top of page

By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger...

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre. The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington. Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension. Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence. Balancing Challenge India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem. There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises. While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington. The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West." However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion. Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil? India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people? If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience. This is where BRICS enters the larger picture. India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight. More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US. (The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

The General’s Republic: Decoding Pakistan’s Security State

A deep dive into Pakistan’s national security strategy reveals an ambitious doctrine rooted in paranoia, prestige, and a powerful military-industrial complex.

“The art of war,” Sun Tzu wrote, “is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.” In few countries is this aphorism more apt than in Pakistan. Since its bloody partition from India in 1947, the Islamic republic has defined its national identity through militarisation and rivalry with its larger neighbour. But while India evolved into a boisterous, if flawed, democracy, Pakistan morphed into a security state dominated by its armed forces - a leviathan that casts a long shadow over its polity, economy and diplomacy.


Unlike most modern militaries, the Pakistan Armed Forces are not merely an instrument of state: they are, in many ways, the state itself. Civilian governments have been repeatedly toppled or manipulated by Rawalpindi’s khaki-clad elite. The military establishment controls the national narrative, corporate empires and the political class. From staging coups to installing pliant leaders, the army has been Pakistan’s preeminent power broker since independence.


This military dominance stems from the deep-rooted hostility towards India. The three wars fought with India in 1947, 1965, and 1971 (the last culminating in the loss of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh) have left psychological scars that shape Islamabad’s defence posture to this day. India’s conventional military superiority, nuclear arsenal and growing investment in disruptive technologies have prompted Pakistan to double down on deterrence, hybrid warfare and regional alliances.


In 2022, Pakistan, for the first time in its history, published a National Security Policy (NSP), a document that attempts to articulate a comprehensive framework beyond the traditional India-centric military doctrine. Though couched in the language of ‘citizen security’ and ‘human development,’ the document ultimately betrays the paranoia of the Establishment. It outlines threats across five domains: land, sea, air, cyber and space, mirroring the ambitions of far larger economies.


The NSP speaks of deterrence and stability, but its subtext is unmistakable: strategic parity with India is non-negotiable. Hence, it emphasises the development of nuclear and conventional capabilities, including an upgrade in cyberspace infrastructure, the protection of critical infrastructure from hostile surveillance, and the need to adapt to hybrid warfare. The nod to non-traditional security issues may be novel, but the mindset remains vintage Cold War.


Dragon’s Embrace

Pakistan’s military posture is also a product of international patronage. Initially armed and funded by the United States during the Cold War, Pakistan later pivoted to China after relations with the West soured. The 1963 Sino-Pakistan agreement was a turning point. Since then, Beijing has become Islamabad’s principal arms supplier, strategic partner and collaborator in everything from missiles to space technology. Pakistan’s nuclear and space capabilities have benefited greatly from Chinese assistance, creating a defence partnership that now resembles an alliance in all but name.


Even as Washington designated Pakistan a major non-NATO ally in 2004 to secure its cooperation in Afghanistan, the bulk of Islamabad’s arms came from China, with auxiliary support from France, Turkey and Italy. With its procurement diversified and its defence manufacturing capabilities increasingly indigenous (often in collaboration with Beijing), Pakistan has ensured it is not strategically beholden to any single benefactor.


The scale of Pakistan’s military apparatus is vast. Its active army consists of roughly 560,000 personnel, with another 550,000 in reserve. The army is equipped with over 2,600 main battle tanks (many jointly developed with China) and a host of artillery systems, rocket launchers and air defence networks sourced from across the globe. Electronic warfare capabilities, communication infrastructure and surveillance tools add further muscle. The Pakistan Army Aviation Wing operates around 300 helicopters, with a fixed-wing fleet of about the same size, including attack, surveillance, and transport aircraft.


The Navy and Air Force, while smaller, have ambitions to punch above their weight, especially as maritime security gains prominence in the Arabian Sea. The Strategic Plans Division Force (SPD), which manages Pakistan’s nuclear assets, reports directly to the powerful Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), headed by Gen. Sahir Shamshad Mirza. The JCSC oversees a sprawling inter-services bureaucracy that includes the notorious Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), long accused of fomenting cross-border militancy and proxy warfare in Kashmir and Afghanistan.


Deep State

Yet, what makes Pakistan’s armed forces unique is not just their battlefield strength, but their commercial empire. Through foundations like the Fauji Foundation and the Army Welfare Trust, the military controls vast holdings in banking (e.g., Askari Bank), construction, telecommunications, and even agriculture. This military-corporate nexus blurs the line between national defence and private enrichment, and ensures that the military’s interests are deeply embedded in every aspect of Pakistani society.


The dual role of warfighter and kingmaker has given rise to a political paradox. The army projects itself as the guardian of national integrity, even as it routinely subverts democratic institutions. Civilian leaders, including Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan, have found themselves on the wrong side of the generals once their popularity threatened military supremacy.


For India, the evolution of Pakistan’s military and strategic doctrine is a reminder of the hard-edged realism that must guide policy.


Yet India must also be cautious not to mirror Pakistan’s militarisation. Unlike its neighbour, India remains a democracy with constitutional safeguards and a vibrant civil society. Preserving that distinction while remaining vigilant may be its greatest long-term strategic advantage. For India, understanding the contours of Pakistan’s security state is a necessary starting point. But victory, in this enduring rivalry, may ultimately lie in winning peace, not just preparing for war.


(The writer is a naval aviation officer and geopolitical analyst. Views personal)

Comments

bottom of page