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By:

Quaid Najmi

4 January 2025 at 3:26:24 pm

Congress’ solo path for ‘ideological survival’

Mumbai: The Congress party’s decision to contest the forthcoming BrihanMumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) elections independently is being viewed as an attempt to reclaim its ideological space among the public and restore credibility within its cadre, senior leaders indicated. The announcement - made by AICC General Secretary Ramesh Chennithala alongside state president Harshwardhan Sapkal and Mumbai Congress chief Varsha Gaikwad - did not trigger a backlash from the Maharashtra Vikas Aghadi...

Congress’ solo path for ‘ideological survival’

Mumbai: The Congress party’s decision to contest the forthcoming BrihanMumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) elections independently is being viewed as an attempt to reclaim its ideological space among the public and restore credibility within its cadre, senior leaders indicated. The announcement - made by AICC General Secretary Ramesh Chennithala alongside state president Harshwardhan Sapkal and Mumbai Congress chief Varsha Gaikwad - did not trigger a backlash from the Maharashtra Vikas Aghadi (MVA) partners, the Nationalist Congress Party (SP) and Shiv Sena (UBT). According to Congress insiders, the move is the outcome of more than a year of intense internal consultations following the party’ dismal performance in the 2024 Assembly elections, belying huge expectations. A broad consensus reportedly emerged that the party should chart a “lone-wolf” course to safeguard the core ideals of Congress, turning140-years-old, next month. State and Mumbai-level Congress leaders, speaking off the record, said that although the party gained momentum in the 2019 Assembly and 2024 Lok Sabha elections, it was frequently constrained by alliance compulsions. Several MVA partners, they claimed, remained unyielding on larger ideological and political issues. “The Congress had to compromise repeatedly and soften its position, but endured it as part of ‘alliance dharma’. Others did not reciprocate in the same spirit. They made unilateral announcements and declared candidates or policies without consensus,” a senior state leader remarked. Avoid liabilities He added that some alliance-backed candidates later proved to be liabilities. Many either lost narrowly or, even after winning with the support of Congress workers, defected to Mahayuti constituents - the Bharatiya Janata Party, Shiv Sena, or the Nationalist Congress Party. “More than five dozen such desertions have taken place so far, which is unethical, backstabbing the voters and a waste of all our efforts,” he rued. A Mumbai office-bearer elaborated that in certain constituencies, Congress workers effectively propelled weak allied candidates through the campaign. “Our assessment is that post-split, some partners have alienated their grassroots base, especially in the mofussil regions. They increasingly rely on Congress workers. This is causing disillusionment among our cadre, who see deserving leaders being sidelined and organisational growth stagnating,” he said. Chennithala’s declaration on Saturday was unambiguous: “We will contest all 227 seats independently in the BMC polls. This is the demand of our leaders and workers - to go alone in the civic elections.” Gaikwad added that the Congress is a “cultured and respectable party” that cannot ally with just anyone—a subtle reference to the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS), which had earlier targeted North Indians and other communities and is now bidding for an electoral arrangement with the SS(UBT). Both state and city leaders reiterated that barring the BMC elections - where the Congress will take the ‘ekla chalo’ route - the MVA alliance remains intact. This is despite the sharp criticism recently levelled at the Congress by senior SS(UBT) leader Ambadas Danve following the Bihar results. “We are confident that secular-minded voters will support the Congress' fight against the BJP-RSS in local body elections. We welcome backing from like-minded parties and hope to finalize understandings with some soon,” a state functionary hinted. Meanwhile, Chennithala’s firm stance has triggered speculation in political circles about whether the Congress’ informal ‘black-sheep' policy vis-a-vis certain parties will extend beyond the BMC polls.

Shifting Alliances

Saudi Arabia’s defence pact with Pakistan signals a new phase in Gulf-South Asian security.

