The cults of Vithoba at Pandharpur and of Bhawani at Tuljapur and Kolhapur, the bhakti poetry of Tukaram and Ramdas - all supplied the moral voltage for political unity. Shivaji Maharaj’s interactions with these saints represented, Ranade thought, “the new aspirations of the time in intensified form.” The Maratha war of independence, therefore, was the political expression of a religious and social awakening. Later scholars would contest Ranade’s cause-and-effect chain, especially the role of religion in the rise of Maratha power. G. S. Sardesai argued in ‘Marathi Riyasat’ (1915) that the religious revival followed, rather than preceded, political consolidation. Yet, Ranade’s larger insight, which was that ideology and organisation mattered as much as arms, has remained seminal. The book’s later chapters read less like history than like moral audit. The later Peshwas, Ranade believed, had abandoned Chhatrapati Shivaji’s inclusive nationalism for Brahminical exclusiveness. Where earlier leaders had drawn strength from the peasantry and the soldiery, the Poona court degenerated into faction and patronage. “Parties within parties,” he lamented, destroyed the sympathy that had once bound classes together. Even the Dakshina charity, founded to support learning, had become “a grant generally to all Brahmins,” turning Poona into “a centre of a large pauper population.” His diagnosis of military decay was equally stern. The adoption of European-style infantry under later Peshwas created mercenary armies devoid of national feeling. Unlike the old hill militia, these troops served only their paymasters. He observed that in assisting the English to put down Angre’s power, the Peshwas diminished the importance of their own navy while the neglect of the hill-forts that had been Shivaji’s backbone, symbolised a deeper rot. Ranade’s argument culminated in a moral epigram worthy of a Victorian sermon: when a state limits its purpose to “protecting the cow and the Brahmin,” virtue decays and conquest follows “as a matter of course.” Time has not been kind to all of Ranade’s conclusions. Maratha historiography has vastly advanced since ‘Rise of the Maratha Power’. Ranade’s comparison between the Maratha  chauth  and Wellesley’s Subsidiary Alliance overstated the analogy.  Chauth,  as later scholars such as Surendranath Sen showed, promised no real protection, and its function evolved only under Shahu. Ranade’s likening of Chhatrapati Shivaji’s Ashta Pradhan council to the Governor-General’s Executive Council also strained credibility. Modern historians note that collective responsibility was only partly recognised in Shivaji’s system. Ranade’s reading of religion as the prime mover of politics reflected his own reformist piety more than the evidence. The Maratha movement’s appeal, as later research has revealed, owed as much to local grievances, regional trade and the opportunism of warrior elites as to bhakti zeal. His insistence on moral unity occasionally blurred the distinctions among castes, sects and interests that made Maratha politics fractious from the start. Yet, these are the inevitable blemishes of a pioneer. “Modern researches have made some of his conclusions untenable today,” admitted Dr. Surendranath Sen in 1925, “but the credit of pointing out a new angle of vision belongs strictly to him.” That “angle of vision” transformed Maratha historiography. Later writers like Dr. Bal Krishna Rao Bahadur G.S. Sardesai and V.V. Joshi among them either refined or contested his framework, but none escaped it. Bal Krishna’s  Shivaji the Great  (1940) largely accepted Ranade’s interpretations, correcting only technical comparisons. Joshi extended his method to the whole eighteenth century in  Clash of the Three Empires  (1941). Sardesai’s  New History of the Marathas  (1946) retained Ranade’s sociological lens even while revising its chronology. Revisiting the book on its quasquicentennial anniversary, one finds that  Rise of the Maratha Power  still remains valuable for its interpretation. Ranade’s Maharashtra was not just a province but a prototype for India - a polity in which geography, faith and self-government intertwined. As a jurist who believed that freedom required self-restraint, and a nationalist who distrusted chauvinism, Ranade’s history was neither a hymn to rebellion nor a paean to empire, but a study in civic virtue.

NCP (SP) bags the best deal in MVA

WITH 85 SEATS AND A FEW MORE FOR ITS SMALLER ALLIES, THE NCP (SP) HAS BAGGED A CHUNK OF THE PIE


MVA

Mumbai: The leader must get the best of the pie. And that’s exactly what Sharad Pawar has managed to get for his party. As the bitterly fought seat sharing talks come to a close, it is clear that the NCP (SP) has walked away with the best deal. Amidst hard negotiations, the three parties have agreed to a seat quota of 85 constituencies for each with another 15 being re-negotiated. The NCP (SP) seems to have cornered constituencies that are crucial for its consolidation and growth. The party, using its top boss’ contacts and friendships across politicians and parties, has roped in local strongmen particularly from western Maharashtra and Marathwada, it’s focus areas, leaving regions such as Vidarbha and Mumbai and Thane to the other constituents.


Party members were expecting around 75 to a maximum of 80 seats going by the strength of the parties and the winnability factor of the candidates. But Pawar has managed to rope in key leaders and regional strongmen, boosting his party’s chances at winning. The influx of leaders from the BJP and Ajit Pawar’s faction of the NCP from western Maharashtra and Nanded and Beed put the NCP (SP) in a higher position than its allies. Whether its Harshvardhan Patil, Laxman Dhoble or the influential Ghatge, Mohite-Patil and Naik-Nimbalkar families, these political leaders have upped the various candidates winnability. “It’s all about who can get the maximum turnout and we now stand a good chance given that our existing leaders and the new ones who have joined, all wield considerable clout in their respective regions,” says an NCP (SP) member.


This turnaround comes a year after the NCP was split by Ajit Pawar who walked away with legislators and party workers. Despite having lost the symbol and party name, the NCP (SP) aced the Lok Sabha elections with a strike rate of 80 percent. Now, three months later, the party has managed to snatch the best deal in the seat sharing arrangement within the MVA with the Congress getting the hardest hit. “We negotiated hard but gave in in the interests of the alliance staying intact. However, it’s not yet done; we will bargain for more seats in Vidarbha and Mumbai but our competitor here is Uddhav Thackeray and not Sharad Pawar,” says a Congress leader.


The seats secured by the NCP (SP) are crucial for the party which sees the sugar and milk belt of western Maharashtra as its bastion from the early days of Pawar’s political career. The seats set aside for the MVA’s alliance partners, too, are a result of Pawar’s good relations with these allies. Making the most of an adverse situation is a lesson that can be well learnt from Pawar. Even as the MVA formed the government in 2019, the undivided NCP bagged the maximum number and the most influential portfolios in the cabinet.


The NCP had taken 12 cabinet positions with portfolios linked to rural politics such as water resources, cooperation and rural development, apart from the key home and finance departments. Even now, the ‘architect’ of the MVA has managed to get a chunk of the pie for his party.

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