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By:

Kiran D. Tare

21 August 2024 at 11:23:13 am

Bengal’s Ludwig Erhard

For decades, Swapan Dasgupta made a career of diagnosing India’s political ailments. As a columnist, editor, author and public intellectual, the erudite and scintillating Dasgupta dissected challenged orthodoxies and defended the intellectual traditions of the Indian Right. However, following his new appointment as the new Finance Minister of a West Bengal in economic doldrums, he perhaps faces the most demanding assignment of his career. His supporters however are confident that if there is...

Bengal’s Ludwig Erhard

For decades, Swapan Dasgupta made a career of diagnosing India’s political ailments. As a columnist, editor, author and public intellectual, the erudite and scintillating Dasgupta dissected challenged orthodoxies and defended the intellectual traditions of the Indian Right. However, following his new appointment as the new Finance Minister of a West Bengal in economic doldrums, he perhaps faces the most demanding assignment of his career. His supporters however are confident that if there is anyone most suited to sort out Bengal’s messy economy, it is Dasgupta. His appointment following the Bharatiya Janata Party’s ascent to power in Bengal after overthrowing Mamata Banerjee’s TMC regime is among the more intriguing political transitions in recent Indian political memory. India has seen journalists cross into politics before. M.J. Akbar moved from the newsroom to the Ministry of External Affairs. Arun Shourie, one of India’s most formidable investigative journalists, became a reform-minded minister in Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s government. Others, from Manish Sisodia to Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi and Chandan Mitra, have made similar journeys. Yet Dasgupta’s case is distinctive. Unlike many journalists-turned-politicians, he was never merely a ‘reporter.’ Whether in debate or through his prolific and trenchant writings, he has always been an intellectual combatant, a scholar of political ideas with a sweeping knowledge of world history by which he leavens those ideas. Dasgupta has always been one of the most articulate exponents of modern Indian conservatism. Educated at La Martiniere College in Kolkata, St Stephen’s College in Delhi and later the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, where he earned a doctorate, Dasgupta cultivated a reputation for formidable scholarship. His books, including Awakening Bharat Mata: The Political Beliefs of the Indian Right and The Ayodhya Reference, revealed an uncommon ability to place contemporary political disputes within a broader historical and ideological framework. For his supporters, he was among the few intellectuals capable of articulating conservative ideas in a language usually dominated by the Left. To critics, he was a sophisticated polemicist. Yet, even his opponents seldom questioned the breadth of his reading or the sharpness of his arguments. However, the challenge facing Dasgupta now is no longer intellectual but administrative. The Bengal he inherits bears little resemblance to the state that once led India in industry, commerce and scientific innovation. As he himself quipped in trademark fashion with a sharp historical analogy, the state’s economy resembled postwar Germany. The figures are sobering. West Bengal’s state debt has ballooned to around Rs. 8 lakh crore during the TMC regime. Thousands of companies have relocated or curtailed operations over the years amid a hostile investment climate. The new BJP government has inherited not merely a fiscal challenge but a crisis of confidence. “We are left with a near-bankrupt treasury,” Dasgupta said. Equally troubling, in his view, is the erosion of trust among investors and entrepreneurs. Bengal’s relationship with business has been uneasy to say the least. First the long night of the Left, followed by the TMC’s anti-business, appeasement brand of politics has ensured that the scars of industrial disputes and land controversies remain fresh. In this dire situation, reviving private investment will require convincing businesses that Bengal has changed. In this respect, Dasgupta’s strengths may prove unexpectedly useful. Throughout his career he displayed an ability to engage with ideas, institutions and stakeholders across ideological divides. His early moves hint at a broader vision. Rather than confining pre-budget consultations to Kolkata, Dasgupta shifted the Finance Department’s attention to Siliguri in a moved suffused with deliberate symbolism. North Bengal has long complained of neglect by governments centred on the state’s southern districts. By engaging tea producers, agricultural interests, tourism operators and local business groups, the newly-minted finance minister appears eager to demonstrate that economic revival will not just be a Kolkata-centric project. That said, debt servicing consumes a substantial portion of state revenues. Welfare commitments are politically difficult to unwind and infrastructure deficits remain significant. While public intellectuals excel at identifying problems, governing demands compromises and the acceptance of imperfect solutions. Still, Bengal’s new finance minister possesses as fine an appreciation of history than any Indian politician around. He knows that states decline not just because economic mistakes but because they lose faith in their future. Restoring that confidence may be the central task of his tenure. For years Swapan Dasgupta chronicled India’s political story from the sidelines. Now he finds himself at the centre of one of its most consequential state-level experiments. Whatever the outcome of his tenure, few would deny that Bengal’s finances have acquired perhaps their most learned custodian in decades.