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Islamabad and Riyadh recently formalised a defence agreement whose origins stretch back more than half a century. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir presided over a ceremony that yielded an unusually stark declaration: any aggression against either country would be treated as aggression against both. In a region defined by overlapping rivalries, the pact is a recalibration of strategic commitments.

 

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have long shared military intimacy. Pakistani troops were sent to the kingdom in the late 1960s amid regional instability stemming from Egypt’s intervention in Yemen, a precursor to decades of cooperative arrangements. That partnership deepened after the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca, when Pakistani special forces provided critical tactical support. By 1982, a formal Bilateral Security Cooperation Agreement institutionalised the relationship, allowing Pakistani deployments on Saudi soil, arms transfers, and advisory roles, while embedding Islamabad in Riyadh’s defence planning.

 

This latest pact is the first explicit mutual-defence agreement with a nuclear-armed partner, elevating the stakes of a historically discreet alliance. Its timing is significant: Israel’s strike in Qatar, Iran’s growing regional assertiveness, and U.S. uncertainty in the Gulf have created a security vacuum.

 

For Saudi Arabia, the deal is a hedge against Iranian influence, Houthi attacks in Yemen, and the destabilising effects of Israeli–Arab hostilities, while signalling a willingness to assert regional autonomy independent of Washington. For Pakistan, it offers fiscal relief through Saudi investment while bolstering Islamabad’s claim to pan-Islamic security leadership and strengthening its hand in nuclear deterrence dynamics. Analysts suggest the pact may enable Pakistan to purchase American weapons financed indirectly by Riyadh, sidestepping political hurdles in Washington.

 

The pact cannot be disentangled from the Indo-Pak rivalry, which remains the primary determinant of Pakistan’s strategic calculations. Earlier this year, Operation Sindoor saw Indian forces strike deep inside Pakistan-administered territory, inflicting severe damage on Pakistani military infrastructure.

 

Yet, the pact complicates Riyadh’s relationship with New Delhi. India has cultivated deep economic, strategic, and energy ties with Saudi Arabia, with bilateral trade hitting nearly USD 43 billion in fiscal 2023–24. Successive high-level visits, from King Abdullah in 2006 to PM Narendra Modi in 2016, have cemented a strategic partnership. Riyadh has historically sought to mediate Indo-Pakistani tensions, condemning terrorism without criticizing Indian policy. A formal defence alignment with Pakistan risks tilting the kingdom’s neutrality, creating latent friction with India.

 

Saudi Arabia’s defence posture now touches upon the nuclear equation in South Asia, where Pakistan’s capabilities counterbalance India’s conventional superiority. In a wider context, the pact demonstrates how Middle Eastern and South Asian security architectures are intertwined, with conflicts in one region reverberating in the other.

 

For Islamabad, the deal consolidates decades of military diplomacy. Since the Cold War, Pakistan has positioned itself as a security provider for the Muslim world, with Riyadh as a consistent patron. Economically, Saudi backing can relieve pressure on Pakistan’s shrinking foreign-exchange reserves, while politically, it allows Islamabad to project influence without appearing entirely dependent on Washington. Historically, such alignments have been double-edged: Pakistan’s Cold War entanglements yielded short-term gains but deepened confrontation with India and drew Islamabad into Afghanistan’s quagmire. Saudi Arabia has oscillated between caution and assertiveness, from the 1991 Gulf War to interventions in Yemen, highlighting the risks inherent in formalised defence commitments.

 

India’s response has been measured but wary. Yet the subtext is clear: a nuclear-armed Pakistan bound to a major Gulf power alters regional deterrence and complicates New Delhi’s strategic calculations. It could shift the balance of influence in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula.

 

The Saudi-Pakistani pact is a signal of the persistent relevance of historical ties, the fragility of regional balances, and the tangled web of interests linking South Asia, the Gulf, and the wider Middle East, where rivalries between Iran, Israel, and the United States intersect with South Asian fault lines. For Islamabad, it is a victory in prestige and finance. For Riyadh, a hedge against uncertainty.

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