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By:

Rajendra Joshi

3 December 2024 at 9:20:26 am

Sugar industry strains as traders reap profits

Gap between ex-mill prices, retail rates raised questions Kolhapur: The Indian sugar industry is caught in a deepening crisis, with sugar mills struggling to secure remunerative prices for their produce even as traders and middlemen appear to be making substantial profits. While sugar mills are receiving between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal through recent sale tenders, retail prices have remained as high as Rs 58 per kg. The widening gap between ex-mill prices and retail rates has...

Sugar industry strains as traders reap profits

Gap between ex-mill prices, retail rates raised questions Kolhapur: The Indian sugar industry is caught in a deepening crisis, with sugar mills struggling to secure remunerative prices for their produce even as traders and middlemen appear to be making substantial profits. While sugar mills are receiving between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal through recent sale tenders, retail prices have remained as high as Rs 58 per kg. The widening gap between ex-mill prices and retail rates has raised serious questions about the role of intermediaries and the effectiveness of the Centre’s efforts to contain sugar prices. The margins available to traders and intermediaries have reportedly crossed 20 per cent, leaving sugar millers perplexed. At a time when both sugarcane growers and mill operators are under financial pressure, the trading chain appears to be benefiting disproportionately. The Centre must examine this growing disparity and take corrective measures to prevent speculative profiteering. Retail sugar prices began rising sharply in August, touching nearly Rs 70 per kg in some markets. The escalation added to inflationary pressures and caused concern among consumers, particularly ahead of the festive season. In response, the Centre introduced a series of measures to improve domestic availability and moderate prices. These included permitting duty-free sugar imports, initially until October 31, a deadline subsequently extended to December 31. The government also directed sugar mills to commence the crushing season from October 15 and tightened monitoring of sugar stocks. In another significant intervention, it modified the ethanol policy, restricting the diversion of sugarcane juice, sugar syrup and B-heavy molasses for ethanol production. Following these measures, sugar mills began witnessing a decline in the prices offered through their sale tenders. Recent transactions have fetched between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal. Going by the conventional relationship between ex-mill prices and retail rates, sugar should ideally have been available to consumers at less than ₹50 per kg. However, retail prices continue to hover around Rs 58 per kg, pointing to a substantial disconnect between the mill gate and the consumer market. Traditionally, sugar retailing operated on relatively thin margins. Since sugar is an essential commodity, retailers often treated it as a low-margin product to attract customers who would subsequently purchase other household provisions. The margin was sometimes informally equated with the resale value of the empty 50-kg jute bags in which sugar was supplied. This was considered a nominal return for retailers. That traditional pricing mechanism, however, appears to have undergone a significant change. The widening gap between mill-level tender prices and retail rates has created considerable scope for intermediaries to extract higher margins. The critical question is whether the additional amount paid by consumers is reaching the sugar mills or remaining within the trading chain. The issue assumes particular significance in Maharashtra, where the sugarcane pricing dispute has intensified ahead of the new crushing season. Farmers’ organisations have been demanding a minimum price of Rs 5,500 per tonne for sugarcane. Millers, meanwhile, are preparing to agitate for a revision in the Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) framework and the restoration of a more supportive ethanol policy. The Swabhimani Shetkari Sanghatana, led by Raju Shetti, has taken a firm position that sugar mills should not be allowed to commence operations until farmers receive an acceptable price for their cane. Shetti has also drawn the state government’s attention to the unusually high retail prices of sugar, questioning why consumers continue to pay more even as mills are forced to sell at relatively lower rates. The Centre’s sudden changes to the ethanol policy have further complicated the industry’s financial position. Ethanol production had emerged as an important revenue stream for sugar mills, enabling them to diversify operations, improve cash flows and enhance their capacity to pay farmers. Restrictions on the diversion of sugarcane-based raw materials have weakened this support at a critical juncture. The resulting contradiction is difficult to ignore: farmers are demanding better cane prices, millers are struggling with shrinking realisations and policy uncertainty, while intermediaries appear to be benefiting from the gap between wholesale and retail prices. The government cannot address the sugar crisis merely by regulating mill stocks, imports and ethanol diversion. It must also examine the entire supply chain, identify where the widening margins are accruing and ensure that the benefits of market interventions reach both sugarcane growers and consumers. With nearly Rs 2 lakh crore riding on the sugar economy, allowing intermediaries to thrive while the industry’s primary stakeholders struggle would be a serious policy failure.

Patriots and Puppets: RSS and the Communists at India’s Dawn

Oct 13, 2025
5 min read

Part 2: From the moment of its birth, the British saw the RSS as seditious while the Communists, born under Moscow’s shadow, paradoxically found comfort in the Empire’s embrace, particularly the Communist Party of Great Britain.

As a young medical student in Kolkata, K.B. Hedgewar joined the revolutionary Anushilan Samiti which was inspired by Bengal’s Swadeshi movement and later channelled that nationalist zeal into founding the RSS.
As a young medical student in Kolkata, K.B. Hedgewar joined the revolutionary Anushilan Samiti which was inspired by Bengal’s Swadeshi movement and later channelled that nationalist zeal into founding the RSS.

Dr. Hedgewar, the founder of the RSS, was a follower and associate of Lokmanya Tilak, and had close links with many armed revolutionaries and with the Anushilan Samiti. For this reason, from the very day of the RSS’s founding, the British government kept a close watch on him. Even when the RSS’s work had not yet spread across the whole of Maharashtra, British intelligence gathered detailed information about the organization, leaving no stone unturned. Some of these intelligence reports were even presented in the legislature. From the very beginning, the British government regarded the RSS as an organization harbouring seditious intentions. Consequently, the question of the RSS receiving any kind of assistance from the British government simply never arose.