With IWT Suspended, The Long Game Begins

While India’s gamble has yet to choke Pakistan’s flows a year after the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, the move has redrawn the rules and weaponised water diplomacy.

One year has passed since the Pahalgam terror attack, an event that triggered a wave of fierce anti-Pakistan sentiment across the nation. In its immediate aftermath, India suspended the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), long regarded as one of the most successful examples of international cooperation, despite decades of hostility between India and Pakistan. The government’s decision provoked intense debate, yet it was less about delivering instant outcomes and more about signalling a calculated strategic intent. This move marked a paradigm shift in India’s posture toward its neighbour, reframing water not merely as a shared resource but as a tool of strategic deterrence. Now, a year later, it becomes essential to assess the consequences of this stance and to examine how effectively it has reshaped the dynamics of India–Pakistan relations.


Decisive Shift

The IWT, signed in 1960, was a World Bank, mediated compromise that partitioned the Indus basin rivers between India and Pakistan. India received full rights over the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej), while Pakistan controlled the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), with India allowed only limited non-consumptive use. Though hailed as a model of transboundary cooperation, the treaty left India with a smaller share of water and decades of disputes over hydropower projects, fuelling perceptions of asymmetry. The 2025 suspension marked a decisive shift, treating water as a strategic instrument rather than a purely cooperative resource. The suspension of the treaty was framed not as a permanent withdrawal but as “holding it in abeyance” until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism”. This terminology was carefully chosen to maintain a level of international legitimacy while signalling that the era of separating “blood and water” was over.


In the year since India suspended the IWT, the rivers themselves continue to flow unchanged, but the institutional framework around them has been fundamentally altered. The most immediate impact was the removal of Pakistan’s effective veto over Indian projects on the Western Rivers. Freed from treaty constraints, India has stopped sharing technical data, gained design autonomy for hydropower infrastructure, and aligned river management with domestic energy needs rather than treaty schedules.


The Chenab River has emerged as the centrepiece of India’s post-IWT suspension water strategy, given its critical importance to Pakistan’s Punjab province. With nearly three-fourths of Pakistan’s water originating from Western Rivers flowing through Indian-administered territory, India has prioritized the “Chenab Cascade” of hydropower projects. In early 2026, the Central Government set strict commissioning deadlines for four major dams. The Pakal Dul project, India’s first storage dam on a Western tributary, is slated for completion by December 2026. Ratle dam, fast-tracked after bypassing treaty hurdles, is expected to begin generation by May 2026. Kiru, part of an integrated river chain, targets December 2026, while Kwar, designed for grid stability, is scheduled for March 2028. Together, these projects signal a decisive strategic shift. The Pakal Dul project represents a critical inflection point. Unlike “run-of-the-river” projects that must release water as it comes, Pakal Dul has a significant storage component. This allows India, for the first time, to regulate the timing of water flows into Pakistan. In a post-IWT environment, this storage can be used to hold water during the lean season or release it in a manner that maximizes Indian power needs, effectively placing the “tap” in New Delhi’s hands.


