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By:

Rajendra Joshi

3 December 2024 at 9:20:26 am

Rajesh Kshirsagar walks into a political trap

The Shiv Sena MLA has chosen confrontation over the Shaktipeeth Expressway risking political isolation Kolhapur: Shiv Sena MLA Rajesh Kshirsagar’s aggressive support to the proposed Shaktipeeth Expressway has brought him face-to-face with former MP Raju Shetti. But the political fallout has not stopped there. In quick succession, he has taken on Congress leader Satej Patil, questioned the position of fellow Mahayuti legislator Chandradip Narake and criticised his own party colleague, Public...

Rajesh Kshirsagar walks into a political trap

The Shiv Sena MLA has chosen confrontation over the Shaktipeeth Expressway risking political isolation Kolhapur: Shiv Sena MLA Rajesh Kshirsagar’s aggressive support to the proposed Shaktipeeth Expressway has brought him face-to-face with former MP Raju Shetti. But the political fallout has not stopped there. In quick succession, he has taken on Congress leader Satej Patil, questioned the position of fellow Mahayuti legislator Chandradip Narake and criticised his own party colleague, Public Health Minister and Kolhapur Guardian Minister Prakash Abitkar. That is a lot of political fronts for one MLA to manage simultaneously. The immediate question, therefore, is not whether Kshirsagar has the courage to fight. He clearly does. The more important question is whether he has calculated the political cost of fighting everyone at once. The Shaktipeeth Expressway has become one of the most contentious political issues in Kolhapur district. Raju Shetti has turned the proposed acquisition of agricultural land into a farmers’ rights issue and has built a sustained campaign around it. His politics has always thrived on confrontation. His rise from the sugarcane farmers’ movement to the Assembly and then the Lok Sabha was built on his ability to convert farmers’ grievances into political mobilisation. Kshirsagar has now chosen to meet that politics head-on. His controversial warning against Shetti, in response to the latter’s aggressive rhetoric on land acquisition, transformed a policy disagreement into a personal political duel. Supporters of both sides have since taken the confrontation to the streets. This is precisely where political calculation becomes important. Supporting a flagship project backed by the Chief Minister can certainly send a message to the leadership in Mumbai. Kshirsagar is willing to stand by the government when the going gets difficult. But the same position can create political liabilities at home, particularly when the project affects constituencies where local MLAs are under pressure from farmers. Different Question Kshirsagar’s decision to attack Satej Patil raises a different question. Patil remains one of the most influential political figures in Kolhapur. Suggesting that he may struggle to win the next Assembly election is not routine political criticism. It is an open challenge. That challenge may energise Kshirsagar’s supporters. It may also consolidate his position among those within the ruling establishment who see Patil as a principal political adversary. But there is a danger in confusing political visibility with political strength. Every additional opponent creates another front that has to be managed during an election. And Kshirsagar has already opened several. The most politically revealing part of Kshirsagar’s criticism of Chandradip Narake and Prakash Abitkar. Narake represents a constituency through which the Shaktipeeth project passes. His opposition, therefore, has an obvious electoral logic: he has to respond to the concerns of his voters. Kshirsagar’s criticism of Narake puts him in a difficult position. He is effectively asking another ruling-party MLA to subordinate constituency politics to the government’s larger project. Then came the attack on Abitkar. To publicly accuse the party’s Kolhapur Guardian Minister of failing to strengthen the organisation amounts to washing the party’s dirty linen in public. Ministerial Ambition There is another possible explanation for Kshirsagar’s increasingly combative posture: the unresolved question of ministerial ambition. A three-time MLA would naturally expect that electoral experience and political seniority might eventually translate into a Cabinet berth. Instead, when the opportunity came, Eknath Shinde chose Prakash Abitkar and gave him an important Cabinet portfolio. Kshirsagar was left outside the ministry. His present position on the State Planning Board gives him a role, but it is not the same political currency as a Cabinet berth. It would be simplistic to suggest that every recent statement is merely an expression of that disappointment. But it would be equally naïve to ignore the possibility that political frustration has influenced his increasingly assertive posture. The Shaktipeeth issue may simply have provided the trigger. Kshirsagar should also be looking closely at the arithmetic of Kolhapur North. The constituency has a history of surprising political outcomes. Its old-city peth culture is blunt, politically conscious and capable of producing results that defy conventional calculations. The last Assembly election demonstrated this dramatically. Madhurimaraje Chhatrapati’s withdrawal as the Congress candidate left the Opposition scrambling just weeks before polling. Satej Patil then backed municipal corporator Rajesh Latkar, who entered the contest with barely 15 days to campaign. Yet Latkar secured nearly 81,000 votes. Kshirsagar won by around 23,000 votes, but the number that should concern his camp is not merely his winning margin.

