Old Friends, New Calculations

Forged in Cold War solidarity, India’s ties with Russia are built on trust and crises weathered together. But in 2025, pragmatism must temper nostalgia.

India’s foreign policy today is at an inflection point. While its partnership with the United States often garners headlines, its longstanding, deep-rooted ties with Russia form a quieter yet foundational pillar. As the global balance of power shifts in uncertain ways, a comprehensive evaluation of Indo-Russian relations becomes essential not just to understand historical trust but also to assess contemporary relevance, long-term risks and future opportunities.

The Indo-Russian partnership (previously Indo-Soviet) is built on decades of trust. During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was India’s principal diplomatic and military supporter. The Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in 1971 and Moscow's support during the Bangladesh Liberation War remain emblematic of that legacy. For decades, Russian-supplied arms formed the backbone of India’s military. Unlike Western nations, Russia refrained from pressuring India on its nuclear ambitions and did not intervene in internal matters. Even today, approximately 60 to 70 percent of India’s military hardware is of Russian origin. Joint development projects such as BrahMos missiles, the leasing of nuclear submarines, and the production of Sukhoi and MiG fighter aircraft reflect deep technical cooperation. India’s purchase of the S-400 Triumf missile system, despite the threat of U.S. sanctions under CAATSA, signalled India’s resolve to preserve strategic autonomy. The reciprocal nature of these deals makes Russia a valuable defence partner.

Since 2022 Russia has become India’s biggest crude supplier, rising from less than one percent to over forty percent of imports by late 2024. Cheap oil steadied fuel prices and curbed inflation while Indian stakes in Sakhalin-I and Vankorneft and its role in the North-South Transport Corridor underscore a deepening energy interdependence.

While Russia is not a leader in digital technologies or semiconductors, its strengths in space, nuclear energy, and advanced defence systems complement India’s needs. The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, built with Russian assistance, is India’s largest nuclear power facility. Russia has offered support for new reactors under an agreement that allows construction of more nuclear units while collaborations in Arctic research, quantum technology and rare earth mineral extraction are on the horizon.

Russia remains a vocal supporter of a multipolar world order - a principle central to India’s own foreign policy doctrine. Moscow supports India’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council and plays a balancing role in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the Russia-India-China trilateral. It seldom aligns with Western critiques on India’s internal policies. Russia has also facilitated India’s access to Central Asia, both for strategic presence and energy partnerships.

However, the Indo-Russian relationship is not without strain. Russia’s growing proximity to China, particularly in the aftermath of the Ukraine war and resultant sanctions, poses a dilemma for India. The Russia-China “no limits” partnership and joint military exercises in the Indo-Pacific have raised eyebrows in New Delhi. Additionally, India’s increasing engagement with the U.S., the QUAD, and I2U2 is viewed with concern in Moscow. Russia’s silence during the 2020 to 2022 India-China border tensions has further complicated perceptions. There is also a technological gap; Russia lacks depth in AI, green technologies, and digital infrastructure - areas where India seeks global partnerships.

The post-Ukraine Western sanctions regime has constrained India–Russia economic ties. Banking restrictions, SWIFT bans, and secondary sanction threats have disrupted payment mechanisms. The Rupee-Ruble trade mechanism has struggled with imbalance and convertibility. As a result, many Indian exporters have reported delays in payments and logistical hurdles. Long-term infrastructure cooperation such as the Chennai–Vladivostok corridor remains underutilized, largely due to geopolitical uncertainties.

In India, Russia continues to be seen as a time-tested friend. Opinion polls show consistent support for maintaining strong ties with Russia, especially among strategic communities and older generations. Indian political leadership across party lines has maintained continuity in Russia ties. This stands in contrast to the more transactional perception of Western partnerships.

Russia’s enduring popularity in Indian strategic and public imagination stems largely from its perceived reliability during moments of crisis. From the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, when the Soviet Union’s vetoes in the UN Security Council shielded India diplomatically, to its support for India’s defence modernization during the 1990s post-nuclear tests phase, Russia has often stood by India when others wavered. Even during the Kargil conflict, Russia took a firm position favouring India’s territorial integrity. In more recent years, it has refrained from criticizing India’s moves in Kashmir or its strategic autonomy in multilateral forums. This has created a reservoir of goodwill that continues to influence India’s elite and popular attitudes. However, the assumption that Russia’s support is unconditional must be re-evaluated in light of its growing dependence on China, its own strategic compulsions and the evolving global order.

In the wake of the U.S. imposing 50 percent tariffs on a wide range of Indian exports, India has quietly moved to deepen ties with alternative partners. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s high-profile visit to Moscow in August 2025 underscored this recalibration. During the visit, both countries reaffirmed their strategic partnership, and Jaishankar dismissed U.S. criticism of India’s energy ties with Russia as hypocritical. The trip came amid fears of a broader decoupling with the West and domestic pressure to diversify trade routes and strategic alliances. Russia, sensing the moment, has offered India more favourable terms in oil and defence purchases, with faster payment channels and expanded rupee-rouble trade mechanisms now under discussion.

India–Russia ties are not defined by flashy headlines but are built quietly through continuity, crisis management and complementary interests. However, legacy trust should not cloud strategic calculation. The world of 2025 demands hard choices, especially when older alliances are tested by newer compulsions. India must navigate this equation not as a nostalgic partner but as a pragmatic power. As old friends evolve, the challenge lies in managing expectations while maximizing returns.

(The author is former Director, Agharkar Research Institute and Visiting Professor, IIT Bombay. Views personal.)