India’s suspension of the IWT has revived long-stalled mega projects on the Eastern Rivers, with a clear focus on eliminating cross-border flows. The Ujh Multipurpose Project, first envisioned in the 1920s, finally received approval in March 2026 for a Rs. 11,000 crore plan. With a storage capacity of 900 million cubic meter (MCM), it will irrigate 90,000 hectares in Jammu & Kashmir, divert 400 MCM to Punjab’s Ranjit Sagar Dam, and serve national security by sealing infiltration routes. Equally significant is the Shahpur Kandi Barrage, now in its final commissioning phase, set for completion by September 2026. Together, these projects aim to ensure India fully utilizes its Eastern Rivers allocation, closing historic gaps in water use.


Despite India’s assertive policy shift, the reality of water control remains constrained by infrastructure and institutional limits. India’s lack of large storage reservoirs on the Western Rivers means run-of-the-river projects cannot significantly alter flows to Pakistan. Pakal Dul is only a modest first step. Hydropower construction in the fragile Himalayas also faces long gestation periods, with landslides and seismic risks slowing progress despite political urgency. Finally, internal disputes over water sharing among Indian states and the need to build new administrative frameworks add layers of friction. Together, these factors explain why the transition from treaty regime to strategic control is necessarily gradual.


Fundamental Change

The suspension of the IWT has not altered the physical flow of rivers, but it has fundamentally reshaped India’s water governance. Four areas stand out. First, speed of execution: clearances that once dragged on for years are now processed within weeks, as seen with the Ujh project. Second, design freedom: engineers are no longer bound by restrictive treaty annexures, enabling deeper foundations and larger spillways for more efficient power generation. Third, operational flexibility: the Chenab projects are now managed as a coordinated cascade, allowing synchronized releases to stabilize the Northern Grid. Finally, strategic posture: India has explicitly linked water to national security, signalling that the treaty is no longer sacrosanct and compelling Pakistan to intensify its monitoring efforts.


Despite the bold rhetoric of the past year, the suspension of the IWT has not yet translated into dramatic changes on the ground. Large-scale irrigation gains remain distant, with projects like Ujh years away from delivering water to the promised 90,000 hectares due to incomplete canal networks. Similarly, no significant diversion of flows has occurred; during the 2025–26 lean season, water entering Pakistan’s Punjab via the Chenab and Jhelum remained consistent with historical averages, underscoring India’s limited storage capacity. Immediate economic benefits are also absent, as the capital-intensive expansion of hydropower and irrigation infrastructure continues to strain the exchequer. Real dividends, both agricultural and electrical, are unlikely before 2027, highlighting the slow pace of transformation.


From India’s perspective, the suspension of the IWT has been framed as a decisive domestic victory, signalling resolve against terrorism while accelerating long-delayed infrastructure projects in Jammu and Kashmir. It also reinforces India’s claim to equitable and reasonable utilization under international water law, even as it risks criticism for breaching the “no-harm rule.” For Pakistan, however, the abeyance represents an existential crisis. Without treaty guarantees, its reliance on seasonal rainfall and Indian release patterns has deepened vulnerabilities tied to groundwater depletion and limited storage. Islamabad’s appeals to the UN have yielded little leverage. Beyond South Asia, the move has unsettled other transboundary basins, with China closely observing whether India’s precedent could justify unilateral actions on the Brahmaputra.


Regional Balance

One year after the suspension of the IWT, the regional balance has been decisively altered. The past twelve months have shown that while rivers cannot be stopped overnight, the legal and political foundations for eventual control can be laid with remarkable speed. By rejecting a World Bank–brokered settlement, India signalled its resolve to defend national interests and demonstrated the courage to take a drastic step. The true test now lies in ensuring smooth, efficient execution of planned projects so that administrative momentum translates into tangible outcomes. For Punjab, where groundwater depletion is already acute, harnessing additional river flows could ease shortages and strengthen long-term resource security. This strategic shift promises not only geopolitical leverage but also distinct agricultural benefits, though its success will depend on time’s critical test.


(The writer is a Chartered Accountant with a leading company in Mumbai. Views personal.)

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