Why Gilgit-Baltistan Belongs to India?

For too long, a vital part of India’s history has been treated as an afterthought. It’s time to reclaim the narrative, and the land.

Ladakh

For much of independent India’s history, Gilgit-Baltistan, the mountainous region that legally belongs to India but remains under Pakistan’s unlawful control, has been neglected in public discourse. While New Delhi has long asserted that the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir including Gilgit-Baltistan is an inalienable part of India, in recent years, a slow but deliberate shift has taken place. Since the resurgence of the BJP under PM Modi in 2014, India is no longer content with simply reiterating its claim but is making it known, forcefully and repeatedly, that Gilgit-Baltistan is an integral part of its national identity.

Pakistan’s illegal occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan dates back to 1947, when British military officers, aligned with Pakistan, orchestrated the region’s separation from the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was signed by Maharaja Hari Singh and ratified by India’s Parliament, making it legally binding under international law. The United Nations Security Council resolution of 1948, which called for a plebiscite in the entire region, was predicated on Pakistan withdrawing its troops first - something it never did. Instead, it consolidated its hold on Gilgit-Baltistan, systematically stripping its people of political agency, economic opportunity and fundamental rights.

India’s vigorous diplomatic protest against Pakistan’s Supreme Court decision in 2020 to conduct elections in Gilgit-Baltistan is part of this renewed assertion. The BJP government, unlike its predecessors, has not been shy about calling out Pakistan’s transgressions, nor has it hesitated to frame Gilgit-Baltistan as a cause that India must reclaim, not just rhetorically, but as part of its long-term strategic vision.

Indeed, much of Pakistan’s recent manoeuvring regarding Gilgit-Baltistan stems from its own anxieties. The region, which is home to key segments of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is essential to Pakistan’s economic and strategic ambitions. Pakistan fears that India’s growing assertiveness could complicate its grip over the region. For decades, it has sought to present itself as the benevolent overseer of Gilgit-Baltistan, yet the region remains politically disenfranchised, economically underdeveloped and socially repressed. While Pakistan claims to uphold the right of self-determination, it has denied Gilgit-Baltistan’s residents meaningful representation and has subjected them to military rule, sectarian crackdowns and enforced demographic changes designed to dilute local ethnic identities.

Dissatisfaction with Pakistan has been simmering for years. Local protests against Pakistan’s exploitation of the region’s natural resources, particularly its hydropower and minerals, have grown more vocal.

The resurgence of Gilgit-Baltistan in India’s political and media discourse has been dismissed by critics as mere ‘electoral rhetoric’ or a tool for the BJP to bolster its nationalist credentials. But such dismissals fail to grasp that India’s renewed focus on Gilgit-Baltistan is about correcting a historical wrong.

The Congress, which dominated Indian politics for much of the post-independence period, largely avoided raising the issue out of a misplaced desire to avoid exacerbating tensions with Pakistan. The BJP, by contrast, has made it a point to remind both its domestic audience and the international community that the fight for Jammu and Kashmir does not end at the Line of Control.

Beijing’s heavy investment in the region, particularly through CPEC, has made it a crucial link in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. By asserting its claims more forcefully, India is not just challenging Pakistan’s occupation but sending a message to China that its encroachments will not go unchallenged. The 2019 revocation of Article 370, which fully integrated Jammu and Kashmir into India’s constitutional framework, was a precursor to this broader recalibration. If that move demonstrated India’s willingness to reshape the status quo in Kashmir, its stance on Gilgit-Baltistan suggests that the next chapter in this story has yet to be written.

For too long, Gilgit-Baltistan has been treated as a footnote in the larger Kashmir dispute. But history has a way of asserting itself. The question is not whether India should reclaim it, but when.