Hard Bargain
- Correspondent
- 3 hours ago
- 2 min read
The proposed India-US trade agreement has now become a test of whether India can convert a turbulent global trading order into a lasting strategic and economic advantage. For decades, trade negotiations largely revolved around a familiar arithmetic of reducing tariffs and expanding market access. That comfortable world has vanished. The United States led by Donald Trump increasingly treats trade as an instrument of geopolitical leverage.
As a result, Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal has insisted that India will proceed only if Washington’s new tariff architecture leaves Indian exporters better placed than competitors such as Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and, above all, China.
When negotiators had reached broad agreement in February, the expectation was that punitive American tariffs on Indian goods would fall substantially, giving Indian manufacturers a meaningful advantage. However, subsequent legal challenges to Trump’s reciprocal tariffs forced Washington to redesign its trade policy. New tariff mechanisms under Section 301 of the US Trade Act are now expected to replace the earlier framework. Naturally, India wants to know where it stands before committing itself.
From Barack Obama through Joe Biden to Donald Trump, successive administrations have increasingly abandoned the old consensus favouring unrestricted free trade. Industrial revival and strategic competition with China have replaced economic liberalism as Washington’s priorities. Tariffs have become tools of foreign policy.
India’s insistence on securing preferential treatment reflects lessons learnt over the past three decades. Since the liberalisation of 1991, India has often entered trade agreements hoping that market access alone would guarantee export growth. Yet countries such as Vietnam used preferential tariff access to build manufacturing ecosystems that increasingly displaced Indian exporters. If a future American tariff regime treats India no differently from its regional competitors, the economic rationale for the agreement diminishes considerably.
The stakes are substantial. The United States today absorbs nearly one-fifth of India’s exports, double its share fifteen years ago, and remains the only major trading partner with whom India enjoys a significant merchandise trade surplus. That surplus has already narrowed sharply under recent American tariff measures. The agreement must therefore preserve India’s export competitiveness rather than merely celebrate diplomatic symbolism.
Washington seeks greater access for American agriculture, dairy products and advanced technology. Here lie the toughest compromises. Indian farmers fear subsidised American imports would undermine domestic livelihoods, while policymakers worry that higher technology imports could widen trade imbalances.
American companies increasingly view India as the most credible alternative to excessive dependence on China. India, meanwhile, requires greater investment, stronger manufacturing capacity and reliable access to global markets if it is to sustain rapid economic growth.
Trade agreements succeed not because they eliminate every difference but because they create enduring mutual advantage. India is therefore right to bargain hard. A deal that secures competitive market access while protecting India’s core economic interests would represent a strategic investment in the country’s long-term economic future.



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