War’s Unequal Burden
- Sagari Gupta

- 2 hours ago
- 4 min read
War widens every fault line, but the status of women bears the deepest fracture.

War does not affect all bodies in the same way. It reorganises power, access, and survival along lines that already exist. Gender is one of those lines. When conflict begins, it does not create new inequalities. It sharpens the old ones and makes them harder to ignore.
The philosophical case for taking this seriously is straightforward. If a society's baseline distribution of rights, resources, and recognition is already unequal, then any shock to that society will produce unequal consequences. War is not a neutral event. It is a pressure test of existing arrangements. The philosopher Iris Marion Young's concept of structural injustice applies here. Harm does not require a single identifiable perpetrator. It is produced when social structures, norms, and institutional arrangements work together to constrain the lives of some while enabling others. War does not create this structure. It reveals and intensifies it.
Sexual Violence as Tactic
In 2024, the UN Secretary-General's annual report on conflict-related sexual violence (S/2025/389) documented over 4,600 verified cases across 21 countries. Women and girls accounted for 92 percent of those cases, a 25 percent increase from 2023. The UN's own report acknowledges these are a significant undercount. The UN Women, Peace and Security Report (S/2025/556, September 2025) found that documented violations increased by 87 percent over two years. In Sudan alone, demand for survivor support rose by 288 percent from 2023 to 2024, with over 12 million women and girls assessed as being at risk.
This violence is not incidental. It is strategic. It is used to intimidate communities, drive displacement, and fragment social structures. The UN Secretary-General's report lists 63 parties credibly suspected of responsibility. More than 70 percent of those listed have appeared on the same annex for five years or more.
In 2023, over 600 million women and girls lived within 50 kilometres of conflict zones, a 50 percent rise over ten years. The proportion of women killed in armed conflict doubled in the same year. UNHCR recorded 122.6 million forcibly displaced persons globally in 2024, with an estimated 32 million women and girls of reproductive age living in emergency situations.
The WHO technical brief published in February 2026 puts the maternal mortality ratio in conflict-affected countries at 504 deaths per 100,000 live births, against 99 in stable countries. In 2023, an estimated 160,000 women died from preventable maternal causes in conflict-affected settings. That is six in ten maternal deaths worldwide, from countries that account for only one in ten global live births. A 15-year-old girl in a conflict-affected country faced a 1 in 51 lifetime risk of dying from a maternal cause. In a stable country, the figure was 1 in 593.
The International Labour Organization confirms that women perform 76.2 percent of all unpaid care work globally, more than three times as much as men. In 2024, 708 million women were outside the labour force due to care responsibilities, against 40 million men. In conflict settings, where services collapse and household needs multiply, this imbalance widens further. Women sustain households economically while maintaining caregiving roles. The workload expands. Control over resources does not.
On decision-making, the UN Secretary-General's WPS Report (S/2025/556) records that women represented only 18 percent of negotiators in UN-supported peace processes in 2024, down from 23 percent in 2020. In formal peace processes globally, women made up 7 percent of negotiators and 14 percent of mediators. UNSC Resolution 1325 was adopted in 2000. Twenty-five years later, women have not reached even a third of negotiators in any year since its adoption
Projection and Practice
India's position within this framework is specific. As of December 2024, India contributed the highest number of women military experts and staff officers to UN missions globally, 176 personnel, confirmed by the Ministry of External Affairs at its February 2025 conference in New Delhi. India was also the first country to deploy an all-female Formed Police Unit to a UN mission, in Liberia in 2007.
The numbers within India's own contingent tell a different story. As of September 2025, women accounted for 3.4 percent of India's total UN peacekeeping contingent, the lowest proportion among the top ten troop-contributing countries. India's neighbours Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan each deploy a higher share.
More significant is the question of domestic policy. Over 100 UN member states have adopted National Action Plans for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325. India has not, as of May 2025, documented in the WILPF NAP database. India's formal position classifies zones of military deployment as 'disturbed areas' under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958, which removes the institutional logic for adopting the domestic dimensions of a Women, Peace and Security framework.
The cost of that classification is documented. Between May and November 2023, at least 175 persons were killed and more than 60,000 were internally displaced in Manipur. This is recorded in the US State Department's 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: India, published in April 2024. On September 4, 2023, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a formal communication raising alarm over alleged sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, and inadequate humanitarian response in Manipur. The Indian government's position is that these situations fall within domestic law and order jurisdiction.
India advocates internationally for women's participation in peacekeeping and supports the WPS agenda as a foreign policy position. It has not adopted the policy architecture that would make those commitments binding at home. The UN framework does not treat these as separate domains. The evidence of differential impact is not contested. The question is whether India's international commitments and its domestic policy will, at some point, point in the same direction.
(The author is an independent public policy researcher who writes on political economy, climate, and the ethics of everyday systems. Views personal.)





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