 

True to its stated principle of “remaining away from political work,” the RSS as an organization never participated in political activity. However, many of its office-bearers and workers took part in the freedom movement under the Congress flag. Dr. Hedgewar himself participated in the 1927 Forest Satyagraha and served a prison sentence for it — though at that time he had stepped down from his position as Sarsanghchalak.

 

Moreover, many RSS workers regularly aided armed revolutionaries in their activities, quietly and without seeking publicity. Leaders ranging from Aruna Asaf Ali to Jayaprakash Narayan have testified to this fact.

 

The British authorities received reports of such activities of RSS workers from their own intelligence network from time to time. For this very reason, the British government did not accept the RSS’s stance that it stayed away from politics. In their eyes, the RSS was — and remained — an organization with seditious intentions.

 

Complex relationship

The relationship between the British government and the communists was complex. From the very inception of the Communist Party, the British maintained contact with them in various ways. Official records exist showing that M. N. Roy was financially supported by the British government for many years. Early history makes it clear that communist loyalties often wavered between the two imperial powers — Russia and Britain.

 

Although Russia was openly acknowledged as the ‘motherland’ of Indian communists, most of the prominent communist leaders in India had close ties to England. For many among them, their true masters were the British. Within the global structure of the Comintern, the responsibility for ‘guiding’ the Communist Party of India rested squarely with the Communist Party of Great Britain.

 

When relations between Russia and Britain were strained, Indian communists opposed British rule. During that period, they participated in Congress-led satyagrahas and even plotted armed revolutions. But as soon as Russia and Britain became allies, the Indian communists switched sides and became supporters of British authority. Acting on this new line, they betrayed the 1942 movement without hesitation. Not only that — they went a step further and bargained with the British government to secure the release of their imprisoned leaders, extracting several financial and political concessions in the process.

 

Unholy alliance

Perhaps even more significant was the fact that the communists had accepted, from the very beginning, the British political plan to partition India. They worked with extraordinary zeal to spread propaganda in favour of this plan and, remarkably, they continue to do so even today. In 1940, P. C. Joshi, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, boasted in a letter to the British Governor-General of India that “we are creating an atmosphere for the creation of Pakistan far more effectively than the Muslim League.”

 

What makes this even more striking is that Stalin himself had issued explicit instructions to the Communist Party of India not to campaign for or take any initiative toward such a partition. Ignoring those instructions completely, the Indian communists actively aided the Muslim League in every possible way, acting in effect as collaborators for the British.

 

The relationship between the RSS and the Congress was never cordial. In fact, from the time of Dr. Hedgewar onward, many RSS workers were active within the Congress. Yet the work initiated by the RSS — the task of organizing Hindu society, its insistence on nationalist thought, and its effort at national rejuvenation — were all unacceptable to the Congress.

 

Most notably, the idea of organizing Hindu society was something both Gandhi and Nehru opposed. Likewise, themes such as nationalism, national regeneration, and the vision of a strong nation were ideas that Pandit Nehru could not tolerate. Moreover, since the British already regarded the RSS as an organization with seditious intentions, the Congress took a strongly adversarial stance toward the RSS right from the beginning.

 

An unwritten rule was established within the Congress that RSS volunteers would not be made office-bearers at any level. The Congress expected the RSS to “wrap up its saffron flag and work as a volunteer corps of the Congress.” Several attempts were made to pressure the RSS into this role, but the organization never yielded to that pressure.

 

As a result, once independence was won and power came into Congress hands, Nehru seized the first available opportunity to ban the RSS.


On 30 January 1948, following Gandhiji’s assassination, the Nehru government imposed a ban on the RSS. However, this ban was declared “in the interest of maintaining law and order in the country.” The order did not mention Gandhi’s assassination at all. The First Information Report (FIR) registered for Gandhi’s murder did not name the RSS, nor was the RSS included in the charge sheet filed in court. No accusations were brought by the government against the Sarsanghchalak or any office-bearer of the RSS in connection with Gandhi’s murder.


Nevertheless, through the spread of falsehoods and relentless propaganda, the Congress and the government carried out a sustained campaign to malign the RSS for years.

 

In the eight decades since independence, the Congress government has imposed a ban on the RSS three separate times on various pretexts, and each time was ultimately forced to withdraw it unconditionally. During none of these bans did the government present to Parliament any statement detailing the allegedly ‘anti-national activities’ of the RSS.

 

Principled stance

True to its principle, the RSS has never acted against the government. Only on two occasions did it organize movements that could be construed as opposition: the agitation for a ban on cow slaughter, and the struggle against the Emergency.

 

During the fight against the Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975, the RSS stood at the forefront of the nation’s democratic forces. On the very day the Emergency was declared, Indira’s government banned the RSS, jailing Sarsanghchalak Balasaheb Deoras along with hundreds of thousands of volunteers.

 

But the RSS took the lead in organizing an underground resistance, bringing together all pro-democracy political parties and organizations under the leadership of the late Jayaprakash Narayan. Thousands upon thousands of volunteers participated in the satyagraha that followed. Jayaprakash himself publicly stated: “Had it not been for the RSS, the fight against the Emergency would never have succeeded, and we would not have come out of jail.”

 

During the three wars forced upon India by Pakistan (1947–48, 1965, 1971) and the 1962 war with China, the RSS fully cooperated with the government. The prime ministers of the time publicly acknowledged this support.

 

[Tomorrow, we examine the relations between the Communists and the Congress and how they have managed to entrench themselves owing to the patronage of the latter party] 

  

(The writer is Vice-President, BJP Maharashtra, former Chief State Spokeperson of the BJP, Maharashtra and Director, Vilasrao Salunke Adhysan (Rambhau Mhalgi Prabodhini). He is also the author of several books including a noted work on Ayodhya. Views personal.)

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