top of page

By:

Abhijit Mulye

21 August 2024 at 11:29:11 am

The Unequal Cousins

Raj Thackeray’s ‘sacrifice’ saved Shiv Sena (UBT) but sank the MNS Mumbai: In the volatile theatre of Maharashtra politics, the long-awaited reunion of the Thackeray cousins on the campaign trail was supposed to be the masterstroke that reclaimed Mumbai. The results of the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) elections, however, tell a story of tragic asymmetry. While the alliance has successfully helped the Shiv Sena (UBT) stem the saffron tide and regain lost ground, it has left Raj...

The Unequal Cousins

Raj Thackeray’s ‘sacrifice’ saved Shiv Sena (UBT) but sank the MNS Mumbai: In the volatile theatre of Maharashtra politics, the long-awaited reunion of the Thackeray cousins on the campaign trail was supposed to be the masterstroke that reclaimed Mumbai. The results of the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) elections, however, tell a story of tragic asymmetry. While the alliance has successfully helped the Shiv Sena (UBT) stem the saffron tide and regain lost ground, it has left Raj Thackeray’s Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS) staring at an existential crisis. The final tally reveals a brutal reality for the MNS - Raj Thackeray played the role of the savior for his cousin, but in the process, he may have become the sole loser of the 2026 mandate. The worse part is that the Shiv Sena (UBT) is reluctant to accept this and is blaming Raj for the poor performance of his party leading to the defeat. A granular analysis of the ward-wise voting patterns exposes the fundamental flaw in this tactical alliance. The vote transfer, the holy grail of any coalition, operated strictly on a one-way street. Data suggests that the traditional MNS voter—often young, aggressive, and driven by regional pride—heeded Raj Thackeray’s call and transferred their votes to Shiv Sena (UBT) candidates in wards where the MNS did not contest. This consolidation was critical in helping the UBT hold its fortresses against the BJP's "Infra Man" juggernaut. However, the favor was not returned. In seats allocated to the MNS, the traditional Shiv Sena (UBT) voter appeared hesitant to back the "Engine" (MNS symbol). Whether due to lingering historical bitterness or a lack of instructions from the local UBT leadership, the "Torch" (UBT symbol) voters did not gravitate toward Raj’s candidates. The result? The UBT survived, while the MNS candidates were left stranded. ‘Second Fiddle’ Perhaps the most poignant aspect of this election was the shift in the personal dynamic between the Thackeray brothers. Decades ago, they parted ways over a bitter dispute regarding who would control the party helm. Raj, refusing to work under Uddhav, formed the MNS to chart his own path. Yet, in 2026, the wheel seems to have come full circle. By agreeing to contest a considerably lower number of seats and focusing his energy on the broader alliance narrative, Raj Thackeray tacitly accepted the role of "second fiddle." It was a pragmatic gamble to save the "Thackeray" brand from total erasure by the BJP-Shinde combine. While the brand survived, it is Uddhav who holds the equity, while Raj has been left with the debt. Charisma as a Charity Throughout the campaign, Raj Thackeray’s rallies were, as always, electric. His fiery oratory and charismatic presence drew massive crowds, a sharp contrast to the more somber tone of the UBT leadership. Ironically, this charisma served as a force multiplier not for his own party, but for his cousin’s. Raj acted as the star campaigner who energised the anti-BJP vote bank. He successfully articulated the anger against the "Delhi-centric" politics he accuses the BJP of fostering. But when the dust settled, the seats were won by UBT candidates who rode the wave Raj helped create. The MNS chief provided the wind for the sails, but the ship that docked in the BMC was captained by Uddhav. ‘Marathi Asmita’ Stung by the results and the realisation of the unequal exchange, Raj Thackeray took to social media shortly after the counting concluded. In an emotive post, he avoided blaming the alliance partner but instead pivoted back to his ideological roots. Urging his followers to "stick to the issue of Marathi Manoos and Marathi Asmita (pride)," Raj signaled a retreat to the core identity politics that birthed the MNS. It was a somber appeal, stripped of the bravado of the campaign, hinting at a leader who knows he must now rebuild from the rubble. The 2026 BMC election will be remembered as the moment Raj Thackeray proved he could be a kingmaker, even if it meant crowning the rival he once despised. He provided the timely help that allowed the Shiv Sena (UBT) to live to fight another day. But in the ruthless arithmetic of democracy, where moral victories count for little, the MNS stands isolated—a party that gave everything to the alliance and received nothing in return. Ironically, there are people within the UBT who still don’t want to accept this and on the contrary blame Raj Thackeray for dismal performance of the MNS, which they argue, derailed the UBT arithmetic. They state that had the MNS performed any better, the results would have been much better for the UBT.

