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By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger...

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre. The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington. Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension. Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence. Balancing Challenge India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem. There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises. While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington. The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West." However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion. Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil? India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people? If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience. This is where BRICS enters the larger picture. India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight. More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US. (The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

Turmoil in Thailand: No-Confidence Motion Threatens PM

Updated: Mar 10, 2025


Thailand
Paetongtarn Shinawatra

Thailand's political landscape shifted last week as the opposition People's Party filed a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, reigniting debates on governance, political dynasties, and opposition effectiveness.


Thailand transitioned from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional one in 1932, a shift that introduced democratic structures but also ushered in periods of political instability. Since then, it has oscillated between civilian and military rule, with frequent coups shaping its landscape. The monarchy remains deeply revered, often stabilising crises, but power struggles between elected governments, the military, and the monarchy have fuelled recurring conflicts.  


The 2017 constitution, drafted under the military-led NCPO after the 2014 coup, is criticised for favouring the military and elites over democracy. Under this framework, Thailand’s Senate is appointed, granting the military and royalists significant political influence. These constraints have hindered reforms, fueling tensions between pro-democracy movements and conservatives.


Current Political Landscape

The 2023 general election saw the Pheu Thai Party return to power after a dramatic turn of events. Although the Move Forward Party won the most seats, it was blocked from governing, prompting Pheu Thai to form a coalition government, initially under Srettha Thavisin. Paetongtarn Shinawatra, daughter of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, became Prime Minister in August 2024 following Srettha’s dismissal. Her administration was considered a bid to restore the influence of the Shinawatra family, long a contentious force in Thai politics due to its populist policies and opposition to the military-backed establishment.


The opposition, led by the newly formed People's Party, emerged from the dissolution of the Move Forward Party, which was disbanded by the Constitutional Court due to its progressive stance on sensitive issues like the lèse-majesté law. This dissolution reflected ongoing struggles between reformist movements and conservative institutions determined to preserve Thailand’s traditional power structure. Despite these challenges, the opposition remains vocal, pushing for greater democratic freedoms and accountability.


Thailand’s political landscape is shaped by a few dominant parties. The Pheu Thai Party, founded by Thaksin Shinawatra, continues to command significant support, particularly among rural and working-class voters. However, its association with political controversies and allegations of corruption has led to repeated legal challenges and opposition from the military-backed establishment.


The People's Party, formed after the dissolution of the Move Forward Party, has taken up the mantle of progressive politics, focusing on democratic reforms, economic justice, and reducing military influence in governance. Its dissolution created widespread dissatisfaction among younger voters, who have increasingly turned to protest movements and alternative political organizations to push for change.


Other influential parties include Palang Pracharath, a military-aligned party, and Bhumjaithai, which has maintained a strategic position in coalition politics. These parties, along with smaller royalist and conservative factions, contribute to the complex and often unpredictable nature of Thai politics.


The No-Confidence Motion

The no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra has been framed around allegations of incompetence and undue influence from her father, Thaksin Shinawatra. Opposition leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut has criticised the prime minister for lack of independent leadership, arguing that her policies reflect Thaksin’s agenda rather than her own vision for the country.


Critics have also pointed to economic mismanagement as a key reason for the motion. Thailand’s economy, which has been struggling with slow post-pandemic recovery, rising inflation, and growing inequality, has put significant pressure on the government. The opposition claims that Paetongtarn’s administration has failed to implement effective economic policies, leading to declining public confidence in her leadership.


Additionally, concerns over corruption and governance have also fuelled the motion. Allegations of favouritism in contracts and a lack of transparency in decision-making have further weakened the prime minister’s position, bolstering the opposition’s call for fresh leadership to restore public trust.


If the no-confidence motion succeeds, it could force Paetongtarn Shinawatra to resign or even collapse the coalition government, potentially triggering early elections. This would offer the opposition a chance to gain power but could also spark renewed instability and uncertainty over governance.


If the motion fails, which is more likely, the prime minister may view it as a vote of confidence, enabling her administration to press on with its agenda. However, this could deepen national divisions, with pro-democracy activists and reformists likely to intensify protests and political pressure.


Another possible outcome is greater intervention by the judiciary and military-backed institutions, which have historically played decisive roles in political crises. Legal actions, further dissolutions of opposition parties, or even military interference remain possible.


Regardless of the result, Thailand’s political landscape is likely to stay turbulent as competing forces shape the nation’s future. The coming weeks will be crucial in determining whether the government weathers the challenge or the country enters another phase of uncertainty.


(The author is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)

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