Strategic Asymmetry

Emmanuel Macron’s India visit signals a quiet reordering of power between Europe and the emerging world. France today is politically brittle, fiscally strained and strategically boxed in. Domestic instability has eroded Macron’s authority well before his presidency ends in 2027. Europe is struggling to convert economic heft into geopolitical agency, caught between American security guarantees and Chinese industrial dominance. In that narrowing corridor, India appears not merely attractive but indispensable with a large market and a technology ecosystem open to partnership.

India’s engagement with France is not born of urgency but of choice. New Delhi values Paris because unlike other Western powers, the latter offers advanced technology without overt political conditionality and a European connection unencumbered by Brussels’s regulatory zeal. The elevation of ties to a ‘Special Global Strategic Partnership’ reflects this calculation.

Defence remains the spine of the relationship between the two countries, but it is being re-engineered as the shift from arms purchases to joint production and technology sharing marks a structural change in India’s external strategy. The helicopter assembly line inaugurated during the visit is emblematic of this shift. India no longer wants equipment alone; it wants design capability, manufacturing depth and export potential. France, under pressure from American defence giants and shrinking European procurement, is unusually willing to oblige.

This convergence is anchored in a shared attachment to strategic autonomy. For India, autonomy is a hedge against great-power volatility. For France, it has become economic realism.

Technology cooperation sharpens the asymmetry further. France’s insistence that the question is no longer whether India will innovate, but who will innovate with India, is revealing. Europe has lost ground in successive technology waves, from digital platforms to frontier AI. India, by contrast, combines talent, scale and a growing startup ecosystem, even if it still lacks deep capital and cutting-edge hardware. For France, embedding itself early in India’s innovation architecture through joint research centres, startup networks and student exchanges is a bid to remain relevant in a world where technological leadership increasingly defines geopolitical weight.

The announcement of an India–France Year of Innovation in 2026 fits neatly into this strategy. By institutionalising collaboration ahead of time, Paris hopes to lock in influence before India’s choices narrow or tilt decisively towards American or East Asian ecosystems. The proposal to showcase Franco-Indian initiatives ahead of a G7 summit similarly signals France’s ambition to act as India’s principal European interlocutor, thus bypassing slower continental mechanisms.

The broader implications extend beyond bilateral ties. As uncertainty clouds America’s future role and Europe’s coherence frays, India is emerging as a stabilising pole in an increasingly multipolar order. The partnership also carries an unspoken China dimension, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where France’s residual presence gives it interests that align more naturally with India’s than those of most European states.

All said, Paris is competing for relevance in India’s crowded diplomatic marketplace. That competition, politely disguised as partnership, is the defining feature of Macron’s visit.