Sino-Indian War and JFK’s Quiet Hand

Updated: Feb 10, 2025

JFK’s Forgotten Crisis

Earlier this week, during a Lok Sabha exchange, Prime Minister Narendra Modi alluded to ‘JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War’ a 2015 book by CIA insider and foreign policy expert Bruce Riedel as a pestle to beat Congress leader Rahul Gandhi and his party. The allusion stemmed as a riposte to Gandhi’s remarks on the Sino-Indian border situation, with Modi invoking the book to suggest that Gandhi’s critique stemmed less from historical awareness than from an attempt to project gravitas. The PM, naturally, wanted to draw attention to the ‘Himalayan Blunders’ of Gandhi’s great-grandfather and India’s first PM Jawaharlal Nehru during the 1962 Sino-Indian War.


However, Riedel has given a superbly balanced account that goes well-beyond detailing Nehru’s missteps while effortlessly evoking the geopolitical landscape of South Asia of the 1950s and early 60s, U.S. President John F. Kennedy deft diplomacy and the corridors of power in Washington, Beijing and New Delhi. A CIA insider for more than three decades and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, Riedel packs in an amazing amount of information in less than 180 pages. No dry diplomatic account, Riedel’s book is an exemplar of clarity and readability, leavened with novelistic flourishes (for instance, Jackie Kennedy’s efforts at bolstering diplomacy between Nehru and Ayub Khan) that reads with the immediacy of a thriller.


In the autumn of 1962, Kennedy was juggling two high-stakes conflicts on opposite sides of the globe. In the Caribbean, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was deploying nuclear weapons in Cuba, bringing the world perilously close to annihilation. Meanwhile, in the Himalayas, Mao Zedong’s China launched an invasion of India, exposing Nehru’s strategic miscalculations and leaving India’s northern frontiers vulnerable.


Beginning with the Eisenhower era, Riedel paints a fascinating picture of how the Korean War (1950-53) shaped American perceptions of China, leading to an entrenched belief that Beijing was reckless, unpredictable, and expansionist. This perception influenced Kennedy’s response to the 1962 Sino-Indian War.


Drawing on declassified documents, Riedel has a sharp eye for the telling detail. For instance, after the first pushback of the North Korean forces, American confidence curdled into calamity that resulted in disaster at Unsan. Meeting Truman on Wake Island in October 1950, Douglas MacArthur assured him the war would be over by Christmas. China, he insisted, would stay out. Even as he spoke, over 250,000 Chinese troops were slipping unnoticed into Korea. When they struck at Unsan, routing the Eighth Army, MacArthur’s intelligence chief dismissed it as a skirmish. It was anything but. The Chinese had feigned retreat, drawing American forces deeper north, then returned in overwhelming force. In 1962, Beijing would play the same game against India - strike hard, withdraw, and then strike again.


In his dissection of Nehru’s blunders in handling China, Riedel presents a nuanced analysis of how Nehru’s idealistic foreign policy, particularly the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement with China, lulled India into a false sense of security. Nehru’s trust in Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s assurances about border disputes proved disastrous, as Beijing methodically built infrastructure in Tibet, including roads through the contested Aksai Chin region.


The 1962 war was not merely a border skirmish but a calculated effort by Mao to humiliate India and assert dominance. When the Chinese advance overwhelmed India’s poorly equipped army, Nehru was forced to make a desperate appeal to Kennedy for military aid, including American air cover for Indian cities.


Riedel shows that Kennedy’s deft handling of the Sino-Indian war was a diplomatic triumph. Despite America’s close alliance with Pakistan, Kennedy swiftly moved to support Nehru, providing crucial military assistance and warning Beijing against further aggression. His intervention, some argue, played a role in China’s decision to withdraw.


The book also reveals how Kennedy’s strategy kept Pakistan from exploiting India’s crisis. Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s president, was displeased with Kennedy’s tilt towards India (he had earlier suspended CIA operations into Tibet based in East Pakistan). Yet, Kennedy managed to keep Islamabad from opening another front against India, preventing the conflict from spiralling into a broader South Asian war.


If there is a ‘hero’ in Riedel’s story, then it is John Kenneth Galbraith, the economist-turned-U.S. ambassador to India. Unlike the more hawkish elements in Washington, Galbraith saw India as a crucial counterbalance to China and worked tirelessly to secure Kennedy’s support for India.

Riedel has given us a number of engrossing books; JFK’s Forgotten Crisis is his most gripping.

Comments

bottom of page