The Desert Dissenter

MBZ’s break with OPEC signals a louder shift in oil geopolitics

For a man who prefers deeds to words, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has once again made news by saying very little. On April 28, the UAE, in a shock move, announced that it would withdraw from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its broader alliance, OPEC+, ending nearly six decades of membership. Against the backdrop of a world convulsed by the United States’ and Israel’s war on Iran, the terse announcement starkly captured the ever-changing dynamics of global energy, and of MBZ’s own ambitions.


To grasp the magnitude of the UAE’s exit, one must return to OPEC’s origins. Founded in 1960 in Baghdad by oil producers determined to wrest control from Western majors (the so-called ‘Seven Sisters’), the cartel had sought to stabilise prices and assert sovereignty over natural resources. For decades it had succeeded, most dramatically during the oil shocks of the 1970s. Yet its coherence has long been under strain. Members from Indonesia to Qatar have exited, chafing at quotas and divergent national interests.


The UAE’s departure, however, is of a different order. With a production capacity approaching 4.8 million barrels per day and ambitions to exceed 5 million by the decade’s end, Abu Dhabi is not a marginal player but a central pillar. Remaining within the cartel, in Emirati eyes, has meant accepting a structural discount on its own capacity.


The recent Iran conflict has sent tremors through energy markets, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of global oil flows. By exiting now, the UAE positions itself to capture the upside of the energy shock, unencumbered by collective restraint that other members may exercise.


But the move has equally to do with the UAE’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia, shaped by the personal friction between MBZ and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, knowns as MBS. For much of the past decade, MBZ was seen as a guiding figure for the younger Mohammed bin Salman, particularly in matters of security and statecraft. Both men shared a distrust of political Islam, a willingness to centralise power and an appetite for economic transformation. But as MBS consolidated authority in Saudi Arabia, he entered into a contest with MBZ for primacy in the Gulf.


The rivalry now plays out across multiple theatres. Economically, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 seeks to lure capital and talent away from Dubai, challenging the UAE’s status as the region’s commercial hub. Riyadh has tightened rules requiring multinational firms to base regional headquarters in the kingdom in an implicit bid to undercut Emirati advantage.


In energy policy, the divergence is starker still. Saudi Arabia has favoured tighter supply management to sustain prices, leveraging its role as OPEC’s de facto leader. The UAE, by contrast, has chafed at quotas that limit its expanding capacity. Disputes over baseline production levels have periodically flared into public disagreement. By exiting OPEC, Abu Dhabi is effectively rejecting Riyadh’s stewardship of the oil order.


Geopolitics has added further friction. While both states initially aligned in conflicts such as Yemen, their approaches have since diverged. The UAE has pursued a more nimble, networked strategy by cultivating ties with Israel through the Abraham Accords, deepening links with Asian powers and hedging its bets in an increasingly multipolar region. Saudi Arabia, under MBS, has sought to assert itself as the indispensable Arab power.


Since consolidating power, MBZ has recast the UAE from a cautious petrostate into an assertive middle power. Investments across Africa, partnerships in Asia and deepening ties with the United States have all served his aim of strategic autonomy. 


Equally important is the transformation of the Emirati economic model. The UAE is now building a diversified energy portfolio spanning gas, petrochemicals, hydrogen and logistics. Exiting the cartel allows the UAE to optimise across sectors, rather than fix policy around a single commodity.


For MBZ, the move to exit the cartel is a calculated gamble. While greater autonomy brings greater exposure to market swings, it also brings the freedom to exploit them. It enhances the UAE’s appeal as a flexible supplier and a strategic partner, particularly for countries seeking reliability amid turbulence. And it cements his reputation as a leader willing to redraw the rules rather than play by them.

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