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By:

Archita Gaur

13 June 2026 at 3:25:13 pm

The Economics of Next-Generation FTAs

While India is rewriting its trade strategy, market access will matter only if domestic industry can turn it into investment, jobs and deeper global value-chain integration. After years of cautiously pursuing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), India has signed landmark deals with the United Kingdom and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), while talks continue with several other major economies. The move reflects a broader strategy to deepen integration with global markets, attract...

The Economics of Next-Generation FTAs

While India is rewriting its trade strategy, market access will matter only if domestic industry can turn it into investment, jobs and deeper global value-chain integration. After years of cautiously pursuing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), India has signed landmark deals with the United Kingdom and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), while talks continue with several other major economies. The move reflects a broader strategy to deepen integration with global markets, attract investment, strengthen manufacturing, and diversify supply chains amid growing geopolitical and economic fragmentation. However, the success of these agreements cannot be measured in the number of deals signed or tariffs reduced. Their true value lies in strengthening export competitiveness, increasing participation in global value chains, generating quality employment, and enhancing long-run productivity. This article analyses the economic implications of India’s recent FTAs, the challenges to their effective implementation, and measures needed to maximize their benefits New Strategy India’s recent push towards FTAs marks a shift from its earlier cautious stance to trade liberalization. Concerns over widening trade deficits and impact of imports on domestic industries had earlier made India reluctant to pursue comprehensive FTAs, which was evident from its decision to remain outside the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). However, changing global dynamics, including supply chain disruptions, geopolitical realignments, and the “China+1” strategy, have prompted India to adopt a more proactive trade policy. Recent agreements with the United Kingdom and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) emphasize expanding market access, attracting investment, and integrating more deeply into global value chains. Unlike traditional FTAs, which focus primarily on tariff reductions, India's recent agreements aim to promote deeper economic integration. The India–UK FTA expands market access for goods and services while including provisions on digital trade, intellectual property, government procurement, and mobility of professionals. Similarly, the India–EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) go beyond trade liberalization by combining tariff concessions with a landmark investment commitment of USD 100 billion over 15 years to support industrial growth and employment generation. These agreements reflect a shift in India’s trade strategy, focusing not just on expanding exports but also on attracting investment, facilitating technology transfer, bolstering supply chains and enhancing competitiveness of local industry. Their success, however, will hinge on strong implementation and competitiveness of domestic industries. Economic Impact Free trade agreements can promote economic growth by reducing trade barriers, expanding market access, and facilitating greater participation in global value chains. For India, recent FTAs are expected to boost exports in textile, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods and services while attracting greater foreign direct investment (FDI) through improved market access and investment provisions. Greater competition can also encourage domestic firms to innovate, improve productivity and achieve economies of scale. However, these gains are not automatic. Labour-intensive industries and MSMEs may struggle to compete with cheaper imports without adequate policy support. Tariff reductions may also lead to short-term revenue losses, while restrictive rules of origin and non-tariff measures may limit the full utilization of trade preferences. Moreover, Indian firms may be unable to fully capitalize on expanded market access without improvements in logistics, infrastructure, and the ease of doing business. Ultimately, the economic success of India’s FTAs will depend not only on the agreements themselves but also on complementary domestic reforms that enhance export competitiveness and strengthen industrial capacity. Although India’s recent FTAs offer significant economic opportunities, realizing their full benefits will depend on effective implementation and complementary domestic reforms. Several structural challenges could constrain the ability of Indian firms to fully capitalize on these agreements. MSMEs are particularly exposed. Many lack the technological capabilities, access to finance and compliance infrastructure required to meet international quality, environmental and sustainability standards. Export-readiness programmes, easier access to credit, technology upgradation and stronger institutional support can therefore be as important as the tariff concessions negotiated abroad. Rules of origin deserve particular attention. They are necessary to prevent trade diversion and ensure that preferential access benefits genuine producers, but excessive complexity can turn an FTA preference into an administrative burden. Simplifying procedures, strengthening customs coordination and making compliance easier for smaller exporters will be essential to improving utilisation. High logistics costs and infrastructure bottlenecks have long weakened India’s export competitiveness. A product that receives zero or low tariffs in a foreign market can still be uncompetitive if it is expensive or slow to move from an Indian factory to a foreign customer. This makes investments in multimodal transport, port modernisation, warehousing, customs digitisation and initiatives such as PM Gati Shakti central to the success of the new trade strategy. Faster clearances and more predictable logistics can effectively create a second layer of competitiveness alongside tariff preferences. The same applies to the broader ease of doing business. Reliable power, faster approvals, access to finance, skilled labour and predictable regulations are not peripheral issues in an FTA strategy. India’s next-generation FTAs represent a strategic shift from tariff-focused liberalisation towards deeper economic integration. They offer an opportunity to expand exports, attract investment, diversify supply chains and strengthen India’s position in global value chains. But the signing of an agreement should be seen as the beginning of the process, not its culmination. The more meaningful measure of success will be whether Indian firms increase their exports, whether new investment creates productive capacity, whether MSMEs enter global supply chains and whether workers gain access to better and more productive employment. (The writer is an economics postgraduate from Jawaharlal Nehru University with research interests in economic policy, trade and global governance. Views personal.)

Oil, Missiles and the Gate of Tears

As the Houthis target Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure, the widening West Asia conflict raises fresh concerns over global oil supplies and India’s economy.

As President Donald Trump struggles to extricate the United States from the increasingly intractable conflict with Iran, the Middle East has become more combustible still. The Houthis, the Yemeni militia once regarded as a peripheral actor in the region’s wars, have opened a new front with remarkable audacity. Over the weekend, they launched coordinated strikes involving ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones against Saudi Arabia's energy infrastructure, hitting sensitive Aramco facilities in Jazan and Yanbu. The attacks were not merely another salvo in Yemen’s long war but a warning that the conflict is spilling across borders and drawing ever more of the Gulf into its vortex.


This is not the first time the Houthis have targeted Saudi Arabia since the Iran conflict erupted. Riyadh and the Yemeni militia have traded blows before, in a rivalry that stretches back more than a decade. Although a fragile truce had tempered hostilities, the recent escalation has shattered any illusion of stability.


Last week, the Houthis effectively closed the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait to Saudi shipping, bringing a substantial portion of the kingdom's oil exports to an abrupt halt. The narrow maritime chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden is one of the world's most vital trade arteries, carrying nearly 10 percent of global seaborne oil. For Saudi Arabia, it is an economic lifeline, with an estimated three-quarters of its oil exports passing through the strait. By disrupting this route and now striking Aramco's production facilities in Jazan and Yanbu, the Houthis are attacking not only the kingdom’s present oil exports but also its future production capacity.


Cheap Weapons

These strategic blows are being delivered with relatively inexpensive ballistic missiles and drones, allowing a lightly equipped militia to inflict outsized economic and geopolitical costs.


The anti-ship cruise missile – Al-Mandab, named after the strait itself, can strike targets up to 300 km away. This radar guided missile costs a few hundred thousand dollars.  


Another example is the QUDS - a subsonic cruise missile gifted by Iran. It can travel nearly 150 km and costs just 50,000 dollars to make the missile.


Houthis also rely on cheap drones like the SHAHED series. Some of the cheaper variants like SHAHED 131 cost just 10,000 dollars. Experts highlight that the Houthis are hurting the Saudi economy with weapons that cost less than what an average American makes in a year. The Yemeni group says that they are in no mood to stop the attacks.


This leaves us with two big questions: Where are Trump’s guarantees and where is Pakistan?


The United States has always projected itself as a net security provider, a pitch that was sold to Riyadh for decades. Today, when Saudi Arabia is battling Houthi attacks, the United States is missing.


Islamabad is missing in action too. Islamabad has a mutual security pact with Riyadh. An attack on one is to be treated as an attack on the other as per the agreement. When it comes to billion-dollar loans or weapons, Pakistan is usually the first in line. When it comes about keeping promises, Islamabad is nowhere to be seen.


Coming back to the Bab-el-Mandeb (which literally translates as the “Gate of Tears”), the name now carries an ominous resonance, especially if that gateway remains closed. For Saudi Arabia, the strait is an economic artery. The kingdom’s prosperity is built on the uninterrupted flow of oil exports, and any disruption to this vital route threatens its economic foundations.


Today, Iran has tightened its grip around the Strait of Hormuz, while the Houthis are turning the Bab-el-Mandeb into another pressure point. The conflict is no longer confined to Iran’s borders or its confrontation with the United States. It has spilled into the Red Sea, into the arteries of global commerce, and into the heart of the world’s largest oil-producing region.


Impact on India

Renewed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, particularly targeting Aramco oil facilities, could have significant economic and strategic implications for India, one of the world’s largest crude oil importers.


India imports nearly 85 per cent of its crude oil requirements, with Saudi Arabia remaining among its top suppliers. Any disruption to Aramco’s production or export infrastructure could tighten global oil supplies, leading to a spike in international crude prices. Higher oil prices would increase India’s import bill, widen the current account deficit, and put pressure on the rupee. Costlier crude could also fuel inflation by raising transportation, manufacturing and energy costs, complicating the Reserve Bank of India’s efforts to manage price stability.

 

The attacks also heighten concerns over the security of energy infrastructure and shipping routes in the Gulf. If hostilities spill over to the Red Sea or threaten maritime traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, shipping insurance premiums and freight costs could rise. This would affect not only crude oil imports but also India’s trade with Europe and West Asia.

 

India also has strategic interests in the Gulf due to the presence of over nine million Indian expatriates in the region, many of whom live and work in Saudi Arabia and neighbouring countries. Escalating conflict could pose risks to their safety and disrupt remittance flows.

 

While India has diversified its crude sourcing in recent years by increasing imports from countries such as Russia, Iraq and the UAE, prolonged instability in West Asia would continue to expose the Indian economy to energy price volatility. The situation underscores the importance of expanding strategic petroleum reserves, diversifying energy imports, and accelerating the transition towards renewable energy to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.

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