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Correspondent

21 August 2024 at 3:50:16 pm

Arid State

Maharashtra has finally put an official number on a crisis that farmers have been experiencing for weeks. The state government has declared 265 of its 358 talukas drought-affected, activating the first stage of its drought-management framework. The scale of the distress should make this more than another seasonal relief exercise. It is a reminder that water stress is no longer an episodic crisis but a recurring governance challenge. The state received 798.2 mm of rain against a normal 970.9...

Arid State

Maharashtra has finally put an official number on a crisis that farmers have been experiencing for weeks. The state government has declared 265 of its 358 talukas drought-affected, activating the first stage of its drought-management framework. The scale of the distress should make this more than another seasonal relief exercise. It is a reminder that water stress is no longer an episodic crisis but a recurring governance challenge. The state received 798.2 mm of rain against a normal 970.9 mm between June 1 and September 26, a deficit of 18 percent. The first drought trigger is activated when rainfall falls more than 25 percent below normal and is accompanied by a prolonged dry spell of 21 days. Though the aggregate state deficit is lower than that threshold, the taluka-level assessment has established the conditions required for intervention. Except for five districts, rainfall has been deficient across the state. The government has ordered a stay on the recovery of agriculture-related loans and restructuring of crop loans, while extending concessions on electricity bills for agricultural pumps. Employment Guarantee Scheme norms are to be relaxed; food grains provided to farmers and arrangements made for drinking water and fodder. Crop-loss surveys will determine the eventual financial assistance. While these measures can cushion the shock, they cannot solve the problem. Maharashtra has lived with drought long enough for drought relief to have become an administrative routine. The more difficult question is why the state repeatedly finds itself having to mobilise the same machinery. Tankers, fodder camps, loan restructuring and employment guarantees are indispensable when the rains fail. But they are essentially the politics and economics of response, not resilience. The state has considerable experience in watershed development, farm ponds, check dams, groundwater recharge and other forms of water conservation. Yet the effectiveness of such interventions depends less on announcing them than on where they are built, whether they are maintained and whether groundwater extraction is regulated. Large-scale water-conservation works announced as part of the present relief package must therefore be judged by measurable outcomes rather than expenditure. There is a larger agricultural question. A state with highly variable rainfall cannot indefinitely expand water-intensive cropping patterns in regions whose hydrology cannot support them. Crop choices, irrigation efficiency and groundwater management have to become part of drought policy rather than being treated as separate subjects. The present declaration should consequently be viewed as both relief and warning. While the relief is urgent, the warning is structural. The state government cannot control the monsoon but it can decide how much water it captures when the rains arrive, how efficiently it uses what it stores and how resilient its farmers are when the skies fail. A drought code can declare an emergency. But only sustained water management can prevent the emergency from becoming routine.

Regional Instability Catches World Attention For Wrong Reason

Nov 23, 2024
3 min read

Updated: Nov 25, 2024

Regional Instability

Pakistan mourns yet another tragic loss of its citizens, including women and children, following a horrific terrorist attack. A convoy of 200 buses came under fire, leaving dozens brutally killed in cold blood on Thursday, November 21. The ambush on passenger convoys in Pakistan’s Lower Kurram district, resulting in 39 deaths and 28 injuries, underscores the interplay of local instability and broader geopolitical challenges. The attack is emblematic of the vulnerabilities that plague Pakistan’s tribal areas and their implications for regional and international actors.


Lower Kurram, a volatile district bordering Afghanistan, is a flashpoint where sectarian divides, tribal disputes, and the presence of militant groups converge. The region’s history of violence is intertwined with its geographical significance, as it straddles Afghanistan’s eastern provinces of Khost and Paktia. The proximity to Afghanistan has allowed militant groups such as Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIL to exploit local tensions for their broader ideological and operational goals.


The incident also highlights the complexity of maintaining stability in an area where state control is often tenuous. Pakistan’s tribal belt has long been a buffer zone, but in recent years, it has become a frontline in South Asia’s interconnected conflicts. This latest violence reflects the broader instability that complicates Islamabad’s efforts to project authority in its border regions.


Global powers, each with their own interests in Pakistan, have a stake in how Islamabad manages such crises. China, heavily invested in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), views any instability as a direct threat to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Persistent violence in areas like Kurram jeopardises both Chinese investments and the safety of Chinese personnel working on infrastructure projects. For Washington, the resurgence of militant activity in Pakistan is a reminder of the unfinished business left in the region after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan facilitates the mobility of groups like the TTP, raising fears of a broader destabilisation that could impact US interests in South Asia.


Moscow, though geographically distant, is equally attentive. Russia’s growing outreach to Pakistan, particularly in the defence and energy sectors, depends on Islamabad’s ability to maintain internal order. Instability in regions like Kurram weakens Pakistan’s capacity to engage with international partners and undermines its position in regional platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).


Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan has struggled to manage cross-border security. While the Taliban regime in Kabul has offered assurances, militant activity along the Durand Line has surged. The Kurram attack exposes the limits of Islamabad’s ability to rely on diplomatic engagement with the Taliban to secure its borders. Afghanistan’s shadow looms large over Pakistan’s tribal areas, with militant sanctuaries and ideological spillovers contributing to the cycle of violence.


Adding to the complexity is that Kurram, home to both Sunni and Shia communities, has witnessed repeated clashes fuelled by historical grievances and external influences. The Sunni-Shia divide is not merely a local issue; it is part of a larger geopolitical struggle. Regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran have historically used sectarian loyalties to project their influence in South Asia. In Kurram, these external pressures exacerbate the existing tensions, turning local disputes into broader sectarian confrontations.


The Kurram ambush also reflects Pakistan’s challenges in enforcing its writ in tribal areas. While tribal jirgas and temporary ceasefires have provided short-term relief, they are no substitute for a comprehensive strategy. Islamabad’s reliance on ad hoc measures has often delayed meaningful reforms, leaving the underlying causes of conflict unaddressed. Land disputes, militant infiltration, and sectarian grievances persist, creating a fertile ground for recurring violence.


For Pakistan, incidents like this not only undermine its internal stability but also weaken its credibility on the international stage. As a country seeking to position itself as a regional leader, Pakistan’s inability to manage its border regions hinders its diplomatic and strategic ambitions. The situation further complicates its relations with allies like China and multilateral partners in forums like the SCO.


For the international community, the Kurram ambush serves as a wake-up call. It underscores the interconnectedness of local conflicts and global security. Militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas far-reaching implications, from destabilising Afghanistan to inspiring extremism beyond South Asia. Addressing this requires coordinated efforts that go beyond immediate security responses.


The path forward means integrating counterterrorism efforts with socio-economic development and political reform in its tribal belt. For global powers, supporting Pakistan’s stabilisation efforts is a moral and strategic imperative. This includes investments in conflict resolution, infrastructure development, and countering the ideological narratives that fuel extremism. The Kurram ambush is a grim reminder of the fragile dynamics at play in South Asia. Its resolution requires not just national but international cooperation. The cost of inaction is high—not just for Pakistan but for the entire region, as local instability continues to ripple through the global geopolitical landscape.


(The author is a senior journalist based in Islamabad. Views personal